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Abstract 
 
The electronic revolution brought with it technological innovations that are now integral 
to communication, business, commerce and the workings of governments all over the 
world.  It also significantly changed the criminal landscape.  Globally it has been 
estimated that crime conducted via the internet (e-crime) costs more than €290 billion 
annually.  Formulating a robust response to cybercrime in law is a top priority for many 
countries that presents ongoing challenges.  New cybercrime trends and behaviours are 
constantly emerging, and debates surrounding legal provisions to deal with them by 
increasing online tracking and surveillance are frequently accompanied by concerns of 
the rights of citizens to freedom, privacy and confidentiality.  This research compares 
the ways that three different legislative frameworks have been navigating these 
challenges.  Specifically, it examines the legal strategies of the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU).  The UAE is 
comparatively inexperienced in this area, its first law to address e-crime was adopted in 
2006, sixteen years after the UK, and so the express purpose of this study is to 
investigate how e-crime legislation in the UAE can be strengthened.  Drawing on a 
range of theoretical resources supplemented with empirical data, this research seeks to 
provide a comprehensive account of how key e-crime legislation has evolved in the 
UAE, the UK and the EU, and to evaluate how effective it has been in tackling 
cybercrime.  Integral to this project is an analysis of some of the past and present 
controversies related to surveillance, data retention, data protection, privacy, non-
disclosure and the public interest.  An important corollary of this research is how e-
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crime legislation is not only aligned with political and economic aims, but when looking 
at the UAE, the discrete ways that legislation can be circumscribed by cultural, social 
and religious norms comes into focus. 
7 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
ACPO   Association of Chief Police Officers 
CFR   Charter of Fundamental Rights  
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union  
CPS   Crown Prosecution Service  
DDoS   Distributed Denial of Service  
DIFC   Dubai International Financial Centre 
DPP   Director of Public Prosecution 
DRIPA  2014 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
Du   Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company  
EC3   European Cybercrime Centre  
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights  
EEA   European Economic Area  
ENISA  European Network and Information Security Agency  
Etisalat  Emirates Telecommunications Corporation 
FATF   Financial Action Task Force  
FSC   Federal Supreme Court  
GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council  
GCHQ  Government Communications Headquarters  
GDPR  General Data Protection Regulation  
IP   Intellectual Property  
8 
 
IPS   Internet service providers   
IPT   Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
IT   Information technology  
ITCs   Information Communication Technologies 
NPCC  National Police Chiefs Council  
NSA   National Security Agency 
NESA  National Electronic Security Authority 
PACE  Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984  
RIPA   Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000  
SIAs   Security and Intelligence Agencies  
SOCA  Serious Organised Crime Agency  
SCEDEA  Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency  
UK   United Kingdom 
UAE   United Arab Emirates 
VoIP   Voice Over Internet Protocol  
VPN   Virtual Private Network 
 
9 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ 3 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... 5 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 7 
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... 9 
Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review ................................................................. 13 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 13 
1.1 The Significance and Importance of the Research Topic .................................................... 15 
1.2 The Scope of the Research .................................................................................................. 21 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives ............................................................................................. 25 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis ......................................................................................................... 26 
1.5 Defining Cybercrime ........................................................................................................... 29 
1.6 The Theoretical Context of and Applicable Social Science Literature on 
Cybercrime ................................................................................................................................ 37 
1.7 Cybercrime Laws in the UK ................................................................................................ 49 
1.8 The European Approach Towards Cybercrime ................................................................... 56 
1.9 Cybercrime Laws in the UAE ............................................................................................. 63 
1.10 The UK Approach Towards Data Protection .................................................................... 71 
1.10.1 The Right to Privacy ..................................................................................... 71 
1.10.2 The UK Data Protection Act 1998 and the European Approach Towards 
Maintaining Privacy ................................................................................................. 79 
1.10.3 The 2012 European Reform Proposals ......................................................... 84 
1.11 Surveillance Laws in the UK ............................................................................................. 88 
10 
 
1.12 Surveillance Laws in the UAE .......................................................................................... 98 
1.13 The UK and European Approach Towards Data Retention ............................................ 100 
1.14 The UK Evidence Rules on Admissibility for Criminal Proceedings ............................. 111 
1.14.1 The UK Evidence Rules Governing Circumstances of Public Policy Non-
Disclosure .............................................................................................................. 118 
1.15 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 123 
Chapter Two: Methodology ..................................................................................................... 127 
2. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 127 
2.1 Ontology ............................................................................................................................ 129 
2.2 Epistemology ..................................................................................................................... 139 
2.3 Research Philosophy ......................................................................................................... 141 
2.4 Research Choices .............................................................................................................. 142 
2.5 Research Design, Approach and Strategy ......................................................................... 143 
2.6 Doctrinal Legal Analysis ................................................................................................... 145 
2.7 Comparative Legal Research ............................................................................................. 147 
2.8 Empirical Legal Research.................................................................................................. 148 
2.9 Researching Sensitive Issues and Ethics ........................................................................... 149 
2.10 Qualitative Interviewing .................................................................................................. 156 
2.11 Sampling .......................................................................................................................... 158 
2.12 Conducting the Interviews and Recording the Data ........................................................ 163 
2.13 Data Quality .................................................................................................................... 164 
2.14 Data Analysis .................................................................................................................. 170 
2.15 Publishing Qualitative Research ..................................................................................... 173 
2.16 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 173 
Chapter Three: The UK’s Main Computer Misuse Offences, RIPA Policing 
Powers, Data Retention and Public Interest Immunity ......................................................... 178 
11 
 
3. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 178 
3.1 The Computer Misuse Act 1990 ....................................................................................... 179 
3.2 Interception, Surveillance, Communications Data Acquisition and Decryption and 
the UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) ............................................... 195 
3.2.1 RIPA and Interception .................................................................................. 202 
3.2.2 RIPA and Surveillance.................................................................................. 207 
3.2.3 RIPA and Decryption.................................................................................... 212 
3.4 Data Retention: The EU Data Retention Directive, the UK Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act 2014 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 ................................ 214 
3.5 Admissibility of Intercepted Communication in Court Proceedings ................................ 226 
3.6 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 230 
Chapter Four: The UAE’s Legislative Framework to Combat E-Crime ............................ 233 
4. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 233 
4.1 The UAE’s Legislative E-Crime Framework .................................................................... 240 
4.2 The Criminal Procedure Law and Procedural Rules Governing Electronic 
Evidence .................................................................................................................................. 259 
4.3 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 274 
Chapter Five: Understanding How to Strengthen E-Crime Legislation in the UAE 
Through Interviews with Senior E-Crime Experts ................................................................ 278 
5. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 278 
5.1 Discussion and Analysis of The Qualitative Interviews ................................................... 280 
5.1.1 Key Findings and the Relevant Literature .................................................... 280 
5.1.2 Legislation for Cybercrime Offences ........................................................... 285 
5.1.3 Surveillance and Data Retention Laws ......................................................... 303 
5.1.4 Privacy and Data Protection ......................................................................... 318 
5.1.5 Evidence Rules on the Admissibility of Digital Evidence and Intercept 
Material in Criminal Proceedings .......................................................................... 322 
12 
 
5.2 Summary ........................................................................................................................... 324 
Chapter Six: Developing a Legal Framework to Combat E-Crime in the UAE ................. 325 
6. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 325 
6.1 Surveillance: Towards a More Preventative and Intelligence-Led Policing Model.......... 327 
6.2 Privacy, Data Protection and Security ............................................................................... 346 
6.3 Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning Combating Information Technology 
Crimes ..................................................................................................................................... 354 
6.4 The Criminal Procedure Law and Procedural Rules Governing Electronic 
Evidence .................................................................................................................................. 358 
6.5 Cooperation ....................................................................................................................... 364 
7. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 370 
8. Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 381 
9. Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 387 
10. Appendices ........................................................................................................................... 488 
10.1.1 Interview Schedules...................................................................................................... 489 
10.1.2 Interview Information Sheet and Consent Form .......................................................... 504 
10.1.3 Example of an Interview Request to a UK Expert ....................................................... 506 
10.1.4 Response Received from a UK Expert to an Interview Request .................................. 507 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter explains the importance of the research. It addresses the topics covered by 
the research, i.e. its scope. Next, the research objectives are presented, followed by an 
overview of the theoretical context and the literature. The purpose of the literature 
review is to identify the core issues from the existing literature with respect to the 
research topic. To this end, a systematic review was conducted and the most recent 
books and papers were consulted in order to identify key legislation, to highlight any 
controversies and the latest developments, including reform proposals in the research 
area.  The literature review draws together a variety of different components - 
cybercrime offences surveillance, data acquisition and retention, data protection, 
network and information security and evidence laws – that are crucial to the formulation 
of a comprehensive legislative framework to combat cybercrime. Specifically, the 
researcher made extensive use of WestLaw, LexisNexis and HeinOnline, and searched 
various journals, such as, the Police Journal, the Computer and Telecommunications 
Law Review, the Archbold Review, Communications Law, the European Human Rights 
Law Review, the Ethics and Information Technology, the Criminal Law Review, the 
European Law Review, Privacy & Data Protection and EU Focus. 
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In terms of the structure, recourse is made to previous research about cybercrime laws, 
surveillance and data retention and protection laws in the UAE, UK and EU, as well as 
UK evidence law rules dealing with admissibility of electronic evidence and intercepted 
communications in criminal court proceedings to prosecute cyber criminals. The reason 
for this is that whilst cybercrime laws proscribe distinct offences, they do not constitute 
the entire legal arsenal necessary to combat cybercrime effectively and to successfully 
prosecute cyber criminals. Grady et al (2007) opine that “policymakers recognise that 
criminalising specific activities is not a complete or sufficient response to the threat of 
hackers, virus writers and cyber-terrorists” and “policymakers have recognised the 
need to facilitate cybersecurity through a variety of mechanisms, including the 
imposition of legal obligations.1 They explain that, for instance, data protection plays an 
essential role since data controllers are obligated to adopt security measures, or are 
required to report security breaches. 
 
Firstly, the literature review defines cybercrime, it examines the theoretical 
criminological context and reviews the existing social science literature in this area. 
Secondly, UK cybercrime laws,, the European approach towards cybercrime, as well as 
cybercrime laws in the UAE are explored. Thirdly, surveillance laws are investigated 
and the approach taken by both the UK and the UAE on this matter is thoroughly 
considered.  Fourthly, how the UK and the European Union has dealt with the issue of 
data retention is  discussed.  Then, the UK approach towards data protection, the right to 
privacy and the UK Data Protection Act 1998 is examined and followed up with the 
                                                 
1 M. Grady, F. Parisi, I. Walden, The Law and Economics of Cybersecurity, Publication Review, 13(2) 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 2007, 78-79, 78 
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European stance on maintaining privacy and the 2012 European reform proposals. 
Finally,  UK evidence rules on admissibility for criminal proceedings, as well asthe 
circumstances in which public policy permits non-disclosure are analysed. 
 
1.1 The Significance and Importance of the Research Topic 
The advent of the internet and the widespread use of mobile phones, tablets and 
computers has not only brought with it many benefits and opportunities, but it has also 
placed governments, businesses and citizens at risk of criminal activity conducted via 
the internet (e-crime). Various terminologies can be used to describe e-crime, such as, 
computer crime, technology crime, online crime, electronic crime, cybercrime, computer 
related crime, high-tech crime and computer misuse.2 For the purposes of this thesis the 
meaning of the terms ‘cybercrime’ and ‘e-crime’ is identical, The UK Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO), now the National Chief Police Council, defines e-crime 
as “The use of networked computers or internet technology to commit or facilitate the 
commission of crime.”3 It has been estimated that globally e-crime costs €290 billion 
annually which exceeds the entire illegal sale of heroin, cocaine and marijuana. 4 
Research about the development of a comprehensive national legislative framework to 
combat e-crime is critical, since it can assist governments around the world to formulate 
                                                 
2 I. Baggili, Digital Forensics and Cybercrime: Second International ICST Conference, ICDF2C 2010, 
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, October 2010, Revised Selected Papers (London, Springer 2011) 2 
3 House of Commons: Home Affairs Committee, Great Britain Parliament, House of Commons - Home 
Affairs Committee: E-Crime - HC 70: Fifth Report of Session 2013-14 (London, TSO Shop 2013) 99 
4 Europol, Cybercrime: A Growing Global Problem, 2014 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec/cybercrime-growing> accessed 15 May 2014 
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an effective response to this newly emerging, and rapidly changing, field by allocating 
“certain burdens and benefits among the citizenry.”5  
 
Cybercrime research is vital for digital economies around the world.  It is an inherently 
global phenomenon which makes it much more difficult to combat than other traditional 
forms of crime. Identification of cyber-criminals through digital footprints raises a 
number of technical problems and prosecution can be very complicated due to 
jurisdictional issues, such as when certain countries may not yet have drawn up any 
specific cybercrime offences.6 Specialised policing and a sophisticated understanding of 
technological issues needs to be developed to secure the ever expanding and borderless 
digital world.7 8  
 
Another continuing concern is that no international cybercrime agreement exists apart 
from the Convention on Cybercrime adopted by the Council of Europe in 2001.9 There 
is no comprehensive and up-to-date international guidance available for the 
development of a strong legislative framework to fight e-crime.10 With the exception of 
Interpol11 and the Virtual Global taskforce (the latter set up to deal with child abuse),12 
there is no other “global cybercrime law enforcement agency”.  Rather, it is the 
                                                 
5 W. A. Edmundson, The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings (Oxford, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc, 1999) 37 
6 R. Miller, F. Cross, The Legal Environment Today: Business In Its Ethical, Regulatory, E-Commerce, 
and Global Setting (7th edn, Mason, South-Western Cengage Learning 2013) 177 
7 C. Hess Orthmann, K. Hess, Criminal Investigation (10th edn, Clifton Parl, Delmar Cengage Learning 
2013) 522 
8 C. Easttom, Computer Crime, Investigation, and the Law (Boston, Cengage Learning 2011) 234 
9 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime 2001 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/185.htm> accessed 7th November 2014 
10 J. Westby, International Guide to Combating Cybercrime (Chicago, ABA Publishing 2003) 61 
11 Interpol, Cybercrime, 2014 <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime> accessed 
7th November 2014 
12 Virtual Global Taskforce, 2014 <http://www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com/> accessed 7th November 2014 
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responsibility of  each country to adopt its own cybercrime legislation and to cooperate 
with each other to prosecute cyber-criminals. Noting that with respect to the EU, the EU 
Cybercrime Centre has been created.13  
 
To create a safe digital space the necessary legal rights, duties and powers have to be 
clearly demarcated. A comprehensive legislative framework to combat cybercrime does 
not solely consist of outlawing certain acts as this is insufficient to combat the already 
mentioned multi-jurisdictional issues that it raises.  Data has to be protected and the 
digital realm has to be surveilled, data also has to be retained and in certain 
circumstances it has to be admissible in court proceedings, whereas in others, 
enforcement agencies have to be able to rely on public policy to prevent disclosure.   
Businesses benefit from the adoption of robust data protection safeguards, as otherwise 
the commercial exchange of data, which has become very important in the information 
age, may be hampered.14 Data protection safeguards make it more difficult for cyber-
criminals to commit security breaches, steal sensitive data and helps preventing data 
loss. These are just some of the complex, diverse and coordinated measures involved in 
securing cyber-space and the development of a legislative framework to analyse and 
implement them requires legal scholarship. This is also critical against the backdrop of 
the recent revelations by Edward Snowden (2014), which highlight that governments 
                                                 
13 S. W. Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal Threats from Cyberspace (Santa Barbara, Greenwood Publishing 
Group 2010) 174; Europol, A Collective EU Response to Cybercrime, 2015 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3> accessed 20 February 2015 
14 Also see Pinsent Masons, US to strengthen Safe Harbour framework for personal data transfers from 
EU by summer, Out-Law.com, 2014 < http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/march/us-to-strengthen-
safe-harbour-framework-for-personal-data-transfers-gfrom-eu-by-summer/> accessed 15 June 2014 
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extensively gather information about their citizens. 15  Edward Snowden acted as a 
whistle-blower and informed the public of the far-reaching and global secret 
surveillance activities conducted by the United States National Security Agency (NSA) 
and other intelligence agencies, and this subsequently sparked a much debate about the 
legality and constitutionality of digital security and surveillance and their impact on the 
right to privacy, civil liberties and human rights. 
 
The UAE is no stranger to cybercrime. Many people in the UAE have suffered financial 
losses from cyber attacks and it has been predicted that these will become more 
sophisticated.16  It is therefore crucial that the UAE adopts an equally sophisticated 
legislative framework to combat e-crime.  In 2006, the UAE government adopted the 
Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on Combating Cybercrime.17 In 2012, the UAE then passed 
Law No. 3 of 2012 on Establishing the National Electronic Security Authority and Law 
No. 5 of 2012 Concerning Combating Information Technology Crimes in order to 
further improve the legislative landscape. 18  Nevertheless, promotion of a digital 
economy requires a proactive stance towards combating e-crime, and this in turn means 
continuously updating and improving legislation. It is for this reason that the research 
will give critical attention to whether the existing cybercrime laws in the UAE are 
effective. To assist with this aim the research will foreground the approach adopted by 
                                                 
15 E. Snowden, What Europe Should Know about US Mass Surveillance, Whistleblower delivers written 
testimony to European Parliament (Original.antiwar.com, 2014) <http://original.antiwar.com/edward-
snowden/2014/03/07/what-europe-should-know-about-us-mass-surveillance/> 30 April 2014 
16 EPOC Messe Frankfurt GmbH, UAE to face advanced cybercrime in 2013 
<http://www.messefrankfurtme.com/frankfurt/1263/for-journalist/technology-production/intersec-middle-
east/industry-news/for-journalists.aspx> accessed 15 May 2014 
17 Gulfnews, Full text of UAE decree on combating cybercrimes, 2012 
<http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/government/full-text-of-uae-decree-on-combating-cyber-crimes-
1.1104040> accessed 16 June 2014 
18 Ibid 
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the UK, as the UK government has been very proactive in its attempts to protect its 
citizens from cybercrime, as can be seen in the following ways: it follows a national 
Cyber Security Strategy, 19  it has created a government agency to monitor 
implementation of the data protection legislation, 20  it has established a National 
Cybercrime Unit,21 it carries out data retention22 and has equipped enforcement agencies 
with wide powers to utilise the UK's state unlimited surveillance capabilities, and23 the 
budget for M15 to conduct research and development in the fields of protective security 
and surveillance technology has significantly increased. 24  Taking into account that 
several of these measures taken by the UK government were driven by and/or in 
response to data retention and protection initiatives taken at the European level, the 
research will make recourse to the relevant EU directives.  
 
The research will also examine the issue of when digital information can/cannot be used 
in criminal proceedings to enforce cybercrime laws. The Scientific Working Group of 
Digital Evidence defines digital evidence as “information of probative value that is 
stored or transmitted in binary form,” it includes evidence on any digital device and is 
                                                 
19 UK Cyber Security Strategy, Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world, November 2011, 1-43 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60961/uk-cyber-security-
strategy-final.pdf> accessed 3rd December 2014 
20 Information Commissioner's Office, Data Protection, 2014 
<https://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection> accessed 3rd December 2014 
21 National Crime Agency, National Cybercrime Unit, 2014 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/national-cyber-crime-unit> accessed 3rd 
December 2014 
22 For instance, see the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
23 C. Cadwalladr, Edward Snowden: state surveillance in Britain has no limits, Guardian, 12 October 2014 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/12/snowden-state-surveillance-britain-no-limits> accessed 
1st December 2014 
24 P. Wilkinson, Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack Since 9/11 
(Abingdon, Routledge 2007) 190 
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not limited to cybercrimes, but extends to traditional crimes.25 Indeed, the unique nature 
of digital information raises a number of thorny legal issues, as the search and seizure of 
electronic data requires adherence to protocols and rules to ensure that the authenticity 
of the evidence does not become undermined and to regulate the extent to which 
searches are deemed lawful.26  
 
Clearly, not all information, which is being gathered and retained, should be used as 
electronic evidence in criminal court proceedings.  It is imperative that digital 
information which has been collected at a crime scene is distinguished from covertly 
collected information used for policing purposes. 27  In certain situations the public 
interest could be compromised through a disclosure of such information.28 The adoption 
of such evidence rules is therefore an important building block to create a framework 
which reinforces “impartiality, transparency, effectiveness, and fairness” in order to 
promote the rule of law.29 It also facilitates co-operation between enforcement agencies, 
including international cooperation, which is crucial to combat cybercrime effectively.30 
Ultimately, the research seeks to contribute to the ongoing, hotly contested and pressing 
legal debates of how best to secure the digital space.  In sum, it is an issue concerning 
“update[ing] legislation and regulation in a timely manner [to avoid]...catastrophic 
                                                 
25 S. K. Prasad, S. Routray, R. Khurana, Information Systems, Technology and Management (Berlin, 
Springer-Verlag 2009) 179 
26 D. Littlejohn Shinder, M. Cross, Scene of the Cybercrime (Burlington, Syngress Publishing Inc 2008) 
642-643 
27 J. Sammens, J. Rajewski, The Basics of Digital Forensics: The Primer For Getting in Digital Forensics 
(Elsevier Inc 2012) 46 
28 A. Keane, P. McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 560 
29 J. E. J. Prins, P. M. A. Ribbers, Trust in Electronic Commerce: The Role of Trust from a Legal, an 
Organizational and a Technical Point of View (Kluwer Law International 2002) 277 
30 Council of Europe, Action against economic crime, Resources: International cooperation against 
cybercrime, 2014 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Internationalcooperation/d
efault_en.asp> accessed 3 May 2014 
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consequences because technology advances occur frequently and subsequent advances 
in cyber-warfare and cyber-crime keep pace.”31  
 
1.2 The Scope of the Research 
The research aim is to compare the legislative frameworks of the UAE, the UK and the 
EU, and to consider the most appropriate e-crime framework for the UAE.  Integral to 
this aim is the issue of rendering the digital environment in the UAE safer through 
improved cybercrime laws. Consequently, the thesis explores and evaluates what 
appears to be working effectively in the UK and the EU, what are the elements of best 
practice and how relevant these are for the UAE context. Five senior experts in the field 
of cybercrime from the UAE are interviewed, namely from the judiciary, the police, 
Interpol, the office of prosecution and the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority in 
order to ascertain how effective the existing legislative regime is and how it might be 
improved.  Whilst the UAE has a different culture than the UK and the EU, the thesis 
does not draw examples from other Middle Eastern countries, such as Bahrain and 
Qatar, as the fight against cybercrime is global and technical in nature, and thus 
transcends local traditions and culture.   
 
Cybercrime laws, surveillance, data retention and data protection laws in the UAE, UK 
and EU, as well as UK evidence law rules dealing with admissibility of electronic 
evidence and intercept material in criminal court proceedings in order to prosecute 
cyber-criminals are investigated. Hence, the cybercrime offences, which the UK and 
                                                 
31 M. Gregory, D. Glance, Security and the Networked Society (London, Springer 2013) 1-2 
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UAE have adopted, as well as the European approach in respect of cybercrime, are 
critically analysed. UK surveillance laws are discussed in order to identify the powers, 
which enforcement agencies can utilise to investigate cybercrime. Additionally, UK and 
European data retention laws are reviewed, as they form an integral part in the fight 
against cybercrime.32 The UK legal framework to secure privacy and data protection, 33 
and the European approach towards maintaining privacy are investigated, including the 
2012 reform proposals to adequately safeguard personal data and those regarding 
network and information security. 34  The UK evidence rules on admissibility of 
electronic evidence are discussed for criminal proceedings, including in relation to 
covertly collected information.  Recourse is made to public policy, which permits non-
disclosure in certain circumstances.35 Hence, the research does not only discuss the 
cybercrime offences, but also scrutinises the treatment of electronic information and 
evidence from the perspective of effectively combating cybercrime.  
Essentially, the scope of the research is limited to discussing the following: firstly UK 
and UAE laws which set out e-crime offences and the European approach; secondly the 
UK laws which permit enforcement agencies to carry out surveillance and other 
proactive methods to combat cybercrime; thirdly, UK, European and UAE laws which 
deal with data retention, data protection and network and information security; and 
fourthly, UK and UAE evidence rules which govern the admissibility of digital evidence 
                                                 
32 For instance, UK legislation, such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which permits 
companies and enforcement agencies to collect electronic data, will be scrutinised.  
33 R. Subramanian, Computer Security, Privacy, and Politics: Current Issues, Challenge, and Solutions 
(IRM Press 2008) 61 
34 European Commission, Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of the data protection rules, 
2012 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en.htm> accessed 1st May 
2014 
35 A. Keane, P. McKeown, The Modern Law of Evidence (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 
especially Chapter  9 
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and intercept material in criminal court proceedings. The Sharia Law will not be 
explored in depth and will not be in the scope of this research. It is noted that the focus 
will not only be on the traditional form of cybercrime, but also on the more general use 
of technology and the internet in commiting crimes in the real world. In this sense, as it 
is discussed in the body of this thesis, and more specifically in the part defining 
cybercrimes, the term ‘cybercrime’ for the purposes of this thesis encompasses the use 
of the internet in facilitating traditional crimes, and for this reason parts of the 
discussion focus on the use of measures to prevent the facilitation of such ‘real world’ 
crimes with the assistance of technology and the internet. It is highlighted that the aim of 
the thesis is not to cover the full spectrum of cybercrimes, even though reference may be 
made to different forms of cybercrime, the focus is on network assisted crimes.  
 
As already indicated, the research focuses on the UK, the European Union and the UAE, 
excluding any other jurisdictions. The UK’s key Act is the Computer Misuse Act 1990, 
as amended by the Police and Justice Act 2006, though various other Acts can be also 
utilised to bring cyber criminals to justice.36  The Computer Misuse Act was adopted in 
1990, i.e. “before the cyberspatial explosion that was delivered by the internet”37 and a 
study, which would be limited to this Act, would be too narrow. Instead, the digital 
realm is rendered more secure in Europe since additional steps have been taken to 
safeguard the digital space, including through surveillance and data retention.38 Yet this 
                                                 
36 J. X. Kelly, Computer Misuse Overview, JISC Legal Information, 2007 
<http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/LegalAreas/ComputerMisuse/ComputerMisuseOverview.aspx> accessed 17 
June 2014 
37 N. MacEwan, The Computer Misuse Act 1990: lessons from its past and predictions for its future, 12 
Criminal Law Review 2008, 955-967, 966 
38 I. M. Portela, M. Manuela Cruz-Cunha, Information Communication Technology Law, Protection, and 
Access Rights Global Approaches and Issues (Hershey PA, IGI Global 2010) 368; A. V. M. Leong, The 
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is not to say that the researcher does not acknowledge the tension that exists between 
safeguarding fundamental human rights, particularly the right to privacy, on the one 
hand, and the work by enforcement agencies who conduct surveillance on the other.  
This is a highly conflictual topic that raises pertinent questions about what data is 
required by these enforcement agencies and what should be considered permissible in an 
increasingly technologically-driven world, and as shall be shown in this thesis the 
answers to these questions are dependent upon cultural and social norms, and political 
and economic considerations.39  
 
The research makes recourse to case law, as well as government strategies, policies, 
protocols and procedures. A comprehensive legislative framework to combat e-crime 
has to be complemented by an appropriate government strategy and policies, and it 
requires enforcement agencies to adopt technical and investigative standards, protocols 
and procedures.40  For instance, it is pivotal that particular procedures are followed to 
ensure that electronic evidence is authentic and in the UK, the ACPO, now the National 
Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) has published the Good Practice Guide for Digital 
Evidence 2011, the Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence and 
the Good Practice Guide for Managers of e-Crime investigation. 41  Best practice 
                                                                                                                                               
Disruption of International Organised Crime: An Analysis of Legal and Non-Legal Strategies (Aldershot, 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd 2007) 171 
39 R. A. Cropf, T. C. Bagwell, Ethical Issues and Citizen Rights in the Era of Digital Government 
Surveillance (Hershey, Information Science Reference 2016) 95 
40 E. U. Savona, Crime and Technology: New Frontiers for Regulation, Law Enforcement and Research 
(Dordrecht, Springer 2004) 51 
41 The Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence 2012, 
<http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2011/201110-cba-digital-evidence-v5.pdf> accessed 2 May 
2014; the Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic 
Evidence, <http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence.pdf> 2 
May 2014; the Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Managers of e-Crime 
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guidance has also been adopted for forensics, 42 and whilst the thesis refers to best 
practice guidance, the technical procedures are not discussed, as this would exceed the 
scope of this research.  The research emphasis is firmly placed on law, as opposed to 
technology and forensics.  Given that the focus is case law, the research does not 
investigate the way in which cyber-criminals operate or how technology can be 
employed to capture cyber criminals or to gather digital information; it is not concerned 
with Information Technology and Information Communications Technology, neither is 
it concerned with the behaviour of offenders in this context.   
 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The research aim is to comprehensively analyse and to critically compare the legislative 
frameworks which the UK, the EU and the UAE have adopted to combat e-crime.  To 
meet this research aim an exploration and evaluation of the following topics will be 
required: 
 
1. UK cybercrime offences legislation.  
2. UK surveillance and UK and EU data retention laws.  
3. UK and EU privacy, data protection, and network and information security laws. 
                                                                                                                                               
Investigation, <http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2011/201103CRIECI14.pdf> accessed 2 May 
2014 
42 For example, see the Codes of Practice and Conduct for forensic science providers and practitioners in 
the Criminal Justice System, Version 1.0, 2011 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118949/codes-practice-
conduct.pdf> accessed 2 May 2014; ENFSI Working Group Forensic IT, Guidelines for Best Practice in 
the Forensic Examination of Digital Technology 2009, 
<http://www.enfsi.eu/sites/default/files/documents/forensic_it_best_practice_guide_v6_0.pdf> accessed 2 
May 2014 
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4. UK evidence rules on the admissibility of digital evidence and intercept material 
in criminal proceedings.  
5. The effectiveness of UAE’s legislative framework to combat e-crime.  
 
It is intended that these research objectives will help with generating and promulgating 
recommendations which will strengthen the existing legislative e-crime landscape and 
result in cybercrime being more effectively combated in the UAE. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter One introduces the research topic and its significance to the literature on e-
crime legislation.  It explains the scope of the research, the research aim and objectives 
and provides an overview of the theoretical context of the thesis. Previous research 
about cyber criminology and relevant social science literature, cybercrime laws, 
surveillance and data retention laws in the UAE, UK and EU are investigated, as well as 
UK evidence law rules dealing with admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal 
court proceedings in order to prosecute cyber criminals.  
 
Chapter Two is the Methodology. It presents the ontology, epistemology, philosophy, 
design, strategy and choices which undergird the research project. As a mixed method 
research approach has been chosen, this chapter makes recourse to doctrinal legal 
analysis/the black letter law approach, the comparative method and empirical research. 
It explains why the positivist approach was chosen to supplement the interpretative 
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stance in the form of a qualitative segment (interviews with different stakeholders). 
Furthermore, the chapter discusses how sensitive issues were addressed and ethics were 
maintained throughout the research process.  Additionally, it describes how participant 
observation was conducted, the qualitative interviewing technique and the type of 
sampling, which were used. Moreover, the setting which was chosen for the interviews 
is outlined, as well as the method of recording and how data quality was achieved. It is 
also explicated how the data was analysed and why the research findings are said to be 
reliable and valid.  
 
Chapter Three explores the literature and commences with an examination of the UK 
Computer Misuse Act 1990, as well as other relevant legislation and case law. 
Thereafter, the topics of interception, surveillance, communications data acquisition and 
decryption are discussed in the context of the UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 (RIPA). RIPA is analysed since this Act empowers many enforcement 
agencies “to intercept communications [and] to acquire existing communications data 
(data held as a result of data retention...) to perform surveillance, and to demand 
encryption keys”, though brief recourse is also be made to UK government 
programmes. 43  Subsequently, the EU and UK approach towards data retention is 
analysed, including the now defunct EU Data Retention Directive, as well as the 
(temporary and now expired) UK Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Thereafter, relevant UK evidence law rules, 
                                                 
43 P. Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 2014) 104-
105 
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which deal with admissibility of intercepted communication in court proceedings, are 
considered. 
 
Chapter Four investigates the legislative framework, which the UAE has adopted to 
combat e-crime. Recourse is made, for instance, to Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on 
combating cybercrime; Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning Combating Information 
Technology Crimes and Law No. 3 of 2012 on Establishing the National Electronic 
Security Authority. It is scrutinised how these laws achieve that the digital space is 
being secured in the UAE. The extent to which these laws equip enforcement agencies 
with the power to collect information is analysed. The circumstances in which electronic 
information can be used as electronic evidence criminal prosecutions is critically 
evaluated. Recourse is made to reported e-crime cases. The existing legislative gaps are 
critically investigated. 
 
Chapter Five analyses interviews with five senior experts in the field of cyber-crime.  
Namely: from the judiciary, the police, Interpol, the office of prosecution and the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. Their experiences and views are critically 
presented, as well as their suggestions and recommendations for improvement.   
 
Chapters Six reviews the theoretical and empirical chapters to formulate a new legal 
framework for the UAE. Chapter Six considers surveillance, privacy, data protection, 
security, the existing federal laws, the criminal procedure law and procedural laws 
governing electronic evidence in the UAE to see how these can be overhauled.   Also 
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this chapter review, evaluate, distil and amend some of the primary areas of law that 
need to be addressed in tackling e-crime based on the black-letter law analysis and the 
comparative findings, as well as the practical suggestions from the interviews.  
 
 
 
1.5 Defining Cybercrime 
In the context of this thesis the term ‘cybercrime’ has a wider meaning, as it includes 
network assisted crimes, which essentially means crimes committed in the real world 
which have been facilitated by the use of internet/cyberspace. David Wall (2007) argues 
that maybe the term ‘cybercrime’ has been misused, arguing that the term ‘cyberspace 
crime’ may have been a better fit. Wall contends that: 
 
 “the term has greater meaning if we construct it in terms of the transformation of 
criminal or harmful behaviour by networked technology, rather than simply the 
behaviour itself…the words cyber and crime actually sit well together linguistically. 
This linkage becomes more significant if we understand cybercrimes as crimes which 
are mediated by networked technology and not just computer44.”  
 
 
Sah and Vinent (2013) observe that whilst the internet is a great tool to develop and 
create, it also has the ability to damage and disrupt, especially since the world has 
                                                 
44 D. Wall, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age, (Polity Press, 2007). 
 
30 
 
become very dependent on information technology (IT) and as a result, is an interesting 
space for crime.45 As the internet has become a global communication medium for the 
private and public sector, extremely sensitive data is being transmitted and this has made 
it prone to security violations committed by, amongst others, criminals.46Thomas and 
Loader (2003) state that “[c]ybercrime can be regarded as computer-mediated activities 
which are either illegal or considered illicit by certain parties and which can be 
conducted through global electronic networks” 47  According to the European 
Commission, the terms “cybercrime”, “computer-related crime”, “computer crime” 
and “high tech crime” can be employed interchangeably.48 Lestrade DATE notes that 
cybercrime has become widely understood to denote the phenomenon of unauthorised or 
criminal acts, which are perpetrated remotely due to the availability of internet 
technology.49  
As noted by Goldsmith (2013), computer systems are extremely complex and this can 
cause malfunctions and result in vulnerabilities which can be exploited by cyber 
criminals in any number of ways. 50  “The aggressor has to find only one crucial 
                                                 
45 N. Sah, V. Vinent, Cyber attack = armed attack? The implications and the challenges, 19(8) Computer 
and Telecommunications Law Review 2013, 226-233, 226 
46 E. Lestrade, The cybercrime phenomenon and Latvian cybercrime law, European Newsletter 2006, 1-5, 
1 
47 D. Thomas, B. Loader, Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security and Surveillance in the Information 
Age (London, Routledge 2000) 3; cited from N. Jarvie, Control of cybercrime - is an end to our privacy on 
the Internet a price worth paying? Part 1, 9(3) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 2003, 76-
81, 78 
48 Communication from Commission to European Parliament: 2000, Creating a Safer Information Society 
by combating Computer-related Crime <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0890> accessed 20th January 2015; N. Jarvie, Control of 
cybercrime - is an end to our privacy on the Internet a price worth paying? Part 1, 9(3) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 2003, 76-81, 77-78 
49 E. Lestrade, The cybercrime phenomenon and Latvian cybercrime law, European Newsletter 2006, 1-5, 
1 
50 Jack Goldsmith, How cyber changes the laws of war, 24(1) European Journal of International Law 
2013, 129-138, 130 
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weakness; the defender has to find all of them and in advance”.51 For instance, malware 
can be installed on a user's electronic device without this being known and can then be 
used for criminal purposes. 52  Cyber attacks can be launched to pursue criminal 
objectives, for instance, to steal information and transfer money, to extort money for 
unlocking infected computers, to sabotage important infrastructure, to illegally exert 
pressure, e.g. to tarnish the reputation of a company, to spy or illegally gather 
information and often these cyber attacks are perpetrated by organised crime and 
millions of computers can be compromised, as happened in March 2009 when malicious 
software was used to generate botnets,53 which infected computers in over 100 countries 
and gathered sensitive information. 54 Moreover, Brannan points out that social 
networking sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, can be used for sexual predation and 
child grooming, cyber-harassment, bullying and stalking, to send threatening messages 
or to incite social unrest.55  
MacEwan highlights that deception-based crime is common within cyberspace. Phising 
is a common form of deception to perpetrate internet fraud, it occurs when individuals 
are encouraged to provide private data.56 The Anti-Phishing Working Group defines 
phising as “a criminal mechanism employing both social engineering and technical 
                                                 
51 H. Kahn, E. Jones, On Thermonuclear War (London, Transaction Publishers 2007) 535; cited from Jack 
Goldsmith, How cyber changes the laws of war, 24(1) European Journal of International Law 2013, 129-
138, 130-131 
52 Ibid (Goldsmith) 131 
53 A botnet is a robot network: N. MacEwan, A tricky situation: deception in cyberspace, 77(5) Journal of 
Criminal Law 2013, 417-432, 419 
54 EU Focus 2010, Commission proposes boosting Europe's defences against cyber-attacks, 277, 22-23, 22 
55 J. Brannan, Crime and social networking sites, 1 Juridical Review 2013, 41-51, 41 
56 N. MacEwan, A tricky situation: deception in cyberspace, 77(5) Journal of Criminal Law 2013, 417-
432, 418 
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subterfuge.”57 Very often malware is installed in form of a Trojan, i.e. the threat goes 
unnoticed by the anti-virus software of the electronic device and malware becomes 
installed, for instance, by the user clicking on a website or a link, which results in the 
malware being downloaded and the device becoming infected and spyware being 
installed.58Digital extortion may occur in these circumstances, in 2013, Europol closed 
down a criminal network which was distributing malware on users' computers, it 
generated a pop-up window with the message that the computer had been locked and 
stated that images about sexual abuse were on the computer and that it would only be 
unlocked if a fine was paid.59 It is not just computers that are vulnerable, but other 
digital devices and smartphones have become targets for cybercrime attacks. 60 
Additionally, the webpages of companies or organisations may be targeted by cyber 
criminals who send them a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack to shut down 
their webpage using botnets (a robot network), attacks such as these can be used to steal 
sensitive data or Intellectual Property (IP).61 Sensitive information can also be stolen by 
hackers who are able to gain unauthorised access by bypassing or circumventing the 
security mechanisms of a network or information system.62 Moreover, cyber criminals 
                                                 
57 Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), Phishing Activity Trends Report, 2nd Quarter 2012, 2, 
available at http://www.apwg.org/resources/apwg-reports/, accessed 13 August 2013; N. MacEwan, A 
tricky situation: deception in cyberspace, 77(5) Journal of Criminal Law 2013, 417-432, 419 
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432, 420 
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can employ viruses, which attack or destroy the system, or worms that can impair the 
system or overload it.63 In short, cybercrime takes a multitude of diverse forms. 
Longo (2013) writes that cybercrimes can be divided into three groups.  Firstly, crimes 
which are directed against a particular computer or a network infrastructure or a 
particular part in order to change, destroy, harm or steal data or equipment; secondly, 
crimes which are directed against organisations or persons and for this purpose their 
computer networks or computers are targeted, for instance, cybercrimes, such as identity 
theft or credit card fraud; and thirdly, crimes which are committed through data which is 
being stored, exchanged or generated and an example is child pornography.64 Longo 
(2013) describes the distinction between cybercrime and crime as “virtually 
seamless.” 65  Furthermore, Lestrade characterises certain distinct features that are 
intrinsic to the cybercrime phenomenon: new forms of crime emerge as a result of the 
internet, criminal offences are perpetrated in a new venue, i.e. in cyberspace which has 
no borders and where criminals can be far from their victims, the mere availability of a 
network that enables criminals to perpetrate cybercrimes, and resultantly new legal, 
technical and procedural measures which have to be adopted to combat it.66 
Rahman et al (2009) concur that existing laws are insufficient to police the vast digital 
world which are exacerbated by its sovereignless nature.67 Equally, traditional forms of 
policing are incapable of  dealing with cybercrimes, for instance, community-oriented 
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policing strategies are ineffective in catching cyber criminals, particularly since 
criminals can often remain anonymous when committing crimes and criminals can be 
based in different countries around the world.68 Walker et al (2006) highlight that when 
cybercrime is committed there are more invisible venues than visible venues and that 
there is also more faceless crime making investigation and prosecution much more 
difficult.69 In cyberspace computers are globally linked which makes it harder for law 
enforcement agents to deter individuals from committing cybercrimes.  A central issue 
is that domestic law enforcement agencies rely on their counterparts in other countries 
who may be slow to cooperate, this is turn makes it easier for cyber criminals to avoid 
prosecution, and even in cases where cooperation is forthcoming, investigating 
cybercrime is resource-intensive and in other cases it simply is not possible to identify 
cyber criminals with sufficient certainty due to the anonymity which exists within the 
virtual realm.70  
 
McCusker (2003) suggests that the inherently global nature of the internet requires 
international regulation, as opposed to national regulation, but points out that this has 
not yet been fully achieved.71 In 1990, the United Nations passed a resolution about 
computer crime legislation in Havana during a Congress about the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders, and in 1994, the United Nations Manual on the 
Prevention of Computer-related Crime was prepared, however, Rychlicki (2006) notes 
                                                 
68 D. Walker, D. Brock, T. R. Stuart, Faceless-orientated policing: traditional policing theories are not 
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that this has not been revised and is no longer up to date due to rapid technological 
advances.72Similarly, the UN recognises that “[l]aws, criminal justice systems and 
international co-operation have not kept pace with technological change. Only a few 
countries have adequate laws to address the problem, and of these, not one has resolved 
all of the legal, enforcement and prevention problems.”73 Nevertheless, the International 
Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) renders assistance and co-operates with law 
enforcement officers from around the world and included in its remit are IT crimes.74 
Rychlicki (2006), explicates that Interpol hosts a convention entitled the European 
Working Party on Information Technology Crime  and at this convention, the 
Information Technology Crime Investigation Manual was produced.75 
 
Respecting this international context, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
2001 was adopted by several countries. Carr and Williams (2001) explain that the 
Convention distinguishes four types of offences:  
1. Those which contravene confidentiality and affect the availability and integrity 
of computer systems and data. 
2. Computer-related crimes, such as computer fraud.  
3. Copyright offences. 
4. Content offences, such as child pornography. 
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The penalties for the above offences are left to the state parties to determine.76 Liability 
can also be imposed on legal entities, such as corporations, when they benefit from the 
commission of an offence, but only when the action is attributable to key personnel.77 
Jerome (2012) explains that the Convention does not obligate state parties to provide 
mutual assistance when this contravenes the national law of the state party, or when the 
state deems that the request contravenes its security, sovereignty, public order or other 
important national interests.78 Extradition of a cyber criminal who is a national of the 
requested state may be refused if the state has domestic laws in place to punish the 
person for the offences stipulated in the Convention, or where the request contravenes 
the national laws and reservations can be entered to the Convention.79 A drawback is 
that these caveats could undermine the overall effectiveness of the Convention.   
The failure to adopt any other international treaty and the difficulties in combating 
cybercrime at the domestic level highlight, as Gersch (2012) observes, “the law[’s] 
struggle to keep up with the pace of technical innovation.”80 Cybercrime is a unique, 
unorthodox and extraordinary phenomenon which raises the question as to whether 
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traditional criminological theories which deal with physical crimes can be extended to 
the digital realm,81this is the focus of the next section. 
 
1.6 The Theoretical Context of and Applicable Social Science 
Literature on Cybercrime  
 
The World Wide Web and computers have become an integral aspect of modern human 
life.  They are used in multiple modes of communications, commerce, and government, 
but the technological innovation which has given rise to the e-revolution has equally 
created new opportunities for deviant behaviour.82 Criminological studies have been 
conducted in order to explain different types of cybercrimes and to test to what extent 
conventional theories can be applied to the digital age.83 
 
Classical criminology considers that persons commit crime after weighing up the 
benefits and costs i.e. that crime is the consequence of a rational and calculated 
decision.84 It is therefore important that people are deterred from committing crimes and 
this requires severe and prompt punishment.85 The positivist school within criminology 
points out that crime is caused by psychological, biological and social factors, which 
persons cannot control and therefore does not favour punishment, but that instead the 
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factors which caused the crime are “treated” and therefore focuses on rehabilitation.86 
However, this school has largely become replaced by the neoclassical school which 
focuses on the person, choice and individual responsibility.87 With the advent of the 
digital age, countries adopted cybercrime legislation in order to send out a clear message 
that these types of crime result in punishment in line with the classical and neo-classical 
school of thought.88 The neo-classical school of thought advocates a deterrence model, 
but in comparison to the classical school of thought the neo-classical school also 
considered the circumstances of the person or the particular situation in order to impose 
a stricter or more lenient sentence.89 
 
However, this is not the only theoretical view. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) explain 
that the “motive to crime is inherent or limited to immediate gains provided by the act 
itself” and “there is no larger purpose behind...theft, or insider trading” and thus 
espouse a “general theory of crime.”90 Certain characteristics, such as inability to self-
control, can result in impulsive behaviour since immediate benefits are thereby reached 
without reflection about the consequences and risks.91 This may render individuals more 
vulnerable and expose them to offender groups, thereby increasing the chance of 
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victimisation.92  Empirical studies have also established that limited individual self-
control can be linked to particular types of cybercrime and this includes software 
piracy,93 illicit music downloads and online pornography.94 Yet it may also be argued 
that young people often do not consider that their behaviour is criminal, the act can be 
done with ease and because they consider it unlikely that they will be caught. Another 
study supports Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory i.e. that a lack of self-control increases 
the chances of cyber stalking, since persons who lack self-control are not strong enough 
to resist participating in such behaviour and are unable to appreciate the consequences 
which flow from this.95 Nonetheless, whilst this argument appears more convincing with 
illegal downloads, it is not as persuasive in relation to cyberstalking where it is unlikely 
that this is the only motivator in this case. However, an empirical study which tested 
whether self-control could account for different types of cybercrime victimisation found 
that there was no direct link i.e. the loss of digital data as a result of malware infection 
or the theft of banking passwords had no correlation to any discrete characteristics or 
choices of a victim. 96  Victims of cybercrime are very rarely at fault, though low 
computer literacy might be viewed as a contributing factor. Computers can become 
infected by viruses without any communication between the perpetrator and the 
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victim.97 It was established that self-control was only relevant when a particular person 
was targeted.98 Other studies have produced mixed findings about the link between 
computer hacking and a lack of self-control, thereby not fully endorsing this general 
theory of crime.99 Moreover, critics say that crime cannot be reduced to one factor in 
this way.100  
 
Akers advocates a “social learning theory” and explains that individuals can choose to 
learn or to unlearn certain acts and this includes learning/unlearning restrains.101 This 
theory posits that persons adopt deviant behaviour and opt for a criminal career because 
their particular learning process exposes them to various associations, for instance, peers 
engage in deviant behaviour102, these deviant behaviour patterns are imitated and then 
there is reinforcement of such behaviour, e.g. in the form of prospective benefits and 
disadvantages.103 Social learning is very relevant to cybercrime since the perpetrator has 
to learn technical skills and procedures to use the computer illicitly. 104  Research 
confirms that three constitutive aspects of social learning theory can be found in respect 
to cybercrime:  
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1. People prefer that laws are violated which govern how computers 
and the internet are used.105  
2. There exist illegal computer models which they can copy.106 
3. They are encouraged to breach computer laws.107  
 
Research also found that those who socialise with deviant groups are more prone to 
cyber stalk others, thereby confirming Akers' theory.108  Another study points out that 
self-control is not as critical when compared to having peers who engage in deviant 
behaviour.109 Hence, in the context of cyber-stalking, the social learning theory and lack 
of self-control have been linked.110 Individuals who regularly associate with deviant 
peers and find it hard to control their impulses were more prone to cyber stalk other 
juveniles.111 
 
Furthermore, empirical research highlights that the same risk factors which are present 
when online victimisation occurs also exist in respect of hacking.112 A lack of self-
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control was found to lead to a higher probability of both online harassment and hacking, 
though a person’s online behaviour was thought to carry certain consequences, for 
instance, regular social media use increased the chance of online harassment.113   
 
The occurrence of crime can also be explained through the lens of cultural deviance 
theory, which focuses on the practices, assumptions, beliefs and values of societies and 
sub-groups which encourage deviant conduct and this is linked to social learning theory 
i.e. social learning can be influenced by cultural deviance.114  The sub-cultural and 
social learning approaches thus argue that groups have the same values and this can be 
applied in the virtual realm, particularly to hackers who often learn their skills from 
peers.115 Computer-aided communications and the internet can thus promote the creation 
of illegal subcultures.116 For instance, subcultures of computer hacking and malware 
writing have emerged.117 It was found that the majority of these hackers were young 
men who were members of a culture which promoted the sharing of information, skills 
and beliefs; they were often graduates who were extremely skilled and regularly 
networked with each other. 118  Moreover, empirical research has found that online 
subcultures of sexual deviants have emerged.119 Hence, the internet allows people with 
deviant interests to connect and engage in deviant behaviour. 
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A similar theory to cultural deviance theory is social disorganisation theory, which 
considers that geographical places and social control are related to crime. 120  This 
perspective has also become known as the Chicago School.121 This is because the initial 
advocates - Shaw and McKay (1942) – promulgated this model by studying the rates of 
juvenile arrests in Chicago. 122  Shaw and McKay employed Park, Burgess and 
McKenzie's (1925) concentric zone model which divided Chicago into five different 
zones, commencing with the city centre and ending with the outer boundaries.123 They 
found that crime decreased the further the location was away from the centre, 
irrespective of the type of neighbourhood or ethnic group which lived there, though in 
certain transitioning areas crime rates were continuously high.124 The results suggested 
that delinquency rates in city areas were linked to poverty, a diverse ethnic spread and 
instability within the community. 125   Shaw and McKay (1942) contend that social 
disorganisation is at the heart of delinquency; it is the result of a deficiency of mutual 
values, inadequate social control within the community and is influenced by the location 
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and neighbourhood, as opposed to individual characteristics.126 The core argument of 
this theory is that disordered and fragile communities are more prone to higher crime 
rates since their members become connected to their environment and positively link 
this with their commitment to combating crime.127  In sum, the characteristics of a 
neighbourhood have an impact on the crime rate.128 In the context of cybercrime, this 
theory suggests that steps should be taken to develop a strong attachment amongst the 
online community in order to combat cybercrime, and there are websites which do this, 
they are regularly visited and are used for the exchange of opinions, and to tag and rate 
posts, utilising these communities could be an effective strategy in fighting 
cybercrime.129 However, even strong networks can become deviant or develop deviancy. 
 
Another important theory, which is a derivative of the previous theory, is situational 
crime prevention theory.130 Clarke (1980) points out that individuals are being motivated 
to commit crime by a mixture of immediately arising situational factors, which fit the 
particular characteristics of the person's past and aspects which match the present 
situation of the person. 131  Accordingly, proponents of situational crime prevention 
theory argue that a systematic eradication of opportunities to commit crime substantially 
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reduces the overall crime rate.132 However, so long as criminal motivation is not also 
diminished, this view may be challenged and it is therefore best to perceive crime as the 
result of interplay between opportunity and motivation. 133 It has therefore been argued 
that cybercrime arises because the internet affords anonymity and therefore has a 
disinhibition effect.134 This may also explain the occurrence of cyber stalking. This 
theory is thus insightful in the context of cybercrime since it emphasises the importance 
of defending targets, for instance, through the use of safe passwords.135  
 
A similar theory is opportunity theory because situational crime prevention depends on 
opportunity. 136  An opportunity arises and individuals feel more empowered to 
misbehave due to the “dissociative anonymity” which the internet offers.137 Mayhew et 
al (1973) point out that opportunities can be described in many different ways and 
therefore distinguish between opportunities which relate to persons, for instance, the 
chance to be victimised, and opportunities which depend on objects, for instance, the 
security of the item, the degree of surveillance, the attractiveness of the item and 
opportunities can therefore depend on a multitude of factors which determine how much 
risk, effort will be expended.138 Opportunity theory employs a “rational choice theory 
for offending” because it is assumed that perpetrators weigh up possible gains against 
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detriments and this perspective is implicitly accepted by situational crime prevention 
theory.139 This theory can be perceived as a species of deterrence theory, for instance, by 
rendering it more difficult for online criminals to launch phishing attacks, the cost-
benefit assessment shifts and results in criminals becoming deterred.140 
 
Another derivative of the Chicago School is Felson and Cohen's (1979) “routine 
activities theory” which holds that property or personal crimes take place when there is 
a criminal who perpetrates a crime, an item of property or a victim and the situation and 
other individuals facilitate the crime or someone else or the victim is present and who 
can take steps to avert the crime.141 These constituent characteristics of place, time, 
persons and objects are divided into the following three core groups of variables: firstly, 
offenders who are motivated; secondly, appropriate targets which can be criminally 
victimised; and thirdly, guardians who are incapable of protecting the property or 
persons.142 The core tenet is thus that criminal victimisation increases when “space and 
time of the three minimal elements of direct-contact predatory violations” converge.143 
This theory has been expanded to cover white-collar crime and illicit drug dealing by 
pointing out that these crimes are made possible when a criminal is motivated, has 
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located an adequate target and there is no effective guardianship.144 For a target to be 
suitable, it must have a value and it is not too difficult to move the object, the object is 
visible and it is easy to gain access. 145 A cyber criminological stance highlights the 
usefulness of this theory; particularly in the context of hackers trying to create botnets 
i.e. various linked computers without their owners’ knowledge, though also in respect of 
other cybercrimes.146 These computers can become appropriate targets, which can be 
used to stage a distributed denial of service attack when there is no appropriate guardian 
e.g. the computer has no firewall and anti-virus software.147 
 
Hindeland, Gottfredson, Garofalo (1978) developed the “lifestyle-exposure theory” 
which is based on the assumption that different lifestyles have an impact on the 
exposure to dangerous people, times and places and lifestyles are “routine daily 
activities, both vocational activities (work, school, keeping house, etc) and leisure 
activities.”148 This theory can be applied to the digital realm since online lifestyle and 
digitally adept guardianship can impact cybercrime victimisation.149 
 
Both the routine activity theory and the lifestyle-exposure theory have been 
amalgamated as part of a joint “opportunity theory of victimisation” which assumes that 
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victimisation is caused by opportunities and certain lifestyles, and daily activities 
promote criminal opportunities.150 In the context of cybercrime, the life-style exposure 
theory has been modified to the digital space and used to predict different kinds of 
victimisation, for example, cyber-stalking, virus infection or threats. 151  “Lifestyle-
routine activities theory” may account for the occurrence of cyber and computer crime, 
though not many empirical tests have been conducted to verify this.152 Yet a study by 
Hold and Bossler (2008), which investigated the “lifestyle-routine activities theory” 
amongst university students, supports that peer involvement can lead to individual 
victimisation.153 Equally, another empirical investigation found that online harassment is 
endemic amongst high school students who often communicate with technologically 
enabled devices.154  
 
This suggests that criminological theories can be applied to certain kinds of 
cybercrimes 155  and empirical research particularly supports the “general theory of 
crime” advocated by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), as well as the “social learning 
theory” espoused by Akers (1973).156 However, the arguments underlying situational 
crime prevention theory and opportunity theory are also very convincing.  They say that 
a person who commits a crime online can dissociate from anxiety and guilt - which may 
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otherwise be present - and feel safe in the anonymity that the internet affords, which in 
turn reduces the likelihood of their being caught. Within this context, Suler's (2004) 
argument that there exists an online disinhibition effect is very persuasive.157  
 
The UK has adopted several measures to combat cybercrime and to secure the digital 
realm.  Cybercrime and cyber security have become critical topics for the European 
legislator.  Correspondingly, the UAE has taken steps to protect its citizens against this 
emerging threat.  The subsequent sections will investigate the diverse legal strands 
which these jurisdictions have adopted. 
 
1.7 Cybercrime Laws in the UK 
Kelly (2007) explains that the UK adopted the Computer Misuse Act 1990,158 to combat 
computer hacking,  the necessity for such an enactment was highlighted on several 
occasions, with the most influential being the 1989 Law Commission's Report159 and the 
House of Lords case R v Gold. 160  In the 1989 Law Commissions Report it was 
highlighted that the criminal law applying to computer crime had gaps in the protection 
offered. At that stage the Law Commission was mainly concerned with the act of 
hacking, noting however other issues such as the inapplicability of deception offences to 
computers.161 One of the questions which troubled the Law Commission was whether 
the unauthorised access to a computer i.e hacking, should be made a criminal offence or 
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whether civil law could offer sufficient protection and remedies. This was considered in 
the Law Commission Working Paper no.110, where the Law Commission reached the 
conclusion that civil law is essentially an ineffective remedy against unauthorised 
access162, and therefore concluding that there is a strong case for creating a criminal 
offence for unauthorised access. This recommendation was made concrete in the Law 
Commission report og 1989, and was conceptualized through its encapsulation in the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990.  
  
In R v Gold, the British telecom Prestel Gold computer network was unlawfully 
accessed and data was changed and one of the computer hackers even wrote a note for 
the Duke of Edinburgh. The accused were journalists who argued that they had only 
accessed the network to bring to light security vulnerabilities; they were nevertheless 
prosecuted by virtue of s.1 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 on the basis that 
they used a fake instrument, i.e. a fake customer identification number. However, the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords did not find them guilty since at the time it was 
not considered sufficient to deceive a machine. Nehaluddin (2009) explains that the 
decision suggested that hacking of computers did not constitute a criminal offence163 
and this lacuna in the law prompted the passing of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
 
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 sets out the following three core offences: accessing the 
data or program on a computer without authority (s.1), facilitating this (s.2), 
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intentionally impairing the computer from operating (s.3(2)(a)), hindering or preventing 
that data or a program can be accessed on a computer (s.3(2)(b)), impairing that the 
program operates or impairing that the data is reliable (s.3(2)(c)) and facilitating any of 
this (s.3(d)).164  
S.1 is specifically designed to cover hacking and no intention has to be established in 
respect of the data or program. Yet in the widely publicised case of Paul Bedworth, the 
defence argued that he was an addict, who therefore undertook hacking and did not have 
the required mens rea. Nehaluddin explains that this resulted in the jury acquitting him 
and this caused concern that the Act was not stringent enough.165 
 
S.2 covers circumstances in which access has been gained without authorisation with 
intention to perpetrate another offence.166 S.3 has been enacted to criminalise situations 
where acts are done which result in contents being modified without authorisation with 
the intention to damage the data and modification encompasses adding, removing or 
altering data.167 The Act applies to all, who have not been authorised to use or access 
data or programs.168 In R v Bow Street Magistrates Court ex parte Allison,169 it was 
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confirmed that even authorised users, who are misusing facilities, can expose 
themselves to criminal liability.170  Hence, the Act has a very wide scope. 
Jarvie (2003) explicates that the terms data, computer or program are not defined by the 
Act, so that they are not limited to the understanding when the Act was passed.171 
Consequently, these can be interpreted flexibly to cover new technological innovations, 
such as smart-phones which are computers and this ensures that the scope of the Act is 
not curtailed.  
 
Additionally, the Police and Justice Act 2006 has made various amendments to the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 to deal with challenges in a rapidly changing digital 
landscape. 172 For example, McEwan (1990) writes that “Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks” have become more commonplace, but that it was unclear whether they were 
covered by the Computer Misuse Act 1990.173  Equally, Rychlicki (2006) points to an 
unreported Wimbledon Magistrates' Court case, which suggested that DoS/DDoS 
attacks were not covered by the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and explains that this 
resulted in the amendments by virtue of the Police and Justice Act 2006.174 
McEwan (2008) opines that these amendments were a “progressive move” as deterrence 
was heightened and offences became extraditable in line with Article 6 of the European 
Union's Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems, as 
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now replaced by the new EU Directive 2013/40 on attacks against information 
systems.175 Additionally, further amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 were 
made by virtue of the Serious Crime Act 2015.176 The Explanatory Notes to the Serious 
Crime Act inform that the amendments modernise the offences, so that tools to 
perpetrate cybercrime, for instance, programmes with which computer systems can be 
unlawfully accessed, are covered.177 Moreover, a new section 3ZA is inserted into the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 to create the “offence of impairing a computer such as to 
cause serious damage”, as currently only s.3 covers this, but this section only allows a 
maximum penalty of up to ten years, which the government considers too lenient in 
serious cases, for instance, when critical infrastructure is damaged.178 The new penalty 
is 14 years or life imprisonment. S.3ZA(1) spells out the criteria which have to be met to 
establish that the offence is made out: Firstly, for the actus reus to be made out the 
perpetrator has to commit an act without authorisation in respect of a computer which 
creates a substantial risk of “serious damage”, which is “of a material kind”;  and 
secondly, the mens rea is established by showing that s/he knew that there was no 
authority and it was intended that such serious damage was caused or the person was 
reckless in respect of the damage.179 An unauthorised act takes place when the person is 
not responsible for the computer and cannot thereby decide to do the act and the person 
                                                 
175 Ibid, 959; M. Turner, N. Pantlin, L. Pugh, C. Young, EU Cybercrime Directive takes a tougher stance 
against attacks on information systems, Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, 2013 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d3863b21-3c3b-419e-8a8f-2b007acb3a10> accessed 1 
July 2014 
176 Parliament UK, Serious Crime Bill [HL] 2014-15 <http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-
15/seriouscrime.html> accessed 1 July 2014 
177 Serious Crime Bill, Explanatory Notes, 2014, 1-85, 2 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0001/en/15001en.pdf> accessed 20th 
January 2015; Serious Crime Act, Explanatory Notes, 2015, 1-85, para.126 < 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/notes/division/3/2> accessed 23rd August 2015 
178 Ibid,29  
179 Serious Crime Act, Explanatory Notes, 2015, 1-85, para.126 < 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/notes/division/3/2> accessed 23rd August 2015 
54 
 
who has responsibility has not consented that the person does the act.180 “Material kind” 
means causing damage to national security, the economy, the environment or human 
welfare.181  
 
Additionally, the territorial scope for computer misuse offences has been extended, so 
that extra-territorial jurisdiction applies to the new s.3ZA offence, so that, for example, a 
UK national, who resides in France, can be prosecuted in the UK or a French national, 
who resides in the UK and who hacks a computer in France.182 The amendments provide 
further clarification, for instance, in respect of s.10 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990.183 
The amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 ensure that the UK fully complies 
with Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems.184 
 
Apart from the Computer Misuse Act 1990, other legislation can be used to prosecute 
cyber criminals.  For instance, the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964 deals with 
electronic pornographic offences; the Protection of Children Act 1978 and the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 can be evoked in respect of electronic child pornography; the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 deals with online and offline sexual grooming; the Public Order Act 
1986 and Crime and Disorder Act 1998 render it illegal to incite religious and racial 
hatred; the Malicious Communications Act 1998 and the Telecommunications Act 1984 
contain provisions rendering it a criminal offence to engage in online harassment; the 
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Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1998 spells out copyright crimes; and the Terrorism 
Act 2006 can be used to prosecute various crimes, which are being perpetrated online.185 
For instance, in R. v Fellows and Arnold,186 it was held that the Protection of Children 
Act 1978 applied when indecent photographs of children were stored in digital format, 
so that they could be accessed by others and that this constituted active participation in 
the crime of showing or distributing such images. 187  Yet in Atkins v DPP, 188  the 
prosecution failed since it could not be established that the accused knew that the photos 
were cached. Jarvie (2003) argues that the imposition of such a requirement burdens the 
authorities, who have to detect and prosecute paedophiles.189 
 
Agate and Ledward (2013) further explicate that s.16 of the Offences Against Person 
Act 1861 can be invoked when someone threatens to kill another; s.4 of the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997 can be used when people are made to fear violence; and s.1 
of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 can be invoked when threatening messages 
are being sent; and s.127 of the Communications Act 2003 can be used when a 
menacing message is sent190 and this ensures that threats, including online threats sent 
via social media, can be combated.191  For instance, an offence may be made out under 
s.127 of the Communications Act 2003 when a public order violation is committed by 
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tweets and the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) has issued guidelines in 2013 
which state that “those communications that should be robustly prosecuted [are]... 
those that amount to a credible threat of violence, a targeted campaign of harassment 
against an individual or which breach court orders, and those communications which 
may be considered grossly offensive, to which the high threshold must apply.”192  
Jarvie (2003) remarks that computer fraud can also be prosecuted by placing reliance on 
the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978, the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 and the Finance 
Act 1972.193 The UK has thus a wide arsenal of statutes to outlaw different forms of 
cybercrime. Some of the developments within UK cybercrime law have also been driven 
by virtue of EU law. 
 
1.8 The European Approach Towards Cybercrime  
Rychlicki (2006) informs that the EU can fight computer crime by virtue of Title VI of 
the Treaty of the European Union entitled “Provisions on police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.”194 The 2000 Communication from the Commission195 
firstly affirmed the importance of adopting definitions for high-tech crimes and 
                                                 
192Crown Prosecution Service, DPP publishes final guidelines for prosecutions involving social media 
communications, 20 June 2013 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/dpp_publishes_final_guidelines_for_prosecutions_involving_s
ocial_media_communications/> accessed 20th January 2015; cited from Z. Akhtar, Malicious 
communications, media platforms and legal sanctions, 20(6) Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review 2014, 179-187, 182 
193 N. Jarvie, Control of cybercrime - is an end to our privacy on the Internet a price worth paying? Part 1, 
9(3) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 2003, 76-81, 78 
194 T. Rychlicki, Legal issues of criminal acts committed via botnets, 12(5) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 2006, 161-167, 164-165; also see M. Jimeno Bulnes, European Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters, 5 European Law Journal 2003, 614-630 
195 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Creating a safer information society by improving 
the security of information infrastructures and combating computer-related crime. COM (2000) 890 final. 
(Brussels, 2000) 
57 
 
sanctions.196 Also, in 2000, the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
between the Member States of the European Union197 was adopted by the Council 
pursuant to Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union in order to facilitate law 
enforcement assistance and co-operation between the Member States.198 Subsequently, 
in 2001, the Council Recommendation on contact points maintaining a 24-hour service 
for combating high-tech crime was adopted.199 In 2002, Eurojust was established to 
combat serious crime and its remit overlaps with that of Europol and includes computer 
fraud and cybercrime. 200  In 2004, the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA) was established to safeguard information systems by virtue of the 
Regulation 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council.201 
In 2005, the European Union then adopted Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA 
on attacks against information systems.202 The Council Framework Decision provided 
that the following acts are rendered criminal offences: illegal data interference, illegal 
system interference, illegally accessing information systems, and that the Member States 
had to transpose the regulation by 16 March 2007.203 However, as the challenges which 
cybercrime pose have increased, it was necessary to adopt a more comprehensive 
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framework.204 Hence, the Decision has been replaced by Directive 2013/40/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against 
information systems (the Cybercrime Directive). 205  Whilst the Framework Decision 
already set out various definitions for cybercrime, rules for cooperation, jurisdiction and 
liability, Graux (2013) informs that “[t]he new Directive further streamlines and 
enhances the European rules in the fight against cybercrime.  While some of the new 
provisions will clearly be a challenge to implement and apply correctly, they provide a 
common path to more effective crime fighting.”206 Graux (2013) also points out that 
whilst the Directive is similar to its predecessor, it makes clear that certain situations 
constitute aggravating factors, for instances, “crimes committed by misusing the 
personal data of another person, with the aim of gaining the trust of a third party, 
thereby causing prejudice to the rightful identity owner” and “crimes where a 
significant number of information systems have been affected through the use of a 
tolls”, for instance, botnet attacks.207 Klimek (2015) further explicates that the following 
four common definitions have been adopted in respect of crimes involving attacks 
against information systems: illegal interception, illegal system interference, illegal data 
interference and illegal access to information systems. 208 Resultantly, Member States 
have to render it a criminal offence when data is illegally intercepted intentionally 
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without authorisation and this is done through technology which captures non-publicly 
transmitted data, including data which is sent through electromagnetic emissions, and 
this is not a minor case.209 Yet it has not been defined what a ‘not minor’ case is. Instead 
this is left for the Member States to decide in accordance with their domestic laws.210 
For example, the Directive explains that a minor case is one where criminal liability is 
not imposed.211  
 
Furthermore, Member States have to render it a criminal offence when a system is 
illegally interfered with intentionally and without the person being able to invoke a right 
to do so and the person does this by gravely interrupting, or hindering its operation by 
sending, deleting, changing, damaging, transmitting, suppressing or deteriorating 
information or by preventing access to a system.212 Member States have to also impose 
criminal sanctions when data is illegally interfered with intentionally and without the 
person having a right and this is done by destroying, damaging, altering, deteriorating, 
or suppressing data or by rendering it inaccessible and this is not a small case.213 
Moreover, Member States have to render it a criminal offence when illegal access is 
gained to information systems and this is done intentionally and without the person 
being entitled to have access and this is not a minor case.214 The Directive also requires 
Member States to answer information requests within eight hours and additionally 
Member States are obligated to gather statistical information and report about 
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cybercrime incidents and convictions.215 In this context, Savin and Trzaskowski (2014) 
further explain that information sharing about cybercrime has also been strengthened 
through the creation of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) by the Commission and 
which is situated within Europol.216 
The deadline for transposition was the 4th September 2015.217 The UK has chosen to opt 
in218 and on the 4th June 2014, the Serious Crime Bill (which has now become the 
Serious Crime Act 2015) was introduced to transpose Directive 2013/40/EU, as well as 
to combat serious crime and to amend the Computer Misuse Act 1990, as discussed 
above.219 Klimek (2015) opines that as a result, criminal law has been harmonised 
within the EU since rules have been spelled out to define criminal offences, as well as 
sanctions for attacks on information systems and that mutual co-operation between 
competent agencies has been strengthened.220 
 
In February 2013, an EU cyber security strategy was proposed by the European 
Commission and as part of this, a Directive on measures to ensure a high common level 
of network and information security across the Union was proposed (the NIS 
Directive).221 During the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Best Practices for 
Computer Network Defence: Incident Detection and Response, it was observed that the 
                                                 
215 L. Klimek, European Arrest Warrant (London, Springer 2015) 112-123 
216 A. Savin, J. Trzaskowski, Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2014) 17 
217 ENISA, The Directive on attacks against information systems, A Good Practice Collection for the 
implementation and application of this Directive 2013, 1-23, 5 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/Octopus2013/Presentations/W
orkshop1/Jo_De_Muynck-ENISA-Octopus.pdf> accessed 1 July 2014 
218 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 5th Report of Session 2013-14, Follow-up report on EU 
police and criminal justice measures: The UK's 2014 opt-out decision (London, TSO 2013) 24 
219 Ashfords, Cybercrime, 2014 <http://www.ashfords.co.uk/cybercrime/> accessed 1 July 2014 
220 L. Klimek, European Arrest Warrant (London, Springer 2015) 112 
221 Case Comment, Europe and US divide once again over cyber security, 13(4) Privacy & Data 
Protection 2013, 1, 17, 1; B. Treacy, Expert comment, 13(4) Privacy & Data Protection 2013, 2, 2 
61 
 
EU's strategy is based on the following five strategic pillars: firstly, the realisation of 
cyber resilience; secondly, a significant reduction of cybercrime; thirdly, the 
development of cybercrime capabilities as part of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy; fourthly, the development of technical and industrial capital to achieve cyber 
security; and fifthly, the adoption of a consistent international policy for cyberspace 
which fosters important EU values. 222  Nagyfejeo (2015) points out that this NIS 
Directive was adopted by the European Parliament in March 2014.223 
 
Savin and Trzaskowski (2014) corroborate that the various EU initiatives are designed 
to prepare states to deal with cyber attacks, especially the Directive.  Member States are 
required to create a “National Information Security strategy” and nominate a domestic 
agency which is competent and has sufficient human and financial resources to combat 
and deal with incidents and risks.224  
The explanatory memorandum of the Directive states that:  
 
“the aim of this Directive is to ensure a high common level of network and 
information security (NIS). This means improving the security of the Internet 
and the private networks and information systems underpinning the 
functioning of our societies and economies. This will be achieved by 
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requiring the Member States to increase their preparedness and improve 
their cooperation with each other, and by requiring operators of critical 
infrastructures, such as energy, transport, and key providers of information 
society services (e-commerce platforms, social networks, etc.), as well as 
public administrations to adopt appropriate steps to manage security risks 
and report serious incidents to the national competent authorities.”225  
 
Hence, this Directive ensures that information and network security becomes 
harmonised within the EU by requiring all market operators, which utilise NIS to adopt 
organisational and technical steps in respect of cyber risks; and organisations which 
come within the scope of the Directive have to report security breaches, be subjected to 
mandatory regulatory audits and have sanctions imposed for failing to comply with the 
Directive.226 Hence, just like telecom operators are already required to report security 
breaches, online service providers, for instance, social networks, large cloud providers, 
search engines and e-commerce platforms and other providers of traditional 
infrastructure have to report cyber security breaches.227 However, no particular security 
standards are being imposed, but instead stakeholders are requested to work together 
with the ENISA to promulgate guidelines.228 Tsagourias and Buchan (2015) state that 
the objective is to create “a cooperative network mechanism for information exchange” 
by imposing legal obligations on important information society service providers and 
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public agencies, so that adequate steps are taken to deal with security risks and to report 
grave incidents. 229  A partner at Field Fisher Waterhouse, Stewart Room (2013), 
observes that “the scope and magnitude of this new Directive is huge. Obviously, the 
regulation of cyber risks in utilities, transport, financial services and public authorities 
is massive in its own right, but it's the wider concept of ‘market operator’ that really 
needs to be looked at.”230  
 
A proactive approach has thus been adopted to ensure that cybercrime is being 
strategically combated at the European level and whilst no regional steps have been 
taken by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, the UAE has also been 
proactive in the fight against cybercrime. 
 
 
1.9 Cybercrime Laws in the UAE 
Cassim (2009) explains that the UAE was the first GCC country to adopt far-reaching 
cybercrime legislation in 2006.231 Beretta (2013) observes that prior to the adoption of 
Law No.2 of 2006 many of the offences were contained in Law No.15 of 1980 on 
printed matter and publications, which were then specifically revised for the digital 
realm. 232 Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on the Prevention of Information Technology 
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Crimes233 imposes stiff penalties for a broad range of activities, such as gaining access 
to a website or information system by breaking through a security measure (s.2); 
procuring the modification or destruction of medical records (s.7); intentionally and 
unlawfully eavesdropping or intercepting communication (s.8); or using the internet or 
an information technology device to threaten or blackmail another (s.9). However, 
Baggili (2011) observes that the sanction system in the UAE is lighter than the one 
adopted by the UK.234 Furthermore, Federal Law No.2 of 2006 is not as aligned with the 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, and the UAE only created a new 
department at the Federal Courts in 2009 in order to draft laws for cybercrime.235 
 
In 2012, the UAE adopted two more cybercrime laws: Federal Legal Decree No. 5 for 
2012 on combating cybercrimes236 and Law No. 3 of 2012 on establishing the National 
Electronic Security Authority. These laws were adopted to proactively combat the 
continuously evolving new cybercrime threats.237Federal Legal Decree No. 5 for 2012 
on combating cybercrimes makes amendments to the 2006 Federal Legal Decree. 
Khasawneh and Ahern (2012) describe this as “a tough new cybercrimes law.”238  For 
example, Article 21 proscribes that technology is used to infringe the privacy of others, 
for instance, by disclosing photographs or conversations or statements, even if they are 
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accurate. 239  The 2012 Federal Legal Decree thus enhances privacy for information 
which is being made available online and this includes bank account numbers, data 
information and other details which are being furnished for online payment 
transactions.240 Protection of the privacy of individuals is essential especially as there 
are no data protection laws on a par with the laws in Europe.  There is no federal 
regulator to oversee that data protection is safeguarded, even though citizens have a 
right to privacy, as defined in Article 31 of the constitution which states that they have a 
right of “freedom of corresponding through the post, telegraph or other means of 
communication and the secrecy thereof shall be guaranteed in accordance with the 
law”, but this right does not extend to non-Emiratis, who make up the great majority of 
residents in the UAE.241 
 
However, publishing personal data about a person's family or private life constitutes a 
criminal offence under Article 378 of Federal Law 3 of 1987 (the Penal Code).242 
Federal Law by Decree No. (3) of 2003 Regarding the Organisation of 
Telecommunications Sector regulates telecommunication providers and such licensees 
have to adhere to the Privacy of Consumer Information Policy 2005, which requires that 
consumer data, including SMS, data and voice transmissions, call patterns and other 
information are kept private.243 Some specific legislation applies solely to the economic 
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free zones, namely the Dubai International Financial Centre Data Protection Law No.1 
of 2007, which is quite similar to the European Data Protection Directive and the Dubai 
Healthcare City Regulation No.7 of 2008, which affirms data protection for health 
information.244 However, O'Connell opines that “these privacy related provisions have 
not been drafted with the information age in mind.”245 
 
Hence, Articles 2 and 21 of the Federal Legal Decree No. 5 for 2012 on combating 
cybercrimes are key steps - albeit rudimentary – to implement data protection.  The 
former Article rendered it illegal to access electronic networks or information systems or 
websites without authority, whilst the latter Article proscribes that the privacy of 
individuals is being evaded through IT, computer networks or electronic information 
systems without the person consenting to this and without legal authorisation.  
Moreover, pursuant to Article 39 of the Federal Legal Decree No. 5 for 2012 on 
combating cybercrimes, operators and owners of computer networks and webpages may 
face criminal liability if information is published on their network or webpage, or 
through other technological devices, when illegal content is published, or they fail to 
take illegal content down upon being notified. Federal Law No.15 of 1980 Governing 
Publications and Publishing delineates what types of publications are proscribed.246 
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Under Federal Legal Decree No. 5 for 2012 on combating cybercrimes, all types of 
cybercrime are being criminalised and custodial sentences and/or fines can be imposed 
and enforcement agencies have been granted extra-territorial enforcement powers. Al 
Tamimi (2013) corroborates that the themes of the 2012 law can be grouped into the 
following categories: “IT security, state security and political stability, morality and 
proper conduct, financial and commercial issues and miscellaneous” matters. 247  
However, Human Rights Watch (2012) observes that the Federal Decree No.5 for 2012 
is an affront to free speech and results in it being very difficult for normal citizens or 
activists to voice their concerns.248 This is because the provisions are very wide and 
ambiguous, so that individuals can be easily prosecuted for criticising officials. Yet 
Human Rights Watch (2012) concedes that not all provisions are directed at curtailing 
free speech, but that provisions also ensure that, for instance, sectarian or racist views 
are not published online.249 For instance, Iaccino (2015) informs about a 2015 Federal 
Supreme Court (FSC) unreported decision in which a person violated the law by 
swearing at a colleague in a WhatsApp message and was as a result fined $68,000 (the 
equivalent of £42,769) and deported.250 
 
Law No. 3 of 2012 on Establishing the National Electronic Security Authority creates 
the National Electronic Security Authority (NESA), which is responsible for 
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“organis[ing] protection for the Communication Network and Information Systems in 
the State and [for] develop[ing], amend[ing] and us[ing] the necessary methods in [the] 
Electronic Security domain” and which co-operates with aeCERT and the 
Telecommunications Authority.251 On the 25th June 2014, the NESA informed that it 
will publish various strategies, standards and policies, so that the efforts to combat cyber 
security become strategically aligned at the national level. 252  Subsequently, NESA 
(2015) published its Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Policy and 
Information Assurance Standards which endorse a threat based approach and make use 
of recognised security guidance and standards, for instance ISO 27001.253 Downton 
points out that NESA lists 24 different threats in accordance with the percentage in 
which they have been reported to have occurred.254 A range of controls which have been 
adopted by others are listed next to the various threats, as well as other sub-controls. 255 
Downton (2015) explains that whilst this appears as a good starting point, this may not 
be sufficient since advanced threats will not be mitigated against by standardised 
security approaches. 256 
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In September 2014, it was announced that a cyber command will be created within the 
UAE military and which will work in parallel to the NESA.257 A cybercrime unit has 
also been created within Abu Dhabi's State Security Apparatus and a Department of 
Anti-Electronic Crimes has been formed as part of Dubai police.258Yet the adoption of 
cybercrime offences and the creation of a specialised agency entrusted with cyber 
security and other units/departments to combat cybercrime are insufficient to deal with 
the emerging threat which emanates from cybercrime. For instance, Dr Saud Al Junaibi 
(2014) highlighted at the Abu Dhabi Electronic Warfare GCC conference in 2014 that 
most cyber criminals try to attack critical infrastructure and critical services and that 
“[d]ata detection systems like Scada (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) are 
still behind in terms of protection from cyber threats” since these systems are only 
programmed to provide services and are therefore only receptive to gathering data from 
different sources and when attackers access such systems, important services can be 
disrupted. 259  He further pointed out that network security of these systems is not 
coordinated and it is therefore important to organise a “Technical Standards Forum”, 
but also acknowledged that NESA is facilitating that government agencies and industry 
are adopting international standards to cope with “cyber electronic warfare.”260 In this 
context, His Excellency Jassem Bu Ataba Al Zaabi (2014), General Director, noted that 
“[c]ybersecurity is one of the biggest economic and national security challenges 
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countries face in the twenty-first century. The National Electronic Security Authority 
was established in line with this modern reality and as soon as the Authority was in 
place, we immediately initiated a thorough review of federal efforts to defend and 
protect the nation's ICT infrastructure. This announcement falls in line with the process 
we are currently engaged in which puts all necessary policies and standards in place to 
ensure a comprehensive approach to securing the nation's digital infrastructure”.261  
 
The researcher argues that police officers can only effectively secure the digital realm if 
it is made more transparent.  This in turn requires that data is retained and surveillance 
takes place, as occurs for instance, in the UK, but this has to be administered in a way 
which both protects data and respects the right to privacy. 
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1.10 The UK Approach Towards Data Protection 
1.10.1 The Right to Privacy 
 
Privacy means “freedom from unauthorized intrusion.”262 Gillespie (2009) emphasises 
that the notion of private information is crucial in respect of surveillance.263 However, 
the director of Liberty, James Welch (2014) summarises the problem as follows: “The 
security services consider that they’re entitled to read, listen to and analyse all our 
communications on Facebook, Google and other US-based platforms. If there was any 
remaining doubt that our snooping laws need a radical overhaul, there can be no 
longer. The agencies now operate in a legal and ethical vacuum; why the deafening 
silence from our elected representatives?”264  
In the UK, the right to privacy traditionally did not exist, but Fenwick explains that 
instead equity or tort claims could be brought, for instance, for trespass, copyright, 
defamation and breach of confidence; accordingly, the right could be indirectly 
enforced.265 For instance, in 1997, before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
Lord Irvine opined “that the true view is that the courts will be able to adapt and 
develop the common law by relying on existing domestic principles in the laws of 
                                                 
262  Merriam Dictionary <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/privacy> accessed 20th January 
2015; H. Sarfaraz, Surveillance, privacy and cyber law, 20(7) Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review 2014, 189-194, 189 
263 A. A. Gillespie, Regulation of internet surveillance, 4 European Human Rights Law Review 2009, 552-
565, 554 
264 Cited from Z. Akhtar, Malicious communications, media platforms and legal sanctions, 20(6) 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 2014, 179-187, 184 
265 H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4th edn, Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 807 
72 
 
trespass, nuisance, copyright, confidence and the like, to fashion a common law right to 
privacy.”266 
Richardson et al (2012) opine that the breach of confidence played a particularly 
important role to distinguish private from public information.267 Von Bar (2009) notes 
that the traditional test to identify whether there was a breach of confidence was 
famously espoused by Megarry J in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd,268 in which he 
stated “[f]irst, the information itself … must have the necessary quality of confidence 
about it.269 Secondly, that information must have been imparted in circumstances 
importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of 
that information to the detriment of the party communicating it.”270 This claim therefore 
became the main tool to enforce privacy.271 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd despite 
being a High Court case and therefore, technically, only binding to lowers courts, it 
managed to recast the doctrine of confidence in a way that responded to a change in the 
broader social background.272 The case became a starting point in many subsequent 
cases, despite only being a High Court decision273 and had led to major academic 
debates about the breadth of equitable confidence; Gareth Jones argues that: 
‘[e]quity, to borrow a metaphor, should not be past the age of child-bearing. A 
defendant who has taken good care not to enter any relationship of any sort with the 
plaintiff and who has obtained confidential information by reprehensible means should 
be in no better position than a defendant who is given and deliberately breaches the 
plaintiff's confidence’274. 
While Jones’ co-writer Robert Goff recast the elements of confidence in such a way as 
to encompass unauthorised (but not necessarily nefarious) takings of information, even 
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in circumstances where there was no prior relationship of confidence between the parties 
or express obligation of confidence placed on the confidant.275 
Smart states that when the Human Rights Act 1998 was enacted the right to privacy 
became recognised, though Article 8 was already recognised by the UK prior to this.276 
The right to privacy is enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), it states: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
 
 The effect of s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is that “[s]o far as it is possible to do 
so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a 
way which is compatible with the Convention rights.”277 S.6 of the Human Rights Act 
1998 ensures that the right to privacy has only a vertical effect (i.e. is only enforceable 
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against public authorities, excluding the police), but courts can “develop the underlying 
common law in such a way to include the value of” privacy.”278  
Irrespective of whether or not the right to privacy has only a vertical effect, the 
European Court of Human Rights has made clear that covert surveillance can breach 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR and has to be justified under Article 8(2). 279  However, 
McArthur opines that privacy cannot be expected on the internet since it constitutes a 
public space, and that privacy may only be possible when tracking software is blocked 
or one's identity is concealed.280 Yet such a stance may hamper innovation, as it would 
imply that trade secrets could not be protected. It also conflicts with Article 8(1). The 
European Court of Human Rights also does not regard that the simple fact that 
something takes place in public means that there is no privacy, as illustrated by Von 
Hannover v Germany. 281  Instead, Von Hannover makes clear that privacy does not 
depend on location and that a public versus private division is too simple, but instead “a 
test of a reasonable expectation of privacy or, more broadly still, of control of private 
information is more satisfactory.”282  
 
Whilst this case did not deal with online privacy, Gillespie (2009) therefore disagrees 
with McArthur (2001) and gives the additional example of using an online service, 
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which specifically offers secure back up storage.283 Coleman (2006) corroborates that 
the essence of privacy is to prevent access to information, particularly emails.284 In 
contrast, McArthur (2001) argues that the fact that access can be restricted does not 
change the public nature of the internet since electronic measures can be used to 
circumvent any access restrictions, but Gillespie (2009) perceives that such perception 
does not fit the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, especially the 
reasonable expectation test in Von Hannover.285 Consequently, when surveillance takes 
place, this has to be authorised in order to ensure that there is compliance with Article 
8(2) of the ECHR..  
 
The European Court of Human Rights has also held that this is necessitated by rejecting 
that administrative authority is sufficient to satisfy the requirement in Article 8(2) to be 
“in accordance with the law.”286 Systematic recording was also found to breach Article 
8(1) of the ECRH287 and the same principle also applies in the online context, as made 
clear by the European Court of Human Rights in Copland v United Kingdom.288 In this 
case, the Court stated that “[a]ccording to the Court's case law, telephone calls … are 
covered by the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ for the purposes of Art 
8(1) … It follows logically that emails sent from work should be similarly protected 
                                                 
283 A. A. Gillespie, Regulation of internet surveillance, 4 European Human Rights Law Review 2009, 552-
565, 556 
284 S. Coleman, E-mail, terrorism, and the right to privacy, 8 Ethics and Information Technology 2006, 17-
27, 20 
285 A. A. Gillespie, Regulation of internet surveillance, 4 European Human Rights Law Review 2009, 552-
565, 556 
286 Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 45 ECtHR; ibid (Gillespie) 556 
287 Friedl v Austria (1996) 21 EHRR 83 ECtHR 
288 (2007) 45 EHRR 37 ECtHR 
76 
 
under Art 8, as should information derived from the monitoring of personal internet 
usage.”289  
In Amann v Switzerland, 290  the European Court of Human Rights also stated that 
“tapping and other forms of interception of telephone conversations constitute a serious 
interference with private life and correspondence and must accordingly be based on a 
‘law’ that is particularly precise. It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the 
subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming more 
sophisticated.” In light of the decision, Taylor (2003) points out that surveillance 
methods have to be regulated by law to ensure that there is compliance with Article 8(1), 
i.e. that the interference is “in accordance with law.”291 Furthermore, Gillespie (2009) 
argues that an authorisation is required to conduct directed surveillance pursuant to the 
RIPA.292  
The Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources293 case mentioned above also mandates that fundamental rights cannot be 
seriously interfered with. 294  The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
observed that data retention allows that the person is identified, the place and time of a 
communication, how often the person communicates with particular persons and this 
means that very private information is being made available, for instance, about their 
everyday habits, their daily activities and home, their social environment, etc. and this 
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seriously breaches the private life and violates the persons' personal data, particularly in 
circumstances where data is retained and used without the knowledge of the person.295 
Yet the Court considered that such data retention was justified in the name of public 
security, but that the principle of proportionality had been stretched too far by the EU 
legislature.296  Indeed, proportionality can be more readily made out when adequate 
protective safeguards have been adopted, as made clear in Klass v Germany,297 where it 
was said that “[o]ne of the fundamental principles of a democratic society is the rule of 
law … [which] implies, inter alia, that an interference by the executive authorities with 
an individual's rights should be subject to an effective control...”298  
The Council of the European Union also notes that the court will not “satisfy itself with 
anything less than a strict assessment of the proportionality and necessity of measures 
that constitute serious restrictions to fundamental rights, however legitimate the 
objectives pursued by the EU legislature.”299 Yet Granger and Irion (2014) point out 
that the Grand Chamber in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources300 has not defined what amounts to a serious interference 
and how to conduct such an assessment. 301  Nonetheless, they corroborate that the 
decision mandates “a new level of responsibility to protect fundamental rights,” 
imposes “a novel strict judicial scrutiny test” and invalidates EU law, which breaches 
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Charter rights and provides substantive guidance to EU and national law-makers in 
respect of data protection and privacy rights.  Granger and Irion (2014) therefore think 
that the decision re-emphasises constitutionalism and human rights as crucial building 
blocks for European integration. 302  Hence, even in a “Big Data era” the requisite 
threshold for data and privacy protection remains high within the EU.303 This is also in 
line with the jurisprudence promulgated by the European Court of Human Rights, for 
instance, in Rotaru v Romania, 304  where it was noted that “[s]tates do not enjoy 
unlimited discretion to subject individuals to secret surveillance or a system of secret 
files. The interest of a state in protecting its national security must be balanced against 
the seriousness of the interference with the applicant's right to respect for his or her 
private life” and in Klass v Germany,, 305  it was observed that “powers of secret 
surveillance of citizens are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly 
necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions.”306 Accordingly, cyber security is 
thus not a blanket reason to permit unlimited surveillance and data retention, but this has 
to be balanced against the right to private life.307 The concept of confidentiality, as 
developed by cases which have created the common law claim for breach of confidence, 
has been strengthened by the human rights claim. Privacy is also protected by virtue of 
the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
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1.10.2 The UK Data Protection Act 1998 and the European Approach 
Towards Maintaining Privacy 
In a digital world, privacy is particularly important to protect individuals and businesses 
from cybercrime. McLeod and Hare (2010) explain that the UK Data Protection Act 
1998 regulates the manner in which personal data about individuals, who are alive, is 
being managed and processed.308 Bainbridge (2004) notes that the Act “does not affect 
any right to relief for breach of confidence or defamation, in appropriate cases.”309  
 
Smith (2007) explains that the UK approach to data protection is based on Directive 
96/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, which was adopted “to protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with 
respect to the processing of personal data, and to prevent the restriction or prohibition 
of the free flow of personal data between Member States for privacy reasons.”310 Those, 
who process personal data in the UK, have to inform the Information Commissioner.311  
 
Data is defined by s.1 of the Data Protection Act 1998, as information, which is 
processed with automatically operating equipment after instructions are given to do so, 
when the data is recorded and there is intention that the processing shall take place with 
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the equipment, the record is made in a relevant filing system 312  and there is such 
intention and the information does not fall within paragraph (a)-(c) and is a record, 
which is accessible, which meets the definition in s.68 of the Data Protection 1998. The 
Act is only invoked when there is personal data and this means data from which it is 
possible to identify a living individual or their expression of opinion.313 Accordingly, the 
Data Protection Act 1998 is only applicable when it is possible to identify an individual 
and the person is alive. In Durant v Financial Services Authority,314 personal data was 
narrowly interpreted as data which is “biographical in a significant sense” and 
requiring that “the information has the putative data subject as its focus.”315  
 
The Data Protection Act 1998 requires data controllers to adhere to eight important 
principles, which range from, processing data lawfully and fairly, not over excessively 
processing data, and ensuring that personal data is accurate to not transferring personal 
data to a country outside the European Economic Area when there is insufficient 
protection in that country.316 
 
Gulwirth et al (2009) explain that the Data Protection Act 1998 places much emphasis 
on data subjects giving consent to their personal data being collected, though personal 
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data can also be processed if any of the conditions in Schedule 2 of the Data Protection 
Act 1998 are met, for instance, if this is needed to for a contract.317 Yet they criticise this 
because as a result the purpose for which data is being collected is being disregarded.318 
 
Gooch and Williams (2007) note that data subjects have a right to write to the 
organisation, which holds information about them and request that they see what data is 
held.319 Yet the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee Report on Personal 
Internet Security 2007 observes that the remedies are inadequate and as a result there is 
no “practical incentive for those holding customer data to take steps to protect it.”320 
However, in light of the important Google Spain SL v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion 
de Datos (AEPD)321 case heard by the CJEU, data protection has been given further 
importance within the online context. In this case a preliminary reference was brought to 
determine whether the Data Protection Directive could be evoked against search 
engines, for instance, Google and even in circumstances where the data processing did 
not take place in the EU, persons could require that their personal data was removed 
from the search engine.322 The CJEU found that the fact that the physical server is not 
located in Europe does not matter, as Google had a branch in a Member State.  As 
search engines control personal data they were bound by EU data protection law and 
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individuals are entitled, if they meet certain criteria, to request search engines to remove 
their personal information.  Even information which was accurate may no longer be 
collected when the information is irrelevant, inadequate or excessive in respect of the 
aim of the data.  What it amounts to is this, individuals are not automatically entitled to 
be forgotten, but a balance has to be struck with other rights, e.g. freedom of speech.323 
Akhtar (2014) explains that as a result of the decision an assessment has to be made 
each time to evaluate: the type of information, whether it constitutes sensitive 
information about a person's private life, what interest the public have in being able to 
access the information, and the role the person plays in public life.324 
 
More recently, on 14 September 2017 a new Data Protection Bill was published in the 
UK which has been introduced in its Parliament.  It aims to overhaul and update the UK 
data protection laws for an increasingly digital age and economy. 325   It is also in 
preparation for Britain’s departure from the EU (also known as ‘Brexit’), ensuring that 
strong data laws and appropriate safeguards are in place so that Britain can trade across 
international borders.  Key features of the new bill are: implementation and clarification 
of the GDPR – which will apply from 25 May 2018 - in the UK context, new criminal 
offences related to data, empowering people to be able to withdraw their consent with 
respect to their personal data, and enabling them to access and/or restrict the way that 
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organisations use their personal data, and the imposition of fines of up to €20m / £17m 
for businesses who are found guilty of serious data breaches.326 
 
Having such data protection laws encourages businesses to safeguard data and it is 
therefore important for the UAE to adopt equally strong measures as this can safeguard 
against cybercrime.  Correspondingly, the UAE should adopt specific data protection 
standards for enforcement agencies, as the European Union has done. De Azevedo 
Cunha (2013) points out that Declaration 21 on the protection of personal data in the 
fields of judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters, which is an annex to the 
Treaty of Lisbon, states “that specific rules on the protection of personal data and the 
free movement of such data in the fields of judicial cooperation criminal matters and 
police cooperation based on Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union may prove necessary because of the specific nature of these fields.”327 Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal 
data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
delineates the necessary data protection measures which have to be adopted when the 
police and judiciary cooperate in relation to criminal matters. 328  Article 5 of the 
Framework Decision makes clear that Directive 95/46/EC does not apply when 
“processing operations concerning public security, defence, state security or the 
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activities of the State in areas of criminal law” are conducted.  Ismaiel and Cieh (2013) 
explain that whilst the European approach is “the world's leading and most 
comprehensive model”, there is a “need for change.”329  
 
1.10.3 The 2012 European Reform Proposals 
The European data protection rules were formulated in 1995 and the digital space has 
since then tremendously increased. As a result, these rules do not deal with data, which 
is being “processed for law enforcement purposes.”330 On the 12th March 2014, the 
European Parliament therefore expressed its support for the reform proposal 
promulgated by the European Commission, particularly against the background of the 
Snowden revelations about the US “data spying scandals.”331  
 
The EU's Justice Commissioner, Vice-President Viviane Reding (2014) stated “[d]ata 
protection in the European Union is a fundamental right. Europe already has the 
highest level of data protection in the world. With the EU data protection reform which 
was proposed exactly two years ago – in January 2012 – Europe has the chance to make 
these rules a global gold standard. These rules will benefit citizens who want to be able 
to trust online services, and the small and medium sized businesses looking at a single 
market of more than 500 million consumers as an untapped opportunity. The European 
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Parliament has led the way by voting overwhelmingly in favour of these rules. I wish to 
see full speed on data protection in 2014.”332  
 
Reding (2013) explains that the aim of the Network Information Security Directive 
2016/1148333 is to create a “resilient digital single market” in order to better cope with 
cyber-attacks and that the “EU's Data Protection rules and Cyber Security Strategy 
[are] two sides of the same coin.”334 Banck (2013) explains that the European data 
reform requires digital market operators to notify data breaches to the data protection 
authority, as well as to a security authority, which has to be established by each Member 
State under the European Commission Cyber Directive project, as well as to adopt 
organisational and technical measures to deal with risks, which emanate from 
information systems and security networks in their control.335  
 
Cannataci (2013) further corroborates that Directive 95/46/EC is replaced by General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) 336, which sets out a 
framework and  the Network Information Security Directive 2016/1148, which replace 
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Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA16 in order to spell out the principles when personal 
data can be processed to prevent, detect, investigate or prosecute crimes and for 
interconnected judicial activities.337 Akhtar explicates that the GDPR modernises the 
European data protection laws and grants citizens new rights, including having personal 
information destroyed338 and the company, as opposed to the individual, has the burden 
of proof to show that the data should not be deleted.339 Article 3 of the GDPR also 
confirms that irrespective of the physical server, when services are provided within 
Europe, European data protection rules have to be adhered to. Member States are also 
required to adopt domestic legislation to strike a balance between freedom of 
expression, which encompasses data processing, so that the media can access it and with 
data protection.340  
 
Also, as discussed above, since 2013, communications service providers have to report 
breaches within 24 hours to their regulator and inform the data subject about a breach, 
which is “likely to adversely affect the personal data or privacy” of an individual 
pursuant to Commission Regulation 611/2013 of June 2013 on the measures applicable 
to the notification of personal data breaches under Directive 2002/58/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on privacy and electronic communications and 
under the GDPR, and this obligation is extended to all those, who act as data controllers, 
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whilst cyber attacks have to be reported under the Network and Information Security 
Directive 2016/1148.341  
 
The European Union has been proactive in combating cybercrime through a host of 
different measures, which are primarily focused on protecting and securing digital data 
as well as retaining and processing data and when cyber-criminals are being prosecuted, 
it is also important to regulate to which extent this data can constitute admissible 
evidence in criminal proceedings.    
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1.11 Surveillance Laws in the UK 
Surveillance can be defined as the “observation and collection of data to provide 
evidence for a purpose.” 342  It is possible to distinguish internet from electronic 
surveillance and the former takes place when data or content is being intercepted over 
the internet, whereas the latter takes place when electronic devices are used to listen, 
record, monitor and store communications covertly.343 Gillespie (2009) explains that 
internet surveillance can denote investigating what persons do online or employing 
online methods to conduct offline surveillance, for instance, by using a device on a car 
which connects to the internet.344 Internet surveillance can be conducted, for instance, 
by examining web postings, web usage and persons' online relationships.345 In recent 
times, Sarfaraz (2014) notes that governments have increasingly used surveillance 
programs to ensure security and combat terrorism and these government surveillance 
programs can capture a broad spectrum of data, as individuals increasingly use digital 
devices on which they store personal information, such as mobile phones, laptops and 
other electronic gadgets.346 However, as observed by the UK House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution “the role of technology in surveillance is pre-eminent 
and poses formidable regulatory problems”, particularly since surveillance conflicts 
with fundamental rights, particularly the right to privacy and also freedom of expression 
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and results in a lot of control which can be abused by those in power and this can 
undermine democracy and the rule of law.347 
 
Gersch (2012) explicates that historically the state conducted intercepts and covert 
surveillance under the royal prerogative and telephone calls could be tapped and 
recorded to prevent or detect crime by virtue of s.80 of the Post Office Act 1969 and 
whilst the latter was unsuccessfully challenged in Malone v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner (No.2),348 the European Court of Human Rights later found that there 
existed confidentiality when persons use telephones. 349  The Interception of 
Communications Act 1985 subsequently permitted the police the power to intercept 
when a warrant had been issued and thus spelt out a regime to ensure that 
telecommunications systems were only lawfully intercepted in certain situations.350 A 
tribunal was also established where complaints could be lodged about unlawful 
interception of communications and the Interception of Communications Commissioner 
was appointed to monitor intercepts.351 
 
Mobbs (2003) explains that the powers to conduct direct surveillance were modernised 
and increased by virtue of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), as 
well as the Terrorism Act 2000, which allow governmental agencies to tap the networks 
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and communications of individuals and organisations, so long as this has been 
authorised by a person with the power to do so.352 Newburn and Neyroud (2013) inform 
that RIPA not only substituted the Interception of Communications Act 1985, but also 
changed Part III of the Police Act 1997 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and is 
supplemented by several codes of practice, such as the Covert Surveillance Code and the 
Covert Human Intelligence Sources Code, which had to be issued by virtue of sections 
71-72 of RIPA.353 RIPA also replaces the Complaints Tribunal with the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (IPT).354 
 
Goold (2009) observes that RIPA was primarily enacted to ensure that surveillance 
activities would not violate the Human Rights Act 1998 and to prevent challenges to 
policing powers, as happened for instance in Halford v United Kingdom355 and Khan v 
United Kingdom356 and the reform was only minimal. 357 The adoption of the RIPA was 
nonetheless extremely important. 
In R v Khan,358 Lord Nolan of the House of Lords explains that “[t]he sole cause of this 
case coming to your Lordship's House is the lack of a statutory system regulating the 
use of surveillance devices by the police. The absence of such a system seems 
astonishing, the more so in view of statutory framework which has governed the use of 
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such devices by the Security Service since 1989, and the interception of communications 
by the police as well as by other agencies since 1985.”359 
Yet Goold (2009) considers that even the modernised surveillance regime adopted by 
RIPA - “while detailed and far-reaching - is riddled with gaps and lacks any clear set 
of overarching legal principles or common objectives” and gives as example that there 
are four different statutory regulators: the Interception of Communications 
Commissioners, the Surveillance Commissioner, the Information Commissioner and the 
Intelligence Services Commissioner which all deal with overlapping subject matters, but 
without close coordination between the different regulators, so that as a result the 
various regulatory frameworks are not harmonised. 360  In this context, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2005) also notes that “there is a mish-mash of oversight 
arrangements” and that this is problematic since this disjointed approach erodes 
important “counter-balancing safeguards” and it is unclear to which extent these 
Commissions have the necessary resources, so that it is difficult for the Commissioners 
to fulfil their respective role of providing scrutiny.361  
 
Furthermore, it has been observed that “RIPA is a convoluted piece of legislation”, for 
instance, because it “is not a complete regulatory code”, only amends “Part III of the 
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Police Act 1997 and...the Intelligence Services Act 1994.”362 Moreover, Gillespie (2009) 
observes that RIPA only partially defines surveillance to include:363  
 
“a) monitoring, observing or listening to persons, their movements, their 
conversations or their other activities or communications; 
(b) recording anything monitored, observed or listened to in the course of 
surveillance; and 
(c) surveillance by or with the assistance of a surveillance device.”364 
 
Jarvie (2003) explains that Part I of RIPA deals with acquiring and disclosing 
communications data, Part II sets out how covert human intelligence sources and 
surveillance are regulated and Part II spells out powers, so that private encryption keys 
can be disclosed.365 
 
The human rights advocacy group Liberty (2010) explains that RIPA applies to five 
kinds of surveillance366 : Firstly, “interception of communications”, which normally 
includes emails and telephones and requires an interception warrant. Secondly, 
“intrusive surveillance”, which means bugging a house or car or filming a person, 
though in some instances, this is also covered by Part 3 of the Police Act 1997 and s.5 of 
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the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and again this requires authorisation. Thirdly, 
“directed surveillance” is predominantly conducted in public spaces, often with the 
objective to gather information about the private life of a person and again this 
necessitates authorisation. Fourthly, “covert human intelligence sources” are persons, 
who gather information by forming a relationship in order to gather information and are 
guided by a public authority. Fifthly, “communications data” means recording 
communications, whether about webpages visited, emails, telephone calls and three 
types of data are included, namely “traffic data”, “service use”, “subscriber 
information”,367 but not the content and pursuant to RIPA there are three types of data: 
subscriber information (s.21(4)(c) of RIPA), service-use data (S.21(4)(b) of RIPA) and 
traffic data (S.21(4)(a) and (6) of RIPA).368Akhtar (2014) corroborates that s.8(1) of 
RIPA makes clear that a specific warrant has to be issued when internal communications 
are being monitored in respect of British residents who reside in the UK and this 
particular warrant should be granted when the person is suspected of illegal activity, but 
external communications can be monitored so long as a general warrant has been issued 
by virtue of s.8(4) of RIPA.369 
 
Wicks and Carney (2009) further explain that RIPA distinguishes two types of 
surveillance: directed surveillance which is “covert but not intrusive” (s.26(2) of RIPA) 
and intrusive surveillance, which takes place when a person or listening device is used 
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“on any residential premises or in any private vehicle” (s.26(3) of RIPA).370 Different 
control frameworks have been established and which are detailed in Chapter II of RIPA 
in order to deal with these two types of surveillance and a higher degree of approval and 
authorisation is required from the surveillance commissioner for intrusive surveillance 
than in respect of covert surveillance 371  and additionally, Home Office Codes of 
Practice have to be adhered to. These control frameworks are internal, though 
subsequently the Office of Interception Commissioners can conduct a review by 
sampling and Akdeniz et al (2001) criticise the fact that there is only such limited 
scrutiny. 372  Akhtar (2014) points out that the previous Surveillance Commissioner 
considered that they could not properly monitor abuse in respect of intrusive powers 
since the intelligence which justified the intrusive powers could not be reviewed by the 
surveillance commissioners.373 In the House of Lords in Re McE,374 the question arose 
whether appellants, who were detained for terrorist related offences could be monitored 
whilst they saw their solicitors, whilst another saw a consultant psychiatrist. They 
sought an assurance from the police, but this was refused. They challenged that this 
breached their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. The majority of 
the House of Lords decided that the right to legal professional privilege could be limited 
and when this was the case, this should be considered an intrusive surveillance under 
Part II of RIPA. Hence, an internal authorisation is insufficient in respect of privileged 
material. Moreover, Lord Hope explained that covert surveillance was permitted and 
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that the powers under RIPA made it possible to limit the right to privacy and resultantly 
private consultations were not immune, so long as the conditions in RIPA were satisfied.  
  
In terms of the criteria, Gillespie (2009) explains that for directed surveillance, this has 
to take place covertly, there has to be a particular operation or a particular investigation, 
the purpose has to be to collect private information and the operation cannot be 
undertaken in response to an immediate situation. 375  This suggests that directed 
surveillance cannot be carried out for a routine operation. The ACPO has stated that one 
key principle is that “[a]uthorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000 is not necessary in order to browse the World Wide Web as part of a specific 
operation or investigation.” 376  Clearly, adopting such an approach is important to 
effectively police the digital realm. 
 
Additionally, RIPA has provisions, which allow delegated legislation to be passed.  
Gersch (2012) explains that this is rather controversial since as a result of this, 792 
different agencies made use of RIPA by 2008, including local authorities, the Royal 
Pharmaceutical Society and several other bodies. 377 For instance, in Paton v Poole 
Burgh Council,378 five complaints were brought against Poole Borough Council, which 
had relied on RIPA to conduct surveillance in order to ascertain whether Ms Paton had 
provided the correct address for a particular catchment area of a school for her child and 
the Council argued that surveillance was necessary in such an instance “for the purpose 
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of preventing or detecting crime.” However, no criminal offence was committed for 
falsely stating the wrong address, apart from not being provided with a place in a school, 
so that the Council failed to establish that the activity fell within the scope for which 
surveillance was lawful, also because the Council had failed to consider whether it was 
reasonably necessary to conduct surveillance.379  
 
The above case illustrates situations where surveillance may be considered 
disproportionate.  On this matter, Lady Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5, 
shared her reservations: 
 
“[w]hen RIPA was introduced … I assumed wrongly that the activities 
authorised by that legislation would be confined to the intelligence and 
security agencies, the police, and Customs and Excise. The legislation was 
drafted at the urgent request of the intelligence and security community so 
that its techniques would be compatible with the Human Rights Act when it 
came into force in 2000. I can remember being astonished to read that 
organisations such as the Milk Marketing Board, and whatever the 
equivalent is for eggs, would have access to some of the techniques. On the 
principle governing the use of intrusive techniques which invade people's 
privacy, there should be clarity in the law as to what is permitted and they 
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should be used only in cases where the threat justified them and their use 
was proportionate.”380  
 
Apart from the great number of agencies which can make use of RIPA and the 
disagreement whether authorisation is required for directed surveillance, Ramraj et al 
(2005) further explicate that authorisation is too wide since it can be granted for very 
far-reaching reasons:381 to protect national security, to avert and identify serious crime, 
to prevent disorder, to protect the economic prosperity of the UK or the UK economic 
interests, to render assistance under an agreement with another country, in the name of 
public safety, public health and to determine and gather tax.382 However, the House of 
Lords also held in Re C's Application for Judicial Review,383 that the statutory and 
common law right to seek privately legal advice or consult a medical professional could 
be qualified under RIPA and covert surveillance could take place, in this case in a prison 
or in a police station when a person seeks advice from a medical professional or lawyer. 
So long as this was labelled intrusive directed surveillance and the more stringent 
protective safeguards were applied, this was considered permissible. Such approach 
benefits law enforcement agents, as they are given broad powers to conduct 
surveillance, which is invaluable in order to secure the digital realm; and like the UK, 
the UAE also undertakes surveillance. 
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1.12 Surveillance Laws in the UAE 
The UAE has been filtering web sites in order to identify unlawful contents, for 
instance, pornography, drug use and  gambling.384 Al Lawati (2011) notes that this 
activity has been undertaken quite stringently, to the extent that Reporters Without 
Borders have labelled “the UAE as being 'under surveillance.’”385 Jones (2010) also 
reports that the government has got the capacity to monitor internet use.386 The non-
governmental organisation Freedom House (2013) reports that the UAE's commitment 
to achieving a safe digital space is underscored by the fact that it reached the 28th place 
in the United Nations 2012 E-Governance Survey and the 25th on the World Economic 
Forum's 2013 Networked Readiness Index Freedom.387   The cybercrime units in co-
operation with the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority are entrusted with 
“tracking cyber-criminals”, whilst the department of anti-electronic crimes was formed 
at the Dubai investigation department. 388   In an interview with Reporters without 
Borders, Major Salem Obaid Salmeen (2014) explained that “These electronic patrols 
are detecting and tracking all topics and materials written and presented on these 
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websites...Dubai’s police is equipped with the latest technologies in the field and has a 
qualified team specializing in anti-electronic crimes...” 389  The Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority blocks the following seven different types of websites: websites 
with content which contravene UAE morals and ethics, which express religious hatred, 
which contravene UAE laws, which permit users to read blocked content, which 
constitutes a risk to internet users, for instance, phising websites and, for instance, those 
websites which allow gambling or offer illegal drugs.390 
 
Mustafa (2014) reports that as of 2014 the UAE doubled its security budget, from $5.5 
billion to $10 billion,, and that a large part of it was planned to be used to strengthen 
cyber-security.391 Aleksander Mitreski (2014) of INEGMA notes that “the investment is 
likely to be into surveillance and communications monitoring..[to] provide a full 
spectrum of communications, surveillance and analytics.”392 Yet the surveillance has to 
be put on a statutory footing, as currently only Article 43 of the Federal Legal Decree 
No. 5 for 2012 mentions surveillance of those, who have been prosecuted, but this does 
not promote a proactive policing approach towards cybercrime. There is also no mention 
of data retention, despite being a very important aspect, which the UK and Europe have 
addressed, as discussed next. 
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1.13 The UK and European Approach Towards Data Retention  
Bernal (2014) explains that data retention laws generally require those who already 
collect data to keep it and share it.393 Jewkes and Mar (2011) corroborate that following 
9/11, the UK government requested the telecommunication sector and internet service 
providers in 2003, pursuant to Part II of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Securities Act 
2001, to voluntarily retain data for six months, though web server logs had to only be 
kept for up to four days.394 The Secretary of State could also make an order to render the 
voluntarily obligation legally binding if this was required.395  
 
Certainly, data retention is as such not unlawful, for instance, when there is a “serious 
threat to public safety posed by organised terrorism in the United Kingdom”, as 
explained by the European Court of Human Rights in McVeigh, O'Neill and Evans v 
United Kingdom. 396  Taylor (2003) explicates that the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 also allows that communications data can be retained and extensive 
information about the private life of a person can thereby be obtained.397  Equally, 
legislation, such as RIPA, can be used to access retained data. 398  
 
Konstadinides (2011) explains that following the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the 
London attacks in 2005, there was a pressing need to exercise control in respect of 
telecommunications within Europe, as this would help with preventing, investigating, 
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detecting and prosecuting terrorists and organised criminals.399Jewkes and Mar (2011) 
point out that data retention has therefore been dealt with at the European level.400 
Equally, Konstadinides (2011) explains that this is because European criminal law has 
developed and EU mechanisms have thus been adopted to ensure access, data collection 
and also exchange of data.401 This necessitates that private and public bodies cooperate 
with each other.402 
 
Walker (2011) notes that initially, the European Union Directive 2002/58/EC 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector was adopted and Article 15 particularly allowed for 
data retention for some time to protect “national security, defence, public security or the 
prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences of 
unauthorised use of the electronic communications system.”403 Subsequently, Directive 
2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (the Data Retention 
Directive) was adopted, resulting in harmonised data retention of between 6 and 24 
months in the European Union.404 This Directive permitted that individual data could be 
used when investigating, detecting and prosecuting serious crime in accordance with the 
definition adopted by the domestic law of the Member States and removed regulatory 
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dissimilarities in respect of electronic communications which impeded the internal 
market.405Pursuant to the Directive, listed providers had to retain location and traffic 
data and related data which was needed to identify users or subscribers, though this did 
not extend to retaining information which had been consulted or the content.406 
 
The UK adopted the Data Retention Directive by virtue of the Data Retention (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/2199).407 The Explanatory Memorandum of the 
Regulations states that “this valuable data has allowed investigators to identify 
suspects, examine their contacts, establish relationships between conspirators and place 
them in a specific location. Communications data is used in numerous other ways, 
including assisting investigation of suspects' interaction with victims and in support of 
suspects' alibi.”408 In the UK, the Regulations 2007 were replaced by the Data Retention 
(EC Directive) Regulations 2009, so that data from email, internet telephony and 
internet access is included and has to be retained across the board for 12 months, except 
where the provider has been requested to retain the data longer by virtue of the 2009 
Regulations.409 The Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection for the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (2005) noted that the Data 
Retention Directive has resulted in “a paradigm shift in the way society looks at traffic 
data.”410 Salgado (2014) also notes that the adoption of the Data Retention Directive was 
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controversial since it effectively permitted “blanket government surveillance on 
communications data.”411  
 
This was particularly the case since the European Commission did not consider it 
necessary to adopt any protective safeguards against possible abuses in respect of traffic 
communications data retention and stated that “specific additional provisions on general 
data protection principles and data security are not necessary.”412 Hence, the Data 
Protection Directive contained no such provisions. Salgado (2014) further explicates 
that the Data Retention Directive, whilst providing that data retention is only 
permissible for investigating, detecting and prosecuting serious crime and sharing it with 
competent authorities, failed to define what constitutes a serious crime (apart from the 
recitals of the Directive referring to organised crime and terrorism) and competent 
authorities and also did not clarify what data sharing procedures should be used and all 
this was left up to the Member States.413 
 
The European Data Protection Supervisor perceived such an approach as flawed and 
therefore noted that “a simple reference to the existing legal framework on data 
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protection (in particular the Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC) was not 
sufficient.”414  
Equally, the European Economic and Social Committee observed that it is likely that the 
Directive will be found unconstitutional by domestic courts since the approach to 
safeguard fundamental rights is too weak and the European Parliament Minority 
Opinion (2005) shared this view and considered that the time for which data has to be 
retained is too long.415 
 
Similarly, Walker (2011) questions whether this “indiscriminate interference with 
private information is necessary and proportionate within Article 8(2)” of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the latter Article guaranteeing the right to privacy, as 
further discussed below.416   In this context, Article 2(1) of the Council of Europe 
Recommendation No. R (87) 15 regulating the use of personal data in the police sector 
(1987) is also noteworthy since it states that personal data should only be gathered to the 
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extent that this is necessary to prevent particular criminal offences or to avert real 
danger and that exceptions to this should be clearly spelled out by domestic 
legislation.417 However, the Economic Crime Division of the Council of Europe (2008) 
points out that currently domestic legislation does not draw a distinction between 
criminal offences, surveillance or security investigation and that also different groups of 
data are not distinguished, for instance, “investigative (police) data”, which is also 
important to adhere to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. 418  However, 
Cannataci (1987) corroborates that the recommendation is not binding419  and equally 
Boehm (2012) points out that “the binding force of [the Recommendation and 
Convention] might be controversial.”420  
 
Konstadinides (2011) highlights that the Data Retention Directive raises thorny issues 
since “[r]etaining communication and location data of all citizens in the European 
Union has raised sensitive issues related to the far-reaching impact of EU 
harmonisation legislation on privacy and the protection of personal data” and strong 
legal safeguards should be therefore adopted to prevent abuse and to ensure that the 
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rights in Article 16 of the TFEU, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are not undermined.421  Equally, Bernal 
(2014) notes that the issue with the Data Retention Directive is that authorities may 
gather too much data.422  However, Harding and Harfield (2012) emphasise that when 
combating cybercrime, communications data can prove invaluable to identify patterns 
and criminal links and can help with prosecutions or with deciding whether or not more 
intrusive surveillance should be undertaken. 423  In contrast, Konstadinides (2011) 
considers that following the Data Retention Directive “[m]ere suspicion suffices to 
resort to actions, such as intense and all-encompassing telecommunications 
surveillance, bringing Member States close to the pervasive Orwellian ‘surveillance 
state’ model.”424 The danger is that innovation within information-delivery systems and 
large databases can assist authoritarian regimes to quell oppositions.425  It also leads to 
democratic states eroding fundamental rights and human rights and this may undermine 
the very foundation on which democracy and the rule of law is based, particularly if 
insufficient safeguards and checks and balances are implemented and stringently 
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enforced. 426  Hence, those who can access and use the new wealth of data about 
individuals should also be stringently enforced to counter the risk of an emergence of 
the Orwellian state.427  
 
In Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources428, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) 
found that the Data Retention Directive was invalid and illegal since fundamental rights 
were being breached in respect of private life, and personal data was insufficiently 
protected since the situations in which authorities could access information were not 
adequately restricted.429 Torremans (2014) points out that the court considered that there 
was far-reaching and particularly grave interference with Articles 7 and 8 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights which affirm the rights to respect for private life and 
communications and the protection of personal data and this interference was 
inconsistent with the EU principles of necessity, as well as proportionality.430 Hopkins 
(2014) observes that virtually “the entire European population” had their fundamental 
rights interfered with.431  As a result, the Directive was considered invalid from its 
inception. 432  The following five particular shortcomings were identified within the 
Directive by the Grand Chamber: Firstly, all persons, all traffic data and all 
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communications are covered and no limitation is imposed; secondly, no criteria are 
stipulated which domestic enforcement agencies have to make out to access data and 
equally no limitations are specified; thirdly, the periods for which data can be retained 
make no distinction in respect of the types of data in relation to the particular persons or 
the kind of investigation and the retention period is not limited to a necessary period; 
fourthly, there are no adequate safeguards to prevent that data is being abused or 
unlawfully accessed or used; fifthly, data does not have to be kept within the EU and 
resultantly insufficient control is exercised over the data.433 The decision cannot be 
appealed by the European Commission, though a new law can be proposed, but it may 
take years to adopt one.434 Salgado (2014) observes that the fact that the CJEU requires 
data to be kept within the European Union, may also cause problems, as very often 
global companies offer electronic communications services and which use cloud 
computing, so that such a restriction may impede economic and technological 
development.435 However, fundamentally the CJEU did not rule that data retention is 
unlawful per se, especially since the Directive does not permit that the content of 
communications can be acquired and also because data retention can be justified to be in 
the general interest and the issue with the Directive is that it failed to spell out the scope 
and extent to which an interference is permissible, as the scope of the data which can be 
retained is too wide, there is no relation between the communications data which is 
being retained and the public security threat, there are no criteria which competent 
authorities have to satisfy to access retained data, the different periods to retain data 
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have no criteria for a specific period, no safeguards have to be satisfied by providers 
which retain data and the data does not have to be stored within the EU.436  As a 
corollary, if these issues were rectified, data retention would be legal and not considered 
invalid. 
 
In response to the decision, the UK Home Office also stated “We are considering the 
judgment and its implications carefully. The retention of communications data is 
absolutely fundamental to ensure law enforcement have the powers they need to 
investigate crime, protect the public and ensure national security.”437 Salgado (2014) 
observes that the issue is that Member States, like the UK, which have transposed the 
Directive, have to change their laws and criminal convictions may even be challenged in 
case reliance is placed on retained data.438 Bernal (2014) notes that this is also why the 
UK government introduced the Communications Data Bill (now enacted as 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016).439 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 replaced the 
Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 and a targeted approach would have to 
be employed when data is being retained and surveillance powers are used.440 It has 
extended the powers further by allowing wide extraterritorial communication acquisition 
and interception powers, including in respect of communications content.441  
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The human rights advocacy group Liberty (2014) therefore labelled the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016  a “snoopers charter” and explains that communications data within 
the UK could be collected, retained and made available, resulting in “private companies 
be[ing] called upon to orchestrate blanket collection of personal data which they have 
no business to retain.”442 However, as pointed out by the UK government, “[w]ithout 
action there is a serious and growing risk that crimes enabled by email and the internet 
will go undetected and unpunished, that the vulnerable will not be protected and that 
terrorists and criminals will not be caught and prosecuted.”443  
 
The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 was temporarily adopted in 
order to replace the invalid UK regulations.444 Alder (2015) explains that under the Act 
the Secretary of State can publish a retention notice in which the means and time are 
detailed and this has to be upheld by the courts.445  It is lawful to obtain communication 
data for “the economic well-being of the UK”, though only in respect of national 
security, rendering it more difficult to exploit the data commercially by selling it to 
interested corporations and the Act may lapse if it is not renewed by September 2016.446 
Security has also been strengthened through the recent enactment of the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015 since pursuant to s.21 communications data from 
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which the internet address can be identified has to be retained by service providers, 
though not the “web logs.”  447 
It should be noted that the Investigatory Powers Act has received heavy criticism and 
after a recent court decision the UK government must re-write the whole Act in order to 
make it compatible with EU law.448  
1.14 The UK Evidence Rules on Admissibility for Criminal 
Proceedings 
Against the background of surveillance and data retention, it is important to scrutinise in 
which circumstances UK evidence law considers that evidence has been obtained by 
illegal or unfair means, so that it cannot be relied upon in court. This is important since 
the adoption of a comprehensive legislative framework to combat cybercrime in the 
UAE has to also clearly spell out in which circumstances the ubiquitous digital 
evidence, which is particularly generated by heightened surveillance and data retention, 
should not be used. This reinforces the rule of law and fosters legitimacy and 
accountability within the administration of justice. 
 
Gersch (2012) explains that as a result of comprehensive government communications, 
surveillance lawyers struggle to deal with problems pertaining to disclosure of evidence 
in court.449 However, in this context it is important to stress that emerging cyber law 
accepts that digital evidence for the court does not consist of providing extremely 
technical digital forensics through technological aids, but a “case-specific assertion of 
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fact that must be probably true in order to lend support to a legal claim.”450 S.78(1) of 
the UK Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 entitled “exclusion of unfair evidence” 
states: 
 
“In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, 
having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in 
which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have 
such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought 
not to admit it.” 
 
Accordingly, the abovementioned section confers discretion on judges to exclude 
evidence from the prosecution by virtue of, and as established by, the common law 
when unfair or illegal means have been used. This requires making recourse to Article 6 
of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to a fair trial and which has to be guaranteed 
due to the enactment of the ECHR by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998.451 Prior to 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, “illegally obtained evidence was very 
rarely excluded.”452 Yet as made clear by the House of Lords in R v Khan453  when 
referring to Schenk v Switzerland454 “the European Court of Human Rights … confirms 
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that the use at a criminal trial of material obtained in breach of the rights of privacy 
enshrined in Art.8 does not itself mean that the trial is unfair. Thus the European Court 
of Human Rights case law on this issue leads to the same conclusion as English law.”455 
Taylor highlights that this approach raises a problem since on the one hand police 
behaviour has to afford certain minimum safeguards to avoid that the right to privacy is 
not being breached in Article 8, but because evidence can be obtained in violation of 
Article 8, this means that “the standards set for policing action might be seen to be 
theoretical rather than practical.”456  
 
As also made clear in R v Maxwell,457 “[i]t is well established that the court has the 
power to stay proceedings in two categories of case, namely (i) where it will be 
impossible to give the accused a fair trial, and (ii) where it offends the court's sense of 
justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the particular circumstances of 
the case. In the first category of case, if the court concludes that an accused cannot 
receive a fair trial, it will stay the proceedings without more. No question of the 
balancing of competing interests arises. In the second category of case, the court is 
concerned to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system. Here a stay will be 
granted where the court concludes that in all the circumstances a trial will 'offend the 
court's sense of justice and propriety' (per Lord Lowry in R v Horseferry Road 
Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [1993] 3 All ER 138, at 161, [1994] 1 AC 42 at 74) or 
will 'undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system and bring it into 
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disrepute' (per Lord Steyn in R v Latif, R v Shahzad [1996] 1 All ER 353 at 360, [1996] 
1 WLR 104 at 112).” The issue is that when certain policing practices become 
normalised, it becomes more difficult to argue that the court should stay the 
proceedings. 
 
The seriousness of the offence will be considered in respect of the second 
consideration.458 Whilst some exceptions exists, for instance where torture has been 
used,459 in the old case of R v Leatham,460  Crompton J explained that “[i]t matters not 
how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence”461 and it has been 
held, for example, that an invasion of privacy is not a reason to exclude.462 Equally, in 
cybercrime cases it could be argued that the exclusion of retained data “would be a 
dangerous obstacle to the administration of justice”, as in the old case of Jones v 
Owen, 463  where a person was unlawfully searched, but the object was nonetheless 
admissible as evidence. 
 
In Fox v Chief Constable of Gwent,464 it was stated by Lord Fraser “...if the appellant 
had been lured to the police station by some trick or deception, or if the police officers 
had behaved oppressively towards the appellant, the justices' jurisdiction to exclude 
otherwise admissible evidence recognised in R v Sang might have come into play....” All 
the circumstances have to be therefore assessed by a judge when deciding whether to 
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exclude evidence, as explained by Lord Lane CJ in R v Quinn465 where it was stated 
“The function of the judge is therefore to protect the fairness of the proceedings, and 
normally proceedings are fair if a jury hears all relevant evidence which either side 
wishes to place before it, but proceedings may become unfair if, for example, one side is 
allowed to adduce relevant evidence which, for one reason or another, the other side 
cannot properly challenge or meet, or where there has been an abuse of process, eg 
because evidence has been obtained in deliberate breach of procedures laid down in an 
official code of practice.” These procedures are contained in the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) codes of practice, which ensure that police powers are 
regulated, so that public rights are not abused.466  
 
In the context of cybercrime this could occur in situations where no surveillance has 
been authorised under RIPA. Yet when there is an entrapment, then the evidence may be 
excluded, by virtue of s.78 or the proceedings can be struck out on the basis of an abuse 
of process.467 Similarly, when undercover operations are conducted, it has to be assessed 
whether evidence can be excluded.468 Nonetheless, the general principle was clearly 
espoused in the Privy Council case Kuruma Son of Kaniu v R469 by Lord Goddard CJ, 
who corroborated that “In their Lordships' opinion the test to be applied in considering 
whether the evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it 
is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained. 
                                                 
465 [1990] Crim LR 581 
466 Home Office, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) codes of practice, 26 March 2013 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/police-and-criminal-evidence-act-1984-pace-codes-of-practice> accessed 
1st December 2015I 
467 R v Looseley and Attorney General's Reference (No.3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2060 
468 R v Smurthwaite and Gill [1994] 1 All ER 898 
469 [1955] AC 197, 203; also see Jeffrey v Black [1978] QB 490 
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While this proposition may not have been stated in so many words in any English case 
there are decisions which support it, and in their Lordships' opinion it is plainly right in 
principle.”470 Accordingly, so long as the intercepts have been authorised, they do not 
breach the person's right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 6 of the ECHR and 
whilst they interfere with the person's Article 8 right to privacy under the ECRH, they 
do not have to be excluded.471 Hence, only when intercepts are made illegally in breach 
of the statute will the evidence be considered inadmissible, as for instance, in Sargent,472 
where the intercepts were used to obtain a confession when the person was being 
interviewed and the confession was then admitted as evidence,.473 
 
In contrast to evidence from unlawful intercepts, under RIPA evidence from 
unauthorised surveillance, including intrusive surveillance, is not inadmissible, though 
an accused may nevertheless argue that this constitutes an abuse of process or that the 
judge should use s.78 of PACE.474 This is because under Part II of RIPA, it is not 
rendered compulsory to obtain authorisation to undertake surveillance and no offence is 
committed when this happens, though enforcement agencies are best off to ensure that 
an authorisation has been granted to avoid that an accused arguing that his Convention 
rights have been breached.475 However, a communication can also be intercepted as part 
                                                 
470 Cited from R. Glover, P. Murphy, Murphy on Evidence (13th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2013) 57 
471 P [2002] 1 AC 146; R. Glover, P. Murphy, Murphy on Evidence (13th edn, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2013) 59 
472 [2003] 1 AC 347  
473 R. Glover, P. Murphy, Murphy on Evidence (13th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013) 59 
474 Editorial, Admissibility; Criminal evidence; Privacy; Surveillance; Telecommunications, Criminal 
Law Review 2000, 877-878, 878 
475 Ibid 
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of surveillance and there is thus some overlap.476 Generally, under RIPA evidence will 
be inadmissible from intercepted communication when the interception constitutes a 
criminal offence (ss.17 and 18 RIPA), but no criminal offence is committed when 
directed or unauthorised surveillance takes place and evidence is therefore not 
inadmissible.477 However, the judge has to nevertheless determine how to weigh the 
evidence and the case of Jones v University of Warwick478 is instructive, where a person 
was secretly filmed by an agent acting for insurers and it was found that the evidence 
was admissible. The court emphasised that it was warranted to inform that the insurers 
had behaved improperly and in an unjustified manner. Lord Woolf stated that “[t]he fact 
that the insurers might have been motivated by a desire to achieve what they considered 
would be a just result did not justify either the commission of trespass or the 
contravention of the claimants privacy which took place irrespective of whether the 
evidence could be obtained by other means.” The court penalised this behaviour when it 
awarded costs.479 
 
Accordingly, under RIPA, material, which has been gathered through covert 
surveillance, may be used in court and this can even extend to privileged conversations 
in case the conversations were undertaken for the purpose of fraud or crime.480 For 
                                                 
476 A. Hale, J. Edwards, Getting it taped, 12(3) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 2006, 71-
73, 71 
477 Ibid, 73 
478 [2003] EWCA Civ 151 
479 A. Hale, J. Edwards, Getting it taped, 12(3) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 2006, 71-
73, 73 
480 R v Cox and Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153; C's Application for Judicial Review, Re [2009] UKHL 15; 
[2009] 1 A.C. 908; also see D. Wicks, D. Carney, Covert surveillance, Case Comment, 82(2) Police 
Journal 2009, 183-186, 186 
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instance, in R v Turner (Elliott Vincent),481 it was held that pursuant to the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers (Extension of Authorisation Provisions: Legal Consultations) 
Order 2010482  surveillance could take place, even if legally privileged information483 is 
thereby acquired. However, the court also cautioned that efforts should be made to 
maintain legal privilege, so that the investigation and trial are not tainted by unfairness 
and s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 cannot be evoked.484 
 
It is important that the UAE also specifies the instances in which evidence should be 
excluded, as this will increase transparency within the administration of justice. 
Connected to this topic is also the question in which circumstances it should be deemed 
in the public interest to not disclose digital evidence. 
1.14.1 The UK Evidence Rules Governing Circumstances of Public 
Policy Non-Disclosure  
As cybercrime works includes sensitive public security areas, it is important that 
evidence is not admissible when this is in the public interest. In this context, sensitive 
evidence means “that which the prosecution considers should not be disclosed to the 
defence because it would constitute a real risk of serious prejudice to an important 
public interest’, and the prosecution do not have to produce sensitive computer evidence 
to the defence because ‘the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an 
                                                 
481 [2013] EWCA Crim 642 
482 (SI 2010/461) 
483 See s.98 of the Police Act 1997 
484 A. Roberts, Case Comment, R. v Turner (Elliott Vincent): evidence - surveillance, 12 Criminal Law 
Review 2013, 993-995, 994 
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absolute right.”485 Keane and McKeown (2012) explain that despite the principle that 
police sources shall not be disclosed being firmly established, the courts have only 
recently dealt with the matter under the public immunity doctrine.486 Yet Phillips J in R 
v Clowes487 acknowledged that it is difficult to balance achieving justice against the 
public interest. Nonetheless, the court has to determine which material should not be 
disclosed, as made clear by Part 1 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996 and s.21(2) thus retains the common law approach which assesses whether the 
public interest applies in the circumstances. Part 22 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 
2011 spells out the procedure which has to be followed by the prosecution when 
immunity is being sought.488 The procedure requires that the other side is notified of the 
type of excluded material, but when this discloses too much or when even the disclosure 
that there is any other material is too sensitive then an ex parte application can also be 
made.489 However, a judge cannot reach a decision on the basis of evidence, which has 
been excluded on the basis of public immunity, as this would violate Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR, as made clear in Edwards v UK.490 The issue is that s.15(3) of RIPA requires 
that intercept material is normally destroyed as soon as possible and may therefore not 
be seen by the judge. Keane and McKeown (2012) thus state that the scope for 
                                                 
485 Edwards and Lewis v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 24, 53; cited from I. Walden, S. Ramage, 
Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations, Publication Review, 72(1) Journal of Criminal Law 2008, 
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immunity on public policy grounds is very wide.491 Choo (2012) points out that it is, for 
instance, available when national security, international comity or diplomatic relations 
requires this.492  
 
Durston (2011) notes that in the House of Lords case of Conway v Rimmer,493 it was 
made clear that the test balanced  the administration of justice against non-disclosure for 
service to the state.494 Lord Reid opined “I do not doubt that there are certain classes of 
documents which ought not to be disclosed whatever their contents may be.”495 He 
explained that “[t]he police are carrying on an unending war with criminals many of 
whom are today highly intelligent. So it is essential that there should be no disclosure of 
anything which might give any useful information to those who organise criminal 
activities.”496  
 
Yet in Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England,497 Lord Keith disagreed when he noted 
“The courts are....concerned with the consideration that it is in the public interest that 
justice should be done and should be publicly recognized as having been done. This may 
demand,...in a very limited number of cases, that the inner workings of government 
should be exposed to public gaze, and there may be some who would regard this as 
likely to lead, not to captious or ill-informed criticism, but to criticism calculated to 
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improve the nature of that working as affecting the individual citizen.”498 However, this 
was not a criminal case, but concerned a claim by an oil company against the Bank 
England which had entered into an agreement to be rescued in accordance with the UK's 
economic policy and the disclosure request related to sensitive government documents. 
However, Munday (2013) explains that the exclusion of police sources is generally 
affirmed; so long as the defendant does not depend on the information to prove his 
innocence.499  
 
In certain circumstances it may also be necessary to conduct “closed material 
procedures” and special advocates have to be instructed, as highlighted by the Supreme 
Court case of Al Rawi v Security Service.500 In this case, two cases were conjoined to 
address the issue whether the government can litigate matters by employing closed 
procedures and secret evidence. 501  The Al Rawi case concerned civil claims for 
mistreatment, rendition and detention against the UK government, whereas the Tariq 
case was an employment tribunal case against the Home Office. It was held that 
parliament has to adopt legislation in order to permit that civil claims can be conducted 
by way of “closed material procedures.”502 
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Furthermore, pursuant to s.17 of RIPA, communications content is inadmissible; the 
section states that: 
“(1) … no evidence shall be adduced, question asked, assertion or 
disclosure made or other thing done in, for the purposes of or in connection 
with any legal proceedings which (in any manner) - 
(a) discloses, in circumstances from which its origin in anything falling 
within subsection (2) may be inferred, any of the contents of an intercepted 
communication or any related communications data; or 
(b) tends (apart from any such disclosure) to suggest that anything falling 
within subsection (2) has or may have occurred or be going to occur.”  
 
This section is a re-enactment of s.9 of Interception of Communications Act 1985, 
RIPA's predecessor. 503  Hence, revealing that an authorisation has been granted to 
intercept remains proscribed.504 Gersch (2012) points out that the problem with this 
section is that advocates are barred from submitting on behalf of their clients that they 
have been under surveillance, even if this is the case.505  
 
The UAE should also adopt legislation, which regulates instances in which evidence 
does not need to be disclosed, particularly in light of its plans to heavily invest in 
surveillance technology. 
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1.15 Summary 
The literature review has set out the theoretical context and relevant social science 
literature on cybercrime in relation to the legislative framework adopted by the UK, EU 
and UAE.  Key cybercrime terms have been defined and some of the challenges which 
have to be overcome in order to successfully fight cybercrime have been highlighted. As 
cybercrime is an emerging phenomenon, this constitutes a new field of study and which 
constantly raises new questions. For instance, the classification of cybercrime may 
change in the future in line with rapid technological innovation, which offers cyber 
criminals new criminal opportunities. Whilst previous research exists, this research is 
important, as it contributes to the ongoing debate of how to successfully fight 
cybercrime which is a dynamic and volatile phenomenon requiring new, innovative and 
effective legislative and policy responses. 
 
The cybercrime laws, which the UK has adopted, have been analysed and problems 
have been identified, as well as how these have been addressed. The UK has a wide 
arsenal of statutes, which can be evoked to prosecute cyber criminals and this caters for 
the ubiquitous nature of cybercrime. These laws have also been updated in light of 
European initiatives to fight cybercrime. The brief history of combating cybercrime at 
the European level has been studied and the latest steps, which have been taken, have 
been discussed. The European approach relies on mutual assistance in respect of 
criminal matters, establishing contact points for high-tech crime and setting up 
specialised agencies to fight cybercrime. A twin strategy is run through the creation of 
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ENISA, which is entrusted with protecting information systems. Legislative steps have 
also been taken in respect of attacks against information systems, particular offences 
have been created on a European wide basis and further measures have been adopted to 
harmonise rules in respect of jurisdiction, cooperation and liability. A European cyber 
security strategy has also been adopted, which places particular emphasis on 
safeguarding network and information security, including through reporting 
requirements. 
 
Subsequently, the literature review has critically discussed the cybercrime laws, which 
the UAE has adopted. It has been observed that Federal Legal Decree No. 5 for 2012 on 
combating cybercrimes is an important step to promote privacy, though other steps 
should also be taken in order to reinforce data security, which is a crucial constituent of 
any successful cybercrime strategy, as highlighted by the European approach. 
 
The surveillance laws in the UK have been studied, as without these law enforcement 
officers cannot effectively police the digital realm, which is characterised by anonymity. 
These laws are particularly instructive for the UAE, which at present has not put 
surveillance powers on a sufficient statutory footing, as also discussed in this literature 
review. Yet it is also important to avoid some of the criticism, which has been levied 
against the UK and the European approach, especially following the recent CJEU 
decision in Google Spain SL v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos 
(AEPD),506which highlights the importance to adopt effective safeguards against abuse, 
to safeguard data privacy and proportionality when data is being retained and used for 
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law enforcement purposes. The Google case has brought to the fore two kinds of 
criticism: Firstly that it was wrong to extend the term “data controllers” to search engine 
operators; and secondly, that the decision favours data erasure and thus overprotects the 
right to privacy and thereby empowers individuals too much and permits censorship 
without a proper oversight mechanism at the expense of the right to freedom of 
information or expression.507  The case could have been avoided if Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC had been clear on that point or if the proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation had already been adopted. The UAE should therefore improve its 
legislative framework for privacy and data protection in line not only with the old Data 
Protection Directive, but the European reform proposals, which are specifically designed 
to foster a digital market, which can cope with cyber attacks and are viewed as part of a 
twin strategy against cybercrime.  
 
The literature review also analysed the UK evidence rules on admissibility for criminal 
proceedings and the relevant rules governing circumstances of public policy non-
disclosure. These are very important, as data retention and data surveillance serve to 
facilitate law enforcement. Accordingly, a legislative framework has to be adopted by 
the UAE to spell out in which circumstances evidence is considered admissible or 
inadmissible. After having reviewed the applicable literature, the next Chapter will 
explain the methodology which will be used to meet the research objective to 
comprehensively compare the legislative frameworks, which the UK, the European 
Union and the UAE have adopted to combat e-crime in order to develop 
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recommendations, which will strengthen the existing legislative e-crime landscape and 
result in cybercrime being more effectively combated in the UAE. 
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
 
2. Introduction 
Fundamentally, the research seeks to realise the research objectives and for this reason a 
mixed method approach was chosen. This approach combined methods from law and 
the social sciences.  The researcher is a pragmatist and tried to find a practical solution 
to the problem of cybercrime and considered that reality is not just objective, but also 
subjective. It was therefore considered that methodological pluralism enriches the 
research, since the different research methods permit triangulation, as originally 
developed by Denzin.508 Accordingly, a number of methods were used to investigate the 
research question and to increase the validity and reliability of the findings.509  
 
The methodology followed the legal positivist tradition which assumes that knowledge 
can be ascertained from objective facts, i.e. laws510 and also drew upon the interpretivist 
approach in using qualitative interviewing. As the legislative response to cybercrime is 
mainly driven by external factors, as well as the social and political context of the 
development of legislation, and this is a new and emerging legal area, social science 
methods were also employed.511 This approach was selected to explore the impact and 
                                                 
508 N. K. Denzin, The Research Act in Sociology (Chicago, Aldine 1970) 50 
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effectiveness of existing e-crime legislation and to address the research question.512 This 
is also known as “the third wave” or “third paradigm”, which was combined with the 
philosophical companion of pragmatism in order to guide the design framework for the 
mixed methods research. 513  Consequently, the research was considered through the 
paradigm or lens of positivism and also interprevitism. As the research is particularly 
law-driven, the research may also be perceived as a type of postpositivism, because it 
implicitly supports the type of truth finding and analysis linked to positivism.514 A 
postpositivist conceptualisation of law perceives law realistically and understands it as 
falling within the sphere of social reality, and as existing outside the realm of legal 
scholarship, despite this also resulting in co-creation within a pragmatically evolving 
legal system.515  
 
In terms of the structure, this chapter starts with an explanation of the researcher’s 
ontological and epistemological world view. It is explained how this view influenced the 
research philosophy, design and strategy. Thereafter, the research methods are 
discussed, namely the doctrinal legal analysis/black letter law approach, the comparative 
method and empirical research. Subsequently, the chapter examines sensitive and ethical 
issues, the qualitative interviewing technique, and the type of sampling which was 
employed. The setting of the interviews and method of recording are described, as well 
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as how data quality was achieved. Data analysis techniques are discussed and how the 
researcher maintained ethics and ensured that the qualitative research can be published.  
2.1 Ontology 
The term “ontology” denotes the philosophical base for a particular theory and is the 
foundational underpinning of the theory.516 Guba and Lincoln observe that “paradigm 
issues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain, ought to go about the business of inquiry 
without being clear about just what paradigm informs and guides his or her 
approach.”517 As the research adopts a mixed methods approach, it is underpinned by a 
combination of positivism and interpretivism, though the black letter approach may not 
be perceived as truly positivist in the social science sense as it is a form of documentary 
analysis which is categorised as a qualitative approach in social research.518Despite 
criticisms that these two systems of inference (positivism and interpretivism) are 
irreconcilable polarities, it has been convincingly argued that using both can enrich and 
even fine-tune research findings.  On this matter it has been asserted that whereas 
positivists identify and recognise patterns in qualitative data, an interpretivist will try to 
establish why the patterns exist, by looking for the causal mechanisms at work and the 
context in which they occur, when applied together it is believed they are very effective 
tools in generating and implementing sustainable solutions based on the research 
findings, which is in accord with the ultimate aims of this study. 519  
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Essentially, it may be more accurate to perceive these two paradigms as being rooted 
within “communities of practice”, as different methods were mixed, this may better lend 
itself to the pragmatist origins, for it integrates the inherent diversity and results in the 
various methodological selections being better understood. 520  This means that the 
research is more practice-based, there is more collaboration connected to the core 
research objective and increased flexibility and permeability, moreover, there is no 
monolithic way, but an amalgamation of various research entities.521 Accordingly, the 
researcher considers that an overly restrictive labelling of numerical data into 
quantitative and other methods as qualitative could frustrate the underlying objective of 
the mixed method approach, which is not necessarily concerned with creating 
separateness between positivism and interpretivism.522 In this context, it is emphasised 
that this research is predominantly concerned with legal positivism, which is different to 
typical positivism with its overwhelming emphasis on a numerical approach. 
Nonetheless, even without falling into the trap of perceiving mixed method research as a 
disjointed amalgamation of two opposing paradigms, it is crucial to consider each 
paradigm in turn, as well as its philosophical roots. 
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In terms of the ontology, positivism assumes that there is a stable and objective reality, 
and that laws and legal cases and the development of the law can be observed and 
measured. It is therefore assumed that reality is distinct from the experience of a person, 
irrespective of the beliefs of a person.523 Reality is therefore external since objects, 
subjects and responsibilities, as well as values and rules objectively exist and can be 
identified.524 Positivism is characterised by its logical, rational and verbal approach, 
which is free of value judgements.525 Similarly, legal positivism perceives law as value-
free principles which can be identified since they have been “posited”, generally through 
rules which have been enacted through the proper legislative process.526 Knowledge is 
therefore created from scientific, legal, scholarly methods in line with the realist 
ontology, as laws and cases can be objectively identified.527  
 
Positivism originates in France and assumed importance after the French Revolution.  It 
was promulgated by Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, who sought to 
introduce an element of natural science into the study of society. 528  For Comte, 
positivism perceives all research phenomena to be governed by natural laws and 
emphasises the importance of discoverable facts over unobservable causes. The 
positivist movement was also influenced by Weber and Durkheim, who further paved 
                                                 
523 B. Hjorland, Empiricism, rationalism and positivism in library and information science, 61(1) Journal 
of Documentation 2005, 130-155, 140   
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the way for a more scientific approach towards sociology.529 Weber employed causality 
to bridge the gap between social science and natural science.530 Durkheim looked at the 
given and viewed it as part of the natural order and thus as a manifestation and focused 
on discovering this given, thereby embracing an inherently realist view towards the 
theory of knowledge.531 He embraced a form of “idealist empiricism;” he looked for 
“social facts” which were created through a collective conscience made up of external 
limitations and norms, and that were internalised by people through their socialisation 
and moral and cultural education.532  
Parsons built upon Durkheim's sociology and perceived it as a move away from “radical 
positivism” to “analytical realism.”533 For Parsons, positivism is a methodological tool 
i.e. a means to depict complicated opinions about the criteria and drivers which funnel 
action and society.534 Parsons viewed everything being objectively observed as positive 
facts and which can therefore be counted as reality and constituted as “total thought.”535 
Both Durkheim and Parsons were concerned with the issue of order through a 
“functionalist conception of social systems.” 536 
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For Parsons, social equilibrium is established through “four functional imperatives”. 
First, there has to be “adaptation” so that acts are adapted to link the environment to the 
system; second, there has to be “goal attainment”, this requires acts which lead to 
resources being made available to realise and achieve these goals; third, there has to be 
“integration”, so that these acts are controlled and coordinated; and fourth, there has to 
be “pattern maintenance”/”latency”, so that those who perform these acts are sufficiently 
motivated.537 Hence, the way in which relations are being structured between people 
engaged in cooperative processes is “essentially the structure of the social system.”538 A 
common value system is thereby created which promotes social integration since society 
shares the same norms, standards and expectations. 539 With respect to this study, the 
legal system is a “social system”540  which is made up of legally valid rules which the 
legislators and courts have authoritatively stipulated. 541  However, this system 
predominantly centres on legal relationships, as opposed to legal rules, though legal 
norms facilitate increased understanding of these relationships.542  
 
Durkheim and Parsons are often associated as the forefathers of functionalist theory 
which underpins positivism. 543  Functionalism has four distinct features: Firstly, 
functionalism emphasises that human conduct has fixed characteristics and structures, 
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and these macrostructures are what is being studied; secondly, it is assumed that social 
structures can preserve or weaken social structure and it is therefore investigated how 
these structures fulfil their function; thirdly, functionalists argue that these structures 
depend on common values; and fourthly, functionalism has been perceived as a force to 
create stability and impose conservative values.544 A key preoccupation of functionalism 
is “equilibrium,” since the functional approach is closely associated with promulgating 
a “theory of society as a whole or totality”, whilst perceiving “society as an integrated 
social system.”545 Under this structural theory, as first espoused by Merton, individual 
behaviour is the result of social structures.546 By way of an example, Chapman uses 
cultural standards and norms which produce “value consensus.”547 Hence, it is assumed 
that social arrangements contribute greatly to creating and maintaining society.548  
 
Merton is another advocate of functionalism, though of a more flexible form, which 
incorporates empirical applications.549 He advocates functional equivalence and argues 
that institutions can have negative and positive effects on society or specific groups, and 
recommends linking empirical findings with theory as utilised in this study. 550  He 
criticises Parsons for making absolute statements and was of the opinion that theorising 
by itself is insufficient, but that empirical studies are required to depict “empirical social 
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reality.” 551  This type of functionalism is a useful perspective for empiricism and 
positivism.552 This is because positive studies are based on an ontology of a nomothetic 
methodology, which examines big groups to identify general norms of behaviour which 
apply to all.553 “Nomos” is Greek and means “laws”554 and considers that persons are a 
complex amalgamation of a variety of universal rules, so it is better to observe a large 
group.555 The quantitative methodology lends itself towards identifying such laws since 
the person becomes subsumed within what others say through statistical means.556 
Deterministic laws can thereby be identified through mechanical natural science 
methods.557 However, the application of such laws may be unethical and the findings 
may only generate superficial accounts.558 
 
Moreover, the manner in which laws are interpreted or enforced can vary from case to 
case, and this is another reason why the paradigm of interpretivism has also been chosen 
for the research, as the researcher believes that reality is a social construct.559 As persons 
create social reality, interpretivism emphasises “understanding”560 i.e. interpreting what 
meaning individuals give and assign to a particular phenomenon.561  Hence, reality is 
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made up of these “interpretative processes” and the researcher therefore reconstructed 
the accounts by those who were interviewed into a scientific description about the 
research topic.562 This interpretive approach is rooted in a relativist epistemology, an 
ideographic methodology, nominalism and a voluntary perspective of human identity.563 
 
Epistemic relativism opposes the perspective that statements can be objectively assessed 
or universally applied since general views are not permanent.  Rather, they can be 
determined by the population being influenced to hold such a belief, or could be the 
result of intellectual efforts to realise unity of interests.564 It thus introduces relativism, 
scepticism and subjectivism. 565  As a relativist, absolute knowledge does not exist 
because it can be observed that opinions about different subjects vary and the 
assumptions on which these views are based depend on the background or the particular 
circumstances which the person has experienced. 566  Accordingly, such a stance 
considers that facts are not absolute facts and epistemic relativism contends that the 
knowledge which persons hold can change and is relative and that therefore all 
knowledge is relative and it is only possible to identify the facts which a person holds at 
a time, but that there are no absolute standards which justify these assumptions.567 
 
                                                 
562 D. Scott, M. Morrison, Key Ideas in Educational Research (London, Continuum International 
Publishing Group 2006) 131 
563 D. J. Falconer, D. R. Mackay, The Key to the Mixed Method Dilemma, Proclamation of 10th 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems 1999, 286-297, 288 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.5.148&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed 1st 
August 2015 
564 S. Luper, Epistemic Relativism, 14 Philosophical Issues Epistemology 2004, 271-295, 271 
565 Ibid 
566 M. Seidel, Epistemic Relativism: A Constructive Critique (Basingstole, Palgrave Macillan 2014) 9 
567 J. Matheson, ‘Epistemic Relativism’ in (eds) A. Cullison, The Bloomsbury Companion to 
Epistemology (London, Bloomsbury 2014) Chapter 9 
137 
 
Idiographic research focuses on examining individuals in order to obtain unique 
knowledge about them which is very detailed.568 The word “idios” means “own” or 
personal” in Greek and when such an approach is adopted humans are perceived as 
inimitable. 569  The qualitative approach is particularly useful to comprehensively 
understand the person since it is more flexible and exhaustive since knowledge is 
created which is situational and contextual which allows that broad themes and 
categories can be developed.570  Individual opinions about the research phenomenon 
become comprehensively understood, including particular issues which would otherwise 
not have been identified. 571  However, the issue is that idiographic studies are 
unscientific and do not generate results which can be generalised due to the 
unrepresentative sample and subjective processes.572 As a result, it is often argued that 
such research studies cannot address real-world issues, despite the fact that these studies 
are conducted in a natural setting, which is less controlled than quantitative studies.573 
 
Interpretive research is also influenced by an ontological perspective based on 
nominalism. 574  Nominalism holds that individuals are the “building blocks” which 
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underlie “constructivistic systems.”575 Individual parts make up reality, which renders it 
difficult to recognise universalism, since primacy is afforded to the specific. 576 
Nominalism finds its underpinnings in extensionalism 577  which does not accept 
characteristics, attributes or properties of classes since they are aggregates and do not 
permit the individual to be identified. 578  For nominalists, words are only used 
meaningfully to identify whether a statement is false or true, but not to identify 
universally true statements since words are syncategorematic i.e. are not generally 
universals. 579  A nominalistic approach therefore supposes that everything is 
individualistic and it is therefore not the task to look for the general in the specific and 
as a result themes of knowledge do not give rise to a separate reality, though modern 
nominalists compare “individuals and sums of their parts.” 580  Modern nominalism 
focuses on the individual or individual characteristics and reduces the metaphysical 
reality to actual existence and thereby rejects abstract ideas and universals and engages 
in a dialect between what is going on outside and inside the mind since concepts are 
subjective and personal since terms are determined by the meaning which a person 
assigns to it and truth is thus established through communicating unique data, particular 
perceptions and representations.581 This form of epistemology is driven by autonomy 
and individualism and depends on what can be inferred through consciousness and what 
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thoughts are formed because of signs and theories, so that real knowledge can only 
come from obvious certitudes through a first person perspective because the human 
mind creates knowledge and objective recognition from what there is or builds it 
therefrom through logic based on what is purposeful, practical and ontic. 582 This also 
presupposes that individuals volunteer data.583   
 
These different philosophical bases underlying the paradigm of positivism and 
interpretivism guided the researcher. The question of “what there is”584 was thus not 
just answered from the objective, but also the subjective stance, resulting in a more in-
depth understanding of the research phenomenon.585 The researcher therefore assumed 
that the world exists, i.e. adopted a realist position, whilst he also considered that the 
human mind creates the world, i.e. a constructionist position was employed.586  
 
 
2.2 Epistemology 
The term “epistemology” denotes the particular paradigm or worldview and very often 
has been described as “theories of knowledge” or “ways of knowing” or more precisely 
“the individual lens, created through our world view that we use to understand 
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knowledge in the world.”587 In terms of the epistemology for this research, it is primarily 
considered that the reality is objective and “beyond the human mind” and this is why 
the main chosen method for this doctrinal research was a “content analysis.”588 This 
thus constitutes expository research since laws and cases, which represent black letter 
law, were studied.589 Empiricism was thus endorsed, i.e. objectivism, as opposed to the 
interpretive approach, but due to the mixed method research approach the subjective and 
qualitative experiences of individuals were also studied in line with the ontological 
foundations, discussed above. 590  Whilst laws arguably take precedence, this is not 
entirely the case since laws are interpreted and enforced by individuals. 
 
Furthermore, by also adopting the interpretive approach, it was avoided that an overtly 
descriptive account of the law was given,591 which is uncritical.592 Interprevitism looks 
at reality as being inherently subjective and therefore emphasise understanding, as 
opposed to offering causal explanations, which positivism does.593 By opting for mixed 
methods research, the researcher chose the “third wave”, as no purist stance was taken 
i.e. the researcher did not solely pursue a positivist or interpretivist research method.594 
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Instead a pragmatic approach, which utilised the advantages of each method and 
minimised the disadvantages associated with each respective method, was chosen.595 
 
2.3 Research Philosophy 
The philosophy underlying the methodology helps in identifying the most suitable 
methods to evaluate the data and therefore assists with answering the research questions. 
Hence, the chosen philosophy should be explained, since this facilitates critical thinking 
and leads to the development of other questions.596 
 
The philosophical assumptions underlying the mixed methods approach influenced the 
research methods and the nature of the inquiry since they represented the underlying 
worldviews on which the study was based.597 Johnson and Gray explicate that “[d]uring 
the emergence of [Mixed Methods (MM)] MM as a third methodological paradigm 
(along with [quantitative] QUAN and [qualitative] QUAL), MM has struggled 
somewhat with to develop a corresponding philosophical paradigm. Many or perhaps 
most leaders in the field are advocating some form of philosophical pragmatism.”598 
 
A pragmatic research philosophy was chosen, so that “theory and practice” can be 
captured and not much emphasis was placed on “intellectual disputes” between 
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positivism and interpretivism.599 Hence, overall a pragmatic research philosophy was 
adopted, as the objective approach was mixed with the subjective stance. 600  This 
pragmatic stance did override adherence to one specific paradigm, but instead viewed 
the two worldviews as additional methodological and practical choices. 601  This 
necessitated familiarity with the arguments in favour and against mixed methods, 
required that risks were taken and choices were justified.602 Yet one of the issues with 
pragmatism is that it may result in thoughtless practicalism and epistemic relativism, so 
that subjectivism becomes applied to logic and facts.603 Resultantly, the researcher tried 
to robustly defend all choices and perspectives. 
2.4 Research Choices 
Positivism perceives that reality is objective and this suggests that the researcher should 
be detached from the research participants and employ techniques, which accord with 
the natural science approach. 604  Whilst positivism is normally associated with 
quantitative data collection methods and statistical analysis, it is important to point out 
that this is slightly different in relation to law. 605  The researcher did not use 
questionnaires to gather data. Nonetheless, this research scrutinised data from the 
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positivist perspective of thought.606 This means that the quantitative parts of the thesis 
were explanation- and description-oriented and the literature played a fundamental role 
and provided the justification for conducting the research and the findings were clearly 
observable and specific and the data were the legal statutes and cases, which were 
analysed and interpreted and objective and unbiased conclusions were drawn.607 The 
qualitative part of the research focused on understanding and was therefore more 
exploratory and the literature did not play an important role or did not provide 
justifications for the research.608 Instead the opinions and experiences of a small group 
of individuals were centre-stage, so that the data was broad and general. Their 
descriptions were analysed and themes were developed in order to ascertain the bigger 
picture behind the findings and conclusions were drawn, but which were flexible and 
emergent and also possibly biased.609   
 
 
 
 
2.5 Research Design, Approach and Strategy 
As the research is predominantly rooted in legal positivism, inductive reasoning was 
primarily employed.  Induction is the base of positivism, as made clear by the founding 
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fathers of legal positivism, starting with Bentham, Austin, Kant and later Kelsen and 
who separated law from morality, which thereby aided with the claim that law resembles 
more the empiricist paradigm.610 
 
However, as a mixed method approach was pursued, deductive reasoning supplemented 
this main approach.611  When deductive logic was employed, a true conclusion was 
reached when the evidence supported this. 612  In contrast, inductive logic implies a 
conclusion which is uncertain and exceeds the evidence.613 Inductive reasoning is thus 
called “bottom up thinking” because it starts with specifics and moves to the abstract 
and general principles. 614  This approach is data-driven. 615  Instead deductive logic 
applies rules or general observations to guestimate specifics and this approach is 
therefore described as “top-down.” 616 This approach is hypothesis-driven.617 Deductive 
logic generates either invalid or valid conclusions, whereas inductive logic can be strong 
or weak and all depends on how much the conclusion is supported by the evidence.618 
An inductive approach was adopted for the black-letter law analysis and the comparative 
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legal research.619 Accordingly, the researcher commenced “from the purpose of the 
study and move...on to delineate specific research questions.” 620  Additionally,  a 
qualitative analysis was conducted, as even a clear legislative regime can result in 
unreliable decisions and as this thesis combines a legal and social science 
methodological approach. Deductive reasoning was therefore employed to identify 
themes from the data provided by the interviewees.621 Deductive logic was also used to 
apply the legal rules to factual situations i.e. to refer to examples provided by the 
interviewees and to draw conclusions. 622  Unique insights were thereby gained, for 
instance, about the specific actions of individuals.623  
 
 
2.6 Doctrinal Legal Analysis 
A doctrinal or black letter law approach was adopted for a significant part of the thesis, 
as the relevant laws in the UK, the European Union and the UAE were studied.624 This 
form of research “provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular 
legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, 
perhaps, predicts future developments.”625 Accordingly, an in-depth legal analysis of 
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cybercrime laws, data protection, data retention, data surveillance and digital evidence 
laws, and case law in the UAE and UK was carried out. Hence, all relevant primary 
sources, such as UK Acts of Parliament, European legislation and UAE laws and cases, 
were studied. Additionally, relevant secondary sources, such as books, journals, articles, 
reports, webpages, were examined to present important arguments and debates by 
academics. 626 The law was faithfully presented and this necessitated a “sound legal 
analysis” and the researcher viewed the doctrinal methodology as “a process...to achieve 
pragmatic solutions” after a careful review of the applicable literature, so that it became 
fully understood “what is known and not known.”627 The researcher first identified 
relevant sources and subsequently analysed and interpreted these in order to identify 
core ideas and to condense these by employing problem solving and reasoning skills, 
drawing analogies and making use of inductive and deductive reasoning.628  
 
Furthermore, the research adopted a critical perspective when laws were analysed. 
Hence, not just a descriptive account was provided of the applicable legal rules, but the 
law was also put into context. 629  Otherwise, the research may have resulted in a 
“narrow-minded black letter” approach, which “lack[s] the intellectual capacities to go 
beyond the mere technical analysis of positive law.”630 For instance, it was explored 
whether any gaps exist within the legislative framework which the UAE has adopted, 
particularly when benchmarked against UK e-crime legislation and the European 
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approach towards data retention and network and information security. Equally, this is 
not just a highly conservative study, which precludes a discussion of law reform, as 
issues are highlighted.631 For instance, the European Commission recently highlighted 
why the UK Data Protection Act 1998 appears to fall foul of EU Directive 95/46/EC and 
such criticism is discussed and born in mind when recommendations were formulated 
for the UAE.632 
 
2.7 Comparative Legal Research 
The comparative method was adopted, and knowledge was gathered about the UK and 
European Union approaches and then the UAE framework was studied to identify 
differences and similarities.633 This method was chosen to suggest legislative solutions 
for the global problem of cybercrime and to generate new knowledge. Laws were 
compared and a new perspective to the currently adopted regime in the UAE was 
described.634 This was useful because an understanding was reached about the UAE’s 
legal system. The research therefore helps in grasping the UAE’s view on this important 
topic. It allows the UAE to borrow ideas in this newly emerging field, whilst taking into 
account the UAE’s particular legal, economic and social culture.635  
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There are various reasons for choosing the UK and the EU as a comparator: The UK 
approach is different to the e-crime legislation, which the UAE has adopted. As 
developed countries with a strong technological base, the UK and EU have a well-
developed digital space, which has aided online business and e-commerce. 636  The 
comparative approach thus served to generate “model solutions”, as the UK and 
European framework offer “a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up in a 
lifetime by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in his own system.”637  A 
very comprehensive understanding was reached about the underlying legal principles in 
an area of law that requires legal reform in most countries around the world.638 By 
explaining how the UK, EU and the UAE currently regulate this area, it also becomes 
easier for governments to co-operate, as the legal rules and principles are being 
communicated.639 New insights were also gained when the English common law system 
and European system were studied and compared to the UAE system, which is based on 
the religious Sharia law, as different families of law were analysed.640   
 
 
2.8 Empirical Legal Research 
The empirical method was chosen in order to assess the impact of the law. This is 
important as cybercrime laws are utilised and enforced by law enforcement agencies and 
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interpreted by judges and relied upon by other stakeholders, such as businesses. Not that 
many cybercrime cases have been heard in the UAE and conducting interviews helped 
to understand the experiences of relevant stakeholders involved in combating 
cybercrime or affected by it. The researcher therefore interviewed a small sample of 
senior UAE experts from the judiciary, police, the office of prosecution, Interpol and the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. A qualitative interview approach was 
employed in order to enable a full exploration of the topic.   
 
This method ensured that the UAE law was put into context, as social, economic and 
political factors were considered, including the different interests of stakeholders, 
namely government and enforcement agencies. Hence, the research took into account 
economic, social, political factors, as “[l]aw is...the vernacular through which power 
and wealth justify their exercise and shroud their authority.”641 The views of these very 
high-ranking individuals assumed much importance.642  
 
 
 
2.9 Researching Sensitive Issues and Ethics 
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The researcher took due account that research may deal with sensitive matters i.e. 
matters which are stressful or private, lead to fear or branding or are politically laden.643 
For instance, research about child abuse has been found to cause distress to participants 
who were themselves victims.644 Equally a topic is sensitive when a threat arises as a 
result of the data collection or the data dissemination may cause problems for the 
researcher. 645  The type of individuals who are being interviewed may also be 
affected.646 In this context, Lee explicates that there can be three kinds of threats: firstly, 
those which are intrusive, secondly, those which have a sanction and thirdly, those 
which have political ramifications. 647 As a result, the researcher may be stigmatised due 
to the research topic, his career may be affected, for instance, because matters have been 
revealed which should not have been disclosed, the researcher may receive anonymous 
threats or face presentational dangers because of the publication being associated with 
the researcher. 648  Hence, a very comprehensive approach was adopted and it was 
therefore considered whether there is indirect harm and not just typical subject matters 
were classified as sensitive topics.  
 
Research highlights that sometimes researchers have to cope with emotionally or 
physically difficult issues and that it is therefore important that researchers are 
                                                 
643 H. McCosker, A. Barnard, R. Gerber, Undertaking Sensitive Research: Issues and Strategies for 
Meeting the Safety Needs of All Participants, 2(1) Forum Qualitative Social Research 2001 
<http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/983/2142> accessed 15 July 2015 
644 S. E. Decker, A. E. Naugle, R. Carter-Visscher , K. Bell, A. Seifert, Ethical Issues in Research on 
Sensitive Topics: Participants’ Experiences of Distress and Benefit, 6(3) Journal of Empirical Research 
on Human Research Ethics: An International Journal 2011, 55-64, 55 
645 Ibid 
646 V. Dickson-Swift, E. L. James, P. Liamputtong, Undertaking Sensitive Research in the Health and 
Social Sciences, Managing Boundaries, Emotions and Risks (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2008) 1 
647 R. M. Lee, Doing Research on Sensitive Topics (London, SAGE 1993) 4  
648 Ibid; G. Adshead, C. Brown, Ethical Issues in Forensic Mental Health Research (London, Kessica 
Kingsley Publishers Ltd 2003) 91 
151 
 
sufficiently trained, prepared and there is supervision, in order to ensure that any risks 
are  mitigated. 649  Consequently, possible problems have to be anticipated and the 
researcher has to be prepared to end a research relationship in a courteous manner when 
this appears necessary.650 The personal safety of the researcher is also ensured by not 
furnishing personal address and contact details, conducting the interviews in public 
locations and alerting another person of the interview location and meeting time or 
adopting a lone working policy, using a SIM card for a phone number which is solely 
used for the research, carefully observing whether the interviews trigger any emotional 
responses and having regular debriefings with a supervisor.651 However, this research 
was not sensitive or emotionally or physically challenging. 
 
Most fundamentally, the researcher acknowledges that he owes a duty of care.652 This 
duty of care is owed to multiple parties, for instance, colleagues, research subjects and 
the research community. 653  Ethical behaviour commands adherence to various 
fundamental values: Firstly, scrupulous honesty, so that research findings are not 
fabricated or fraudulent; secondly, integrity, so that the research is rooted on firm moral 
principles and consistent beliefs and values; thirdly; fairness, so that benefits and 
burdens resulting from the research are equally shared; and fourthly, respect, so that all 
those who are involved in the research are duly venerated, including by upholding their 
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rights. 654  Moreover, compliance with the principles of justice, beneficence and 
autonomy can be used to overcome tensions between the research objectives and the 
rights of the interview participants.655 
 
Additionally, research participants were shielded from any harm and whilst the research 
topic does not deal with controversial matters, it was ensured that interviews were in no 
way distressing.656  The researcher obtained written consent from the Ministry of Justice 
in the UAE to conduct this research.657 Furthermore, informed consent was sought from 
the research participants and ‘informed’ not only meant that those who participated in 
the research appreciated that they authorised the researcher, but also in respect of which 
aspects and the latter required details about the objectives of the research, the methods, 
risks, discomforts and inconveniences and how the findings will be used, for instance, 
for the publication of articles or the thesis.658 This necessitated that research participants 
were provided with sufficient information to understand to what they consented to, but it 
may not always be easy to determine what a person considers material to reach their 
decision to participate.659 
The participants were informed that they can refuse to take part and are only volunteers, 
who can even throughout the entire process refuse their consent to participate.660 The 
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research participants were not coerced, persuaded or manipulated to reach a particular 
decision.661 This ensured that primacy was given to the research participants and their 
autonomy was not being evaded.662  
 
As the thesis also contains qualitative findings, which are detailed and rich and describe 
unique circumstances, there was a higher danger that confidentiality may be 
compromised.663 The researcher therefore ensured that anonymity was preserved. The 
names of those who participate were kept anonymous.664 Before data was collected, 
interviews were assigned letters, for instance, each interview participant had a specific 
letter assigned (i.e. interviewee A) and the name of the persons was noted down on a 
separate sheet, which is kept in a different and secure location (i.e. in a locked filing 
cabinet or password protected electronic device) which only the researcher can 
access.665 
 
Moreover, information about the characteristics of participants which may identify 
them, such as occupation or city, was not disclosed, so that no deductive disclosure 
takes place and internal confidentiality is maintained.666 The main objective was to 
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achieve full confidentiality for each research participant.667 A thorough data cleansing 
process was followed and rare traits which may identify individuals were deleted, but 
the issue is that there may still remain contextual identifiers.668 In such instances, data 
was modified in a way which did not alter essential information.669 In cases where it was 
not possible to remove personal identifiers, consent was sought from the particular 
interview participants to nonetheless release the data.670  
 
Moreover, ‘off the record’ comments were not included, as this would breach 
confidentiality, though the researcher clarified whether and if so, in which way the 
research participants felt comfortable to have such information included in the 
research.671 After conclusion of each interview, debriefings took place, so that feedback 
could be provided, research participants were thanked for their participation and 
provided with interview transcripts and details about how to obtain possible results from 
the research.672 Participants were also enabled to access any personal content and to read 
interview transcripts and to point out inaccuracies and comment on the content.673 They 
could also choose that their comments were not included.674  
 
                                                 
667 B. Baez, Confidentiality in qualitative research: Reflections on secrets, power and agency, 2 
Qualitative Research 2002, 35–58, 32 
668 M. Tolich, Internal confidentiality: When confidentiality assurances fail relational informants, 27 
Qualitative Sociology 2004, 101–106, 102 
669 K. Kaiser, Protecting Respondent Confidentiality in Qualitative Research, 19(11) Qualitative Health 
Research 2009, 1632-1641, 1634 
670 Ibid 
671 R. Wiles, What are Qualitative Research Ethics? (London, Bloomsbury Academic 2013) 50 
672 E. A. Buchanan, Readings in Virtual Research Ethics: Issues and Controversies (London, Information 
Science Publishing 2004) 19 
673 S. E. Israel, C. A. Lassonde, The Ethical Educator, Integrating Ethics within the Context of Teaching 
and Teacher Research (New York, Peter Lang Publishing Inc 2007) 23 
674 Also see D. C. Blankenship, Applied Research and Evaluation Methods in Recreation (Leeds, Human 
Kinetics 2010) 78 
155 
 
Not only the common law duty of confidentiality was guaranteed, but there was full 
compliance with the Data Protection Act 1988, including the following eight data 
protection principles:675 Personal information was fairly and lawfully processed; the 
processing only took place in respect of limited purposes; the processing was relevant, 
adequate and not disproportionate; accuracy was maintained; data was not retained for a 
longer period than what was necessary; the processing was undertaken in compliance 
with the rights of the data subjects; the data was kept secure; and data protection was 
also adequate in case it was transferred to a country outside the European Economic 
Area (EEA).676 
 
As the data was retained for some time, the data was properly managed and kept 
securely.677  
Strategies were adopted to ensure secure storage, for instance, back-ups were made, data 
was stored in open standard and non-proprietary formats, data was stored on different 
types of storage; paper notes were stored in PDF and a secure location was used to keep 
the data which can only be accessed by the researcher; confidential data was not stored 
on external networks; regular security updates were made and the computer was 
protected by a firewall; passwords were used to lock the computer system and 
encryption was employed to control access; and confidential data was not be sent by 
email, but only as encrypted file.678 Data will not be stored for more than five years and 
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will thereafter be destroyed.679 Paper-based documents will be shredded in accordance 
with the German Institute for Standardisation DIN 3 standard, which requires confetti 
like bits no bigger than 4x40 mm or strips no bigger than two millimetre.680 Digital files 
will be overwritten several times until they are permanently deleted and additionally, a 
magnet may be used to erase the data.681 
 
Throughout the research, it was ensured that the research was conducted in accordance 
with the University's ethical code of conduct and the highest ethical standards.682Ethics 
permission has been gained from the university’s ethics committee and the research 
adheres to the British Society of Criminology’s Code of Ethics for Researchers in the 
Field of Criminology.683  
 
 
 
2.10 Qualitative Interviewing 
The researcher conducted interviews and this method provided a more in-depth 
understanding of the topic than if quantitative  methods were used  for instance, 
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surveys.684 Semi-structured interviews were held i.e. core questions were developed in 
order to outline  the topics which were discussed, thereby permitting the interviewee or 
interviewer to deviate during the interview, so that more data could be provided about 
particular matters.685 Hence, this type of interview was more flexible than structured 
interviews and made it possible that participants could speak about matters which they 
considered important in relation to the research topic.686 Yet the disadvantage was that it 
was more difficult to interpret follow-up questions since not all participants answered 
the same follow-up question and this may result in bias, for instance, if the interviewer 
only probed particular questions or did this in a particular manner.687 
 
The objective of conducting interviews was to ascertain the beliefs, experiences and 
views about the legal cybercrime framework and to explore the way in which the 
framework operates in practice.  As the cybercrime legal regime is fairly new and this is 
an emerging topic, not much is known about the impact of UAE cybercrime laws which 
have been enacted. Open-ended questions were asked which generated a lot of data 
about the research phenomenon and which aimed to answer the research objectives.688 
The researcher also enquired about the background and occupation of the interview 
participant, so that these could be located in respect to other persons.689 
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The researcher did not ask leading, double-barrelled or long questions, or questions 
which negated or had a socially desirable answer or influenced subsequent questions and 
care was taken when questions were worded and plain and simple langue was used to 
avoid that participants misinterpret the question and irrelevant matters were not 
probed.690 Questions dealing with easy and noncontroversial topics were asked first, 
followed by questions which required participants to express their opinion and skill and 
knowledge questions were only asked subsequently to prevent that the participants felt 
threatened.691 The researcher also provided the participants the questions in advance, so 
that they could familiarise themselves with the topics before the interviews. 
 
 
2.11 Sampling 
Sampling denotes purposefully selecting an aspect of the entire population in order to 
generate insight and this raises the question who should be chosen and how this 
selection should be made. 692  The quantitative probability sampling method is 
inappropriate for qualitative research since it contravenes the qualitative concept of 
appropriateness which necessitates a purposive sample.693 As the researcher conducted 
qualitative research, the researcher therefore employed non-probability purposive 
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sampling, so that data was generated which is relevant and information-rich.694 The 
purposive non-random sample consisted of the top five people in the UAE, namely an 
officer at the Department of Cybercrime in the UAE, who was seconded to Interpol for 
the period from 2012 to 2016; the Chief and Head of the Public, Civil and Commercial 
Department at Fujairah Court, who was previously the Head of the Department of 
Information Technology at the Fujairah Federal Court of First Instance; the Head of 
Department of Electronic Investigations at the General Directorate of Investigations at 
Dubai Police; the Chief at Dubai Public Prosecution and the Legal Advisor/Counsel for 
the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. Hence, the most senior experts in the 
field were interviewed. These experts shared their knowledge, which has formed the 
foundation of the research. The characteristics of the individuals were used as the basis 
of selection and reflected the diversity and breadth of the sample population.  
 
The characteristics and features of these senior UAE experts were known to the 
researcher. The persons were deliberately chosen because they were the main experts in 
the field in the UAE. The most senior cybercrime judge was interviewed, as he not only 
knew the relevant laws, but was also aware of practical legal issues which hindered 
successful prosecutions. Similarly, the researcher interviewed one of the most 
experienced police officers specialised in electronic investigations. The officer was not 
only familiar with the relevant laws, but was acutely aware which problems existed in 
respect of procedural. evidential and other matters. The public prosecutor was 
interviewed who deals with most cybercrime cases because he not only knew the law, 
but could identify what undermine the effectiveness of combating cybercrime in the 
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UAE. An officer who had worked for Interpol was interviewed in light of his 
experience, especially in the field of international cooperation. Cybercrime can often 
only be successfully investigated through cooperation with other countries and this 
interview particularly elucidated issues in relation to this, but also other common legal 
problems. In the UAE, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority is at the forefront 
of preventing cyber attacks.695 For this reason, a senior officer was interviewed who 
knew the legal framework of the UAE. 
 
It was not particularly difficult for the researcher to identify these experts, as he knew 
who was particularly familiar with the research topic. He therefore chose the main 
cybercrime experts since they were most likely to be knowledgeable and articulate.696 
Hence, the researcher chose interview participants based on the objectives of the 
research and the role which they performed within organisations was a starting point.697 
This approach is also called criterion sampling since participants were selected on the 
basis of fixed criteria.698 By applying predetermined criteria, quality was assured.699 
Opting for a purposive non-random sample was called for to stay within the framework 
and within the field of interest and also because the researcher had only a limited 
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amount of time. 700  Consequently, the sample was not meant to be a statistically 
representative sample.701 
 
Moreover, the number of people interviewed was less important than the criteria used to 
select them. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that a sample which is small offends the 
quantitative idea which holds that there has to be a sufficient sample size to render 
findings representative.702 A too small sample may not realise theoretical saturation or 
informational redundancy, whilst a too large sample may not allow a thick and detailed 
analysis which is the underlying purpose of qualitative research.703 The sample selection 
had thus a bearing on the overall quality of the work.704 As it was unknown how many 
individuals had to be interviewed for the data collection process, interviews were 
continued until data saturation was reached and no new information was being generated 
from the interview process.705  
 
It must be stressed that as a judge, the researcher had unprecedented access. It would not 
have been possible to access these people if not for the researcher’s senior judicial 
position. Also, as an insider, the researcher not only shared the same culture and 
language. He also worked in the legal industry and thus had similar characteristics as 
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those interviewed. The researcher’s experience and position meant that the researcher 
felt as belonging to those who were interviewed.706 The researcher was knowledgeable 
and could easily interact with the experts.707 Equally, the interviewees felt that the 
researcher belonged to the same social group i.e. had similar characteristics.708 As a 
result, they felt comfortable sharing their views with the researcher. This arguably 
makes the work even more unique and rigorous. However, it is also acknowledged that 
being an inside researcher also poses the risk of being subjective and biased.709 Such 
criticism was addressed since the researcher approached the research phenomenon from 
a wide legal perspective which was not limited by the UAE legal approach. He was also 
not afraid to pose questions which challenged the current legal status quo in the UAE. 
 
 
The researcher also intended to interview UK experts. He therefore contacted the Crown 
Prosecution Service in order to arrange an interview with a UK prosecutor, as well as 
the National Cybercrime Unit and the Metropolitan Police Cybercrime Unit. He also 
contacted Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, as well as some other UK companies. 
However, regrettably all declined to take part in the interviews (please see ‘Example of 
an Interview Request to a UK Expert’ and ‘Response Received to an Interview Request 
from a UK Expert’ in the Appendices).. The reason why those contacted declined to take 
part in interviews are unknown. Although it highlights that having unprecedented access 
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to senior UAE experts due to the researcher being a judge was a real advantage. 
 
 
2.12 Conducting the Interviews and Recording the Data 
An interview consists of a “two-way conversation” which should be interactive and 
dynamic.710  For this to take place, the interview was opened with a short introduction 
which outlined the aims of the research, the importance of the information and key 
ethical issues, such as confidentiality and informed consent and this served as an 
“icebreaker”.711 The questions were developed in advance, real questions were asked, 
the informants were provided with sufficient time to answer questions without being 
interrupted, the researcher engaged in active listening, so that the informants felt that 
they could answer without being judged and upon conclusion the researcher expressed 
gratitude for the time and information which the informant provided.712 
 
The five face-to-face interviews took place in a private setting, for instance, in a private 
and quiet room at the offices of the research participants.713 As the researcher worked 
alone and this poses certain risks, it was ensured that necessary precautions were taken, 
for instance, meeting details, including name and contact address and meeting location, 
were left with another person in case there was an emergency, thereby safeguarding the 
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researcher's safety. 714  However, such risk was very low. The interviews were 
immediately translated from Arabic into English by the researcher and transcribed after 
each interview.715 Interviewees were asked to sign a consent form.  
 
2.13 Data Quality 
Quality is a crucial objective of any research and this can only be attained if great care is 
taken throughout the different stages, starting with the research questions and continuing 
with the data collection, the data analysis and subsequent interpretation of the findings 
in light of the literature. 716  The researcher was guided by the meta-theory when 
developing the research questions and did not base the questions on a priori 
assumptions, for instance, which reflect the experience of the researcher or are the 
findings from similar studies, but instead the criterion was relevance alone.717 During 
the data collection process, professionalism and ethics were maintained at all times; 
respondents were motivated, a good rapport and trust was developed;; there was active 
listening; what was being communicated was fully understood, including nonverbal 
cues; it was determined whether a response was sufficient and relevant and if not the 
researcher probed for responses; notes were prepared diligently; and data security was 
maintained at all times; and after each interview it was verified that the interview 
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transcript is accurate and it was promptly imported into NViva.718  More generally 
speaking, it was ensured that the research questions were consistent with the 
epistemology, the research objectives, the audience, methods, ethics and research 
recommendations.719 
 
The adoption of these kinds of measures was important to render quality concerns an 
integral aspect in order to demonstrate accountability and validity.720 Furthermore, by 
explicitly depicting what steps have been taken, another researcher would be able to 
determine how plausible the findings are.721 Scientific rigour was thus demonstrated as 
described above, but the quantitative concepts of validity and reliability and 
generalisability were not perceived as useful for qualitative research. 722  Yet it is 
acknowledged that this is debated and some consider that some form of validity and 
reliability are important in qualitative research.723 Nonetheless, these concepts rather 
belong to the toolkit of positivists.724 This is because for qualitative researchers, there 
exists no “objective social reality”, but instead social reality is being constructed by 
individuals and there are therefore many different social realities which all have their 
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distinct internal logic.725  It can therefore not be determined which one has more validity 
than others. 726  This does not mean that the truthfulness of the data should not be 
ascertained, though Silverman concedes that for qualitative researchers this is an 
ambiguous objective.727 
 
Equally, the concept of reliability within qualitative research is problematic since it 
affords “consistency or constancy of a measuring instrument.” 728  This necessitates 
neutral, standardised and non-biased means to generate data. 729  However, human 
conduct is not constant or static and a repeated study will not yield the same outcome 
because for qualitative researchers no single and uniform reality exists.730 It is therefore 
extremely difficult to fully standardise qualitative tools, also because interpretivists try 
and capture the background and context and not just narrow variables.731 
 
Something akin to reliability within qualitative research is stability and this can be 
achieved by posing the same questions and having consistent answers and testing 
whether the same answers are received when equivalent questions are being asked.732 It 
therefore appears more accurate to speak of “dependability” in respect of qualitative 
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research, as opposed to reliability.733 Dependability denotes research procedures which 
are adequate and clear and this is realised by thoroughly documenting all research 
processes and decisions, for instance, by having memos which address possible 
questions about the research process.734 The researcher therefore strived to document all 
processes in order to enable other researchers to replicate the research.735  Just like 
reliability, the core concern of dependability is therefore that a consistent data collection 
process is followed, so that the data is not affected.736 
 
Another important idea within qualitative research is internal consistency which requires 
that social reality is captured in an authentic manner. 737  The various voices and 
perspectives were articulated and any recommendations did not merely advocate “one 
size fits all...recommendations” which fail to take into account the different voices.738 
The criterion of credibility or believability therefore became a substitute for internal 
validity in respect of the qualitative research segment.739 The way in which experiences, 
interpretations and internal knowledge was described was accurate and matched what 
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the participants reported. 740  Raw data in the form of quotes from participants was 
provided to enhance verisimilitude.741 
 
This is not to say that the findings constitute objective facts or can be generalised since 
the concept of generalisability belongs to the positivist paradigm.742 Generalisability can 
be understood as the extent to which conclusions from the research sample apply to the 
entire class or research phenomenon which is being studied.743 Another description for 
generalisability is external validity or transferability.744 Whilst qualitative work does not 
allow statistical generalisability, it generates in-depth descriptions and these permit to a 
certain degree flexible generalisability i.e. certain central themes may be captured which 
generate broad, thick and rich knowledge.745 
 
Trustworthiness was enhanced through the adoption of the following strategies: Personal 
prejudice was accounted for in order to avoid that the findings became influenced, for 
instance, by critically scrutinising whether the sampling process was biased and the data 
collection process and analysis resulted in relevant data; by keeping accurate records, 
including a trail of all decisions, so that it is apparent why data was interpreted in a 
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particular manner and clearly displaying the thought process.746 Credibility was also 
aided through the use of well-established research methods; study of the culture of the 
organisation in which participants work before the interview; adoption of strategies to 
elicit honest responses; and numerous debriefing talks with supervisors.747 Furthermore, 
the researcher asked the interview participants to review the transcripts.748 Constant 
comparison were made, so that multiple perspectives were being communicated.749 
However, as observed by Yin trustworthiness is not achieved by following particular 
procedures750 since “[a]ny prespecification of universal criteria is in danger of foisting 
on research artificial categories of judgment, and a framework of a prior conditions that 
may be impossible or inappropriate to meet...”751  
 
Furthermore, reflexivity was employed and for this purpose knowledge was studied 
inwardly and outwardly i.e. the relationship between current knowledge and the 
knowledge gained from individual participants was studied.752 Questions were asked as 
part of a critical appraisal, for instance, about the appropriateness of the sample in 
relation to the research objectives, the adequacy of the data collection and data analysis 
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process, the transferability of the research, and the adequacy of the ethical standards.753 
However, as the main approach is rooted in legal positivism, the qualitative data was 
unlikely to warrant an abrupt change, but rather provided insights which helped to fine-
tune the findings.754 
 
2.14 Data Analysis 
The data was analysed and themes and patterns were identified,  the data was grouped 
into categories.755 The categories encapsulated the concepts and sub-concepts conveyed 
during the interviews.756 This taxonomy started with bigger concepts which branched 
out into smaller sub-concepts, similar to a probability tree.757 The researcher constantly 
compared the data, as advocated by proponents of grounded theory, such as Glasser and 
Strauss (1967).758 For this purpose, the researcher read the transcripts, as well as the 
notes which were taken during the interviews.759 Common characteristics which suggest 
that the data falls within a particular category or sub-category and particular concept 
were highlighted and a name was assigned, as well as distinct codes.760 The data was 
thereby reduced and simplified.761 The different codes were reviewed and scrutinised in 
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order to identify differences and similarities in a way which is integrated within the data 
set and clearly spelled out, so that it can be further tested.762 When unique examples 
were provided, it was checked whether these fall into a particular category and if not a 
separate category was assigned. NVivo software was used and the search tools were 
employed to facilitate the data analysis process. Whenever a new node was created and 
the existing categories were changed, expanded or decreased, memos were made in 
order to stringently document the qualitative data analysis process. Whenever the 
researcher conducts a further interview, this process was repeated until no more 
categories could be identified and nodes could be assigned. The dominant topics thereby 
emerged. Statements were formulated and hypothesis were thereby generated i.e. an 
analytical induction process was employed.763 The researcher assessed whether there 
were any negative cases or inconsistencies which contradicted particular hypothesis and 
constituted exceptions.764 The NVivo program was used to graphically illustrate the 
main concepts and causal relationships.765 Hence, a logical analysis was conducted.766 
Most fundamentally, the content was analysed, so that categories, concepts, themes and 
patters could be identified.767 This necessitated ascertaining how often particular topics 
were being mentioned and analysing what matters were particular stressed or implicitly 
observed, reported and suggested.  
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Not only was a macro-analysis undertaken, but also a micro-analysis. 768  Once the 
content analysis was completed, the researcher looked at the frequencies by which 
particular topics and sub-topics were mentioned i.e. a small quantitative analysis 
approach was integrated within the qualitative data analysis process.769 The researcher 
quoted what interview participants said, so that it was ensured that their point of view 
was portrayed in the manner in which they chose to communicate. These quotes were 
reported in such a way that the reader understands the context and cultural background 
in which they were made.770 This is also known as a hermeneutical analysis, it ensured 
that the topic was much more elucidated and clarified and this resulted in a refined 
understanding of the core ideas conveyed by the text.771 The information was narrated in 
a story-like manner, so that the language of the interviewee became understood.772 
 
Emphasis was placed on how the interview participants experienced the topic of 
cybercrime and the researcher tried and viewed what was being reported through the 
lens of the interviewee.773 Consequently, a phenomenological view point was adopted in 
order to ascertain the impact this has on the researcher, so that the data was interpreted 
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heuristically. 774  The triangulation of the legal methods data formed part of the 
discussion of the interview results. 
 
2.15 Publishing Qualitative Research 
The research was privately funded, though due to the researcher's position as a judge, it 
was easy to gain access and also because of the interest in the research phenomenon. It 
is therefore hoped that the research is of use to the judiciary and legislators. Whilst the 
research benefits the judiciary and the legislator in the UAE, the research also benefits 
other countries which are developing their legal framework to combat cybercrime. The 
researcher therefore intends to attend conferences in order to exchange views with peers 
and hopes to also publish articles about his findings. When articles will be published 
and/or findings will be presented at conferences, great care will be taken to keep the 
names of interview participants anonymous, including by removing other identifiers, as 
discussed above. As the research deals with cybercrime which is critical to the security 
of the nation, it will be ensured that no harm emanates as a result of the research 
findings, for instance, by revealing insider information. 
 
 
2.16 Summary 
The research is situated within paradigms: Firstly and predominantly the research is 
rooted in legal positivism and is therefore rooted in realism, functionalism and 
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empiricism making use of a nomothetic methodology. Secondly, the research is 
interpretivist and therefore perceives existence from the viewpoint of epistemic 
relativism and through an ideographic lens which is inherently nominalistic and 
phenomenological, and meanings are therefore understood through hermeneutics. In line 
with the ontological orientation, the researcher counted as knowledge not only objective 
facts, for instance, valid laws, but also subjective experiences of individuals and 
therefore recognised that knowledge can be acquired through the study of individual 
opinions and expressions. By looking at the issue from the paradigm of positivism and 
the opposing paradigm of interpretivism, questions which could not be answered by one 
empirical strategy could be successfully addressed by the other empirical tactic. 775 
Furthermore, it made it possible to shift from theory to observation and back, and 
thereby avoided that the legal positivist findings became overtly rigid since the 
perceptions of individuals were taken into account, resulting in more integrated, holistic 
and diverse findings. 776  This is because different paradigms capture a different 
perspective of reality and therefore of the research phenomenon. 777  A pragmatic 
approach was thus adopted in order to creatively combine the positivist with the 
interpretivist approach, thereby minimising the weaknesses of both paradigms and 
maximising their benefits. 778  By combining both approaches, theory, practice and 
reflection were brought together, which assisted with questioning existing laws and 
assumptions.  
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Inductive reasoning was particularly employed, and hypotheses were developed based 
on the literature, though also deductive logic was employed in respect of the data 
generated from the interviews. Whilst the quantitative parts dealt with the particular 
laws, the qualitative parts focused more broadly on understanding the research 
phenomenon outside the narrow prescriptions of the law and looked at the practical 
effects. 
 
Furthermore, it has been discussed that three methods were used, namely: the black 
letter law approach; the comparative method; and a qualitative study employing the 
interview guide approach. For the doctrinal legal analysis all relevant primary and 
secondary sources were studied. The comparative method compared the laws in the 
UAE, the UK and the European Union, particularly with a view of highlighting 
differences and similarities. Hence, the research explored how e-crime legislation in 
these different jurisdictions addressed the issue of cybercrime. Additionally, the 
empirical method was used to assess the impact of the law. It was assumed that the 
research problem is better understood by adopting a mixed method research strategy, as 
opposed to adopting a purist stance solely rooted in black letter law.  
As the researcher therefore employed the qualitative social science research method, it 
was pertinent that he safeguarded research participants from any harm which may arise 
due to the sensitivity of the research topic. The highest ethical standards were therefore 
displayed. The anonymity of the interviewees was preserved. The semi-structured 
interview method was employed in order to elicit maximum understanding about the 
research topic. Non-probability purposive sampling was employed to ensure that rich 
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and thick data was generated. The face-to-face interviews were held in a private setting. 
The interviews were immediately translated and transcribed. A thorough research 
process was followed in order to achieve data quality. The same interview questions 
were asked, clear research procedures were followed, opinions were not generalised, but 
differences were pointed out. An accurate account was provided of what was being 
reported. In-depth descriptions were provided, and it was explained which themes 
emerged from the findings and these were broadly captured. Various steps were taken to 
enhance trustworthiness, for instance, accurate records were kept. Credibility was also 
established through the use of recognised research methods. Furthermore, the researcher 
adopted a reflexive process i.e. examined his own beliefs and assumptions and how 
these impacted the findings. The qualitative data was coded with the help of NVivo 
software in order to identify categories, concepts, themes and patterns and a small 
quantitative analysis was also conducted i.e. it was analysed how often certain 
categories, concepts, themes and patterns were mentioned. The researcher intends to 
publish articles about his findings and will take great care to ensure the anonymity of all 
research participants. 
 
The next chapter critically discusses the theoretical context by examining the UK’s main 
computer misuse offences, RIPA policing powers, data retention and public interest 
immunity. 
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Chapter Three: The UK’s Main Computer Misuse 
Offences, RIPA Policing Powers, Data Retention and 
Public Interest Immunity 
 
3. Introduction 
For cybercrime to be combated, the first step is to enact a law which criminalises 
deviant behaviour. In light of innovation, it has to be also ensured that the law is kept up 
to date. This Chapter will therefore start with an analysis of the promulgation and 
enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and its legislative history in terms of 
subsequent amendments. The passing of cybercrime laws is one step, but for 
enforcement agencies to be able to prevent, detect and prosecute cyber-criminals, it is 
essential that they are equipped with the necessary powers. In the UK, enforcement 
agencies have been permitted to intercept communications data, engage in surveillance 
and to acquire communications data and to decrypt communications data when it has 
been encrypted. Yet it is vital that a due process is followed, so that these powers are not 
abused,the rule of law is upheld and fundamental rights and freedoms are not unduly 
curtailed. The Chapter will therefore scrutinise the powers which RIPA confers in terms 
of interception, surveillance, communications data acquisition and decryption and its 
governing framework. A related issue is the topic of data retention, so that enforcement 
agents can look at historic data when they are investigating a crime. The EU approach 
towards data retention will therefore be analysed, including the now defunct Data 
Retention Directive, the Grand Chamber decision of the Court of Justice of the 
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European Union in which this Directive was declared invalid, as well as the UK’s 
emergency legislation which was passed in response to this, as well as the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016 which replaced the emergency legislation. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the UK prohibition which renders intercepted communication inadmissible in 
court proceedings. 
3.1 The Computer Misuse Act 1990  
Prior to the enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, computer crime was purely 
governed by criminal law, and more specifically the Criminal Damage Act of 1971779, 
this has now hanged as the government has enhanced the legal principles governing and 
regulating computer crime through the enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, 
which now governs computer crime in conjunction with the Criminal Damage Act 1971. 
The two acts were considered in conjunction in the 1991 case of R v Whiteley780 , 
clarifying in this way that the Criminal Damage Act 1971 will still be applicable despite 
the enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. For example, s.1(1) of the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971 covers situations when computer data, which was stored on a 
magnetic disk, was erased.781 S.1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 provides: 
 
“A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any physical 
property belonging to another, intending to destroy or damage such 
property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be 
destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.”  
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However, the issue was that it required a creative interpretation in order to demonstrate 
that tangible property had been physically damaged.782 In R v Talboys783 , a person 
escaped a charge for a programming prank. In Cox v Riley784, a person was charged with 
erasing computer programs from a plastic circuit card. The saw was thereby rendered 
inoperable. The defendant appealed on the basis that the programs, which he erased, did 
not constitute tangible property. The Divisional Court found that this constituted 
damage. In 1988, the Law Commission published a Working Paper on Computer 
Misuse, which observed: 
  
“[i]n essence, any interference with the operation of a computer or its 
software which causes loss or inconvenience to its legitimate users can 
probably now be charged as criminal damage...The law of criminal damage 
now seems to extend to persons who damage a computer system, without the 
need for any further reform of the law.”785 
 
In 1989, the Law Commission then published a Final Report on Computer Misuse, 
which highlighted the issues and stated:  
 
“the police and prosecuting authorities who have informed us that, although 
convictions have been obtained in serious cases of unauthorised access to 
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data or programs, there is recurrent (and understandable) difficulty in 
explaining to judges, magistrates and juries how the facts fit in with the 
present law of criminal damage.”786  
 
The following year, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 was enacted expressly for the 
purpose of combating computer hacking.787 Various anti-hacking offences were enacted, 
namely to gain unauthorised access to computer material (ss1 and 2); to modify 
computer material without authorisation and to access with an intention to facilitate or 
perpetrate offences without authorisation (s.3).788 S.1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
is a key element as it links to other provisions, including s.2, as discussed below.  For 
this reason, Lloyds describes it as “the most critical element of the legislation.”789 S.1 of 
the Computer Misuse Act 1990 states: 
 
“1. A person is guilty of an offence if –  
(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure 
access to any program or data held in any computer;  
(b) the access he intends to secure is unauthorized; and  
(c) he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the 
function that that is the case.” 
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Although, the technical terms are not defined, it is clear that three aspects require close 
consideration:790 Firstly, what can constitute access is very broad. Secondly, it has to be 
determined whether access was unauthorised. Thirdly, the level of intent which has to be 
shown to exist is relevant for being prosecuted under s.1.  The actus reus requirement to 
establish the offence is satisfied when a computer is used i.e. a person “causes a 
computer to perform any function.”791 The definition to “perform any function with 
intent to secure access” covers any act where a computer is used. 792 
The statute omits to define what a computer is, which is good, as technology is 
constantly evolving and as a result, any device, which can store data electronically, 
including mobile phones or smart watches, can be a computer. 793   Lord Hoffman 
adopted a flexible interpretation when he stated that a computer is “a device for storing, 
processing and retrieving information.” 794  Any other interpretation would result in 
many cybercrime offences escaping punishment.795 The mens rea for the offences is to 
have an intention to gain access to some data regardless of whether or not it can be 
identified which item the defendant sought to gain access to. 796  Hence, those who 
engaged in searching for a program or file can possess the requisite mens rea.797 
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A problem arose in R v Cropp798, as Aglionby J considered that “[i]t seems to me, doing 
the best that I can in elucidating the meaning of section 1(1)(a) [of the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990], that a second computer must be involved. It seems to me to be straining 
language to say that only one computer is necessary...”799 Equally, in A-G's Reference 
(No.1 of 1991)800, it was suggested that two computers are required i.e. one to perform 
the function and another one to access any data or program. However, the court found 
that one machine is sufficient to establish both aspects.801 Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ 
explained that otherwise the Act would have left a gap, “as going straight to the in-
house computer and extracting confidential information from it could be committed with 
impunity so far as the three offences in this Act are concerned.”802  
 
In DPP v Bignell, 803  a married couple, who were both police officers, obtained 
information about the ex-wife of the husband. They were charged under s.1, but 
appealed on the basis that they accessed the data lawfully, as they had authority to 
access the police national computer. Yet they acknowledged that this was for a purpose 
which was unauthorised. Astill J held that the Computer Misuse Act 1990 was adopted 
to combat hacking and breaking into computer systems.804 He therefore concluded that 
as they were police officers, they had authority to access the police national computer 
and therefore did not act in a manner which was unlawful. Lloyd observes that the 
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adoption of Astill J’s approach would have had serious repercussions for the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990.805 This is because a lot of cybercrime is perpetrated by insiders or 
employees.806  Similarly, Wasik criticises the decision, as authorisation for a lawful 
purpose should not be equated with having lawful authority for a non-legitimate 
purpose.807  
 
The House of Lords subsequently rejected this approach in R v Bow Street Magistrates' 
Court, ex parte Allison808, where it was made clear that misutilising access rights could 
result in criminal sanctions. The House of Lords pointed out that in DPP v Bignell,809 
the court had mistaken the concept of being allowed to access a network or computer 
with being allowed to access data and programs.810 Lord Hobhouse explained that s.17 
of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 sets out what the concepts of access and authorisation 
denote. S.17(2)(a)-(s) makes clear that access to data or a program is shown to have 
gained when a user causes the computer to erase or alter, move or copy to a different 
location, use or output it by displaying it or in any other form.811 S.17(3)(a)(b) provides 
that access is gained to a program if the person “causes the program to be executed”; or 
“is itself a function of the program.” Hence, when a program is run, then access is 
gained.812 With this definition, most actions which result in a user using a computer 
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system and the system showing or transmitting information will be covered by the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990.813  
 
Moreover, s.17(5)(a)-(b) explains that any kind of access which a person gains to data or 
a program is unauthorised if the person is not allowed to control access to the data or 
program; and the person who is entitled to control access has not consented that s/he can 
access the data or program. In R v Bow Street Magistrates' Court, ex parte Allison,814 it 
was also made clear that when an employee's authorisation to access data is limited, but 
he nonetheless exceeds this, then this may fall within the scope of the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990. Stein states that this was seen as the Act coming of age, thereby enabling 
authorities to fully utilise the Act.815 
 
For a s.2 charge to be made out, the requisite elements, which have to be satisfied, are to 
commit a s.1 offence and to show that there is an intention to facilitate or commit a 
“further” offence, which is of a more serious kind. Further offences are those where 
“the sentence is fixed by law” or where a person is over eighteen and has not been 
previously convicted for a charge for five years.816 However, it does not have to be 
shown that this further offence has been carried out.817 Examples where s.2 offences 
may be committed are intending to commit theft, for instance, by channelling funds 
during an online transfer to a different account or accessing sensitive information in 
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order to blackmail a person with the information.818 Moreover, a person can intend to 
perpetrate this further offence at the same time the s.1 offence is being committed.819 A 
person can be charged even if it was not possible to commit the further offence.820 
Omerod explains that this corresponds with the rule in s.1(2) of the Criminal Attempts 
Act 1981.821 
 
In 2004, the All Party Parliamentary Internet Group suggested that the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990 should be revised.822 The Police and Justice Act 2006, Part 5 then made 
various amendments, which were designed to address issues with the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990, especially in respect of DoS attacks and to ensure compliance with the 
Cybercrime Convention.823 S.3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which deals with 
causing unauthorised modifications to data or programs stored on a computer, was 
amended by virtue of the Police and Justice Act 2006. S.3 is entitled “Unauthorised acts 
with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to impairing, operation of computer, etc.” 
and s3(1) states that: 
  
“[a] person is guilty of an offence if –  
(a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; 
(b) at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and 
                                                 
818 Ibid 
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a person convicted of the offence may be sentenced to a maximum of 12 
months' imprisonment on summary conviction (6 months in Scotland) or ten 
years on indictment.” 
 
Erasing, altering or adding data all constitute an unauthorised act.824 When a person 
modifies data, then this is considered unauthorised if the person who was entitled to 
consent has not permitted this or the person who did the act had no such authority.825 
S.3(2) makes clear that an unauthorised act has: 
  
“(a) to impair the operation of any computer; 
(b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any 
computer; [or] 
(c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any 
such data; [or 
(d) to enable any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above to 
be done.” 
 
Moreover, s.3(5)(c) further provides that “impairing, preventing or hindering” can 
include temporary acts.  S.3(4) also states that the intention does not have to relate to: 
  
“(a) any particular computer; 
(b) any particular program or data; or 
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(c) a program or data of any particular kind.” 
 
Consequently, a person, who creates a virus, which causes that a computer is modified, 
can be held responsible, despite the person not being responsible for a particular device, 
as this may even be caused by an authorised user, who is unaware of the virus.826 
Accordingly, “causing” means acts which have a particular effect and acts where there 
is proximity with the effect.827 
The amendment of s.3 ensures compliance with Article 3 of the Cybercrime Convention, 
which states that: 
  
“1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally, the damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or 
suppression of computer data without right.  
2. A Party may reserve the right to require that the conduct described in 
paragraph 1 result in serious harm.”  
 
Furthermore, Article 5 of the Cybercrime Convention was taken into account,828 it states 
that: 
 
“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
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committed intentionally, the serious hindering without right of the 
functioning of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, 
deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data.” 
 
Prior to the amendment, it had to be shown that the person had the intention, but the 
Police and Justice Act 2006 has lowered the threshold in respect of s.3, so that the mens 
rea is acting intentional or being reckless in respect of causing the impairment.829 For 
instance, s.3 renders it illegal to intentionally delete data or programs or to input 
additional data into the computer system or to infect a computer with a virus or to install 
a program which causes a disturbance.830 S.3 also renders it illegal to access a cable 
television channel without a subscription831 or to interfere with a website.832 
 
An example of a case under s.3 is that of R v Whitaker,833 where the person was charged 
with installing a program which prevented the use of a computer, except when a 
password was used.834 However, the password was not provided and the computer could 
not be used for a period of time, which resulted in losses.835 In DPP v Lennon,836 a 
former employee was charged under s.3, who was disgruntled and had impaired the 
employer's computer and thereby ensured that the company received 5 million emails. 
The Court did not accept that the defence in s.17(8)(b) of the Computer Misuse Act 
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1990 could be evoked, as consenting to receive emails was not unlimited. Following the 
introduction of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 it was becoming apparent, over time, 
that the act was insufficient in dealing with new manifestations of computer misuse that 
were unknown and unforeseen at the time of its enactment, therefore a change was vital, 
hence for the amendments introduced by the Police and Justice Act 2006.837 
 
 
Apart from the amendment of s.3, the other main changes which were introduced by 
virtue of sections 35-38 of the Police and Justice Act 2006 were as follows:838 The 
maximum sentence was increased to two years for the s.1 of the Computer Misuse Act 
1990 offence (i.e. to gain unauthorised access to computer material).839 In respect of s.3 
offences (i.e. to try and impair the way a computer operates without authority) the 
maximum sentence was increased to ten years. 840  Additionally, a new offence was 
created which was added as s.3A to the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which outlaws that 
articles are made, supplied or obtained which are used for the purpose of computer 
misuse crimes.841 In 2007/2008, the House of Lords Science & Technology Committee 
dealt with the issue whether the s.3A offence would result in those, which develop tools 
to perpetrate offences, e.g. security testers, committing an offence. The Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) guidance clarified that such tools could be used for 
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authorised purposes.842 The amendments and more specifically s.3 have opened up a 
‘range of potential interpretative challenges that may trouble both security professionals 
and the courts’843 
 
In 2015, further changes were made to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 by virtue of 
s.41(2) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 which “updates the existing offences to cover 
importing tools for cybercrime (such as data programmes designed for unlawfully 
accessing a computer system.”844 This also achieves compliance with Article 7 of the 
Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems. This Article requires that 
Member States render it illegal to interfere with systems; to illegally intercept; or to gain 
illegal access. Equally, the tools, which are used to commit offences, are rendered illegal 
when there is an intention to produce, sell, procure for import, use, distribute or 
otherwise make available these tools without being entitled to commit any of the 
offences set out in Article 3 to 6 of the Directive.845 The criminal offence is not minor 
where there is a computer programme which is designed to commit the offences or the 
tool is designed to obtain access codes, computer passwords or comparable data, so that 
an information system can be accessed.846 The Explanatory Notes state that s.3A of the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990 complies with Article 7 of the Directive, together with 
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sections 1 to 3, except in relation to procuring use of tools. S.3A of the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990 is therefore amended to: 
  
“a person is guilty of an offence if he obtains any article with a view to 
article – 
(a) intending to use it to commit, or assist in the commission of, an offence 
under section 1, 3 or 3ZA, or 
(b) with a view to its being supplied for use to commit, or assist in the 
commission of, an offence under section 1 or 3.”847 
 
The Serious Crime Act 2015 also introduces a new s.3ZA entitled “unauthorised acts 
causing, or creating risk of, serious damage”, which can result in a fine and 
imprisonment of up to 14 years or life imprisonment.848 S.3ZA ensures that computer 
hacking which causes serious damage to the national security of any country, the UK 
economy, the environment or human welfare is rendered illegal.849 This ensures that the 
UK complies with Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems.850 The 
government also considered that there was a gap within the criminal law, as the most 
serious hacking offence of impairing the way in which a computer operates without 
authorisation under s.3 only carries a maximum sentence of up to ten years in prison, but 
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this was deemed insufficient.851 The adoption of the new section is crucial in order to 
protect critical infrastructures from cyber attacks, but the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights observes that it is not certain what “damage to the economy”, “damage to the 
environment” or “damage to national security” or “damage to human welfare” mean in 
order to justify a sentence of up to 14 years or life imprisonment.852 They state that the 
Act “therefore appears to cross a significant line by using these unsatisfactory concepts 
in the definition of a serious criminal offence carrying a lengthy sentence.”853 It is 
therefore important that these terms are defined. 
Moreover, as the digital space has no national borders, it is important that this issue is 
addressed. 854  The Computer Misuse Act 1990 therefore allows for extra-territorial 
jurisdiction to a limited extent in respect of the offences detailed in sections 1 and 3.855 
Orakhelashvili observes that the UK is one of the few countries, which have adopted 
“technology-specific jurisdiction” in ss4-5 i.e. requires that there is a significant link 
with the domestic jurisdiction.856 Additionally, s.6 details the jurisdiction for inchoate 
offences, such as conspiracy and attempt, when there is computer misuse.857  
Article 12 of Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems makes 
provisions in respect of jurisdiction.858 Article 12(1) requires that jurisdiction should be 
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established when Articles 3 to 8 offences are committed “(a) in whole or in part within 
their territory; or (b) by one of their nationals, at least in cases where the act is an 
offence where it was committed.” Article 12(2)(a)(b) requires that in respect of Article 
12(1)(1)(a) jurisdiction has to be established when the offender is present in the territory 
of the Member State, though the offence is committed against an information system or 
the offence takes place in the territory of the Member States, even though the offender is 
not present in the territory of the Member State. Sections 4 and 5 of the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990 already grant jurisdiction when there is a “significant link” to the 
relevant jurisdiction. Nonetheless, s.4(2) is amended, so that extra-territorial jurisdiction 
can be established in respect of the new s.3ZA.859 Equally, s.5 is revised, so that it is 
defined what a “significant link” is.860 As a result, it is, for example, possible to convict 
an Italian national, who resides in England and hacks computer systems in Italy or a UK 
national, who hacks computer systems in the UK, whilst he resides in Italy and then 
returns to the UK.861 Furthermore, a new s.5(1a) and (1B) make it possible to prosecute 
UK nationals, even though the offence has no significant link to the UK, so long as the 
offence is one in the country where the person resides.862  
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 remains the main statute for pursuing cybercrime and 
the improved Act ensures that also those, who make, supply and use tools to perpetrate 
offences set out in the Computer Misuse Act can be prosecuted.863 As mentioned in 
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Chapter One, reliance can additionally be placed on other legislation, such as the 
Protection of Children Act 1978, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003. Despite the Computer Misuse Act 1990 having been adopted, the 
prevention, detection and prosecution of cyber criminals for these offences is difficult 
and it is important that enforcement agencies are equipped with powers to conduct 
surveillance of the online space, so that business and individuals can use it safely, which 
is discussed next.864Neil Mac Ewan contends that the even though the changes should be 
welcomed as they do cause some improvement ‘the new provisions will also bring some 
problems of their own. A combination of some short-sighted, or simply stubborn, policy-
making and some forceful government amendment during the Bill's passage through 
Parliament has produced certain provisions  which invite controversy, could sometimes 
prove difficult to interpret or enforce, and may lead to claims of legislative overkill.’865 
3.2 Interception, Surveillance, Communications Data Acquisition and 
Decryption and the UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(RIPA) 
In the 1960s, British police undertook the first experiments with CCTV in Liverpool and 
London. 866  Since then new technological innovations have transformed the “crime 
control field” in line with broader global trends in response to terrorism.867 Furthermore, 
                                                 
864 D. Thomas, B. D. Loader, 'Cybercrime: law enforcement, security and surveillance in the information 
age' in (eds) B. D. Loader, D. Thomas, Cybercrime: Security and Surveillance in the Information Age 
(Abingdon, Routledge 2005) 1 
865 Neil MacEwan, (2008) The Computer Misuse Act 1990: lessons from its past and predictions for its 
future Criminal Law Review 12, 955-967. 
 
866 C. A. Williams, 'Police Surveillance and the Emergence of CCTV in the 1960s' (2003) 5 Crime 
Prevention and Community Safety: An International Journal, 27-37, 27 
867 M. McCahill, 'Theorizing Surveillance in the UK Crime Control Field' (2015) 3(2) Open Access 
Journal, 10-20, 10 
196 
 
in an information society, intelligence-led policing has increasingly been adopted as a 
management model for enforcement agencies. 868  Intelligence and its analysis are 
therefore considered essential to prevent, detect and investigate cybercrime.869  This 
necessitates that surveillance takes place and communications are intercepted and data is 
acquired and encrypted data can be decrypted.870  
In the past, interception meant opening letters or reading private telegrams, but in a 
digital world new techniques have been adopted, including in respect of 
communications data.871 Haggerty and Ericson define surveillance as the “collection 
and analysis of information about populations in order to govern their activities.”872 
Communications data can be divided into three types: traffic data; use data; and 
subscriber data.873 Subscriber data is information which the service provider holds i.e. 
the person's name and contact details; use data consist of itemised records, e.g. of online 
calls; and traffic data is information which is attached to the communication and informs 
e.g. about the location. 874 
A multitude of new procedures have been adopted by the state to gather, control and 
manage information.  State agencies have been equipped with comprehensive and 
invasive power to collect information about its citizens.875  As a result, the population is 
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directly supervised.876 What began with photographs and fingerprints has transformed 
into surveillance cameras, computer databases and other new sophisticated surveillance 
technology.877 In the UK, the “processes of normalisation of surveillance have gone 
much further than elsewhere.”878 Tempora879 was used by GHCQ to tap fibre-optic 
cables in order to conduct internet surveillance.880 Additionally, the clandestine US’s 
PRISM programme operated by the US National Security Agency (NSA) has been 
accessed by the UK intelligence service in order to monitor British people in addition to 
the operation of the domestic surveillance regime, for instance, as spelled out in 
RIPA. 881  The abovementioned mass-surveillance systems came to light after the 
revelations by Edward Snowden, and it has been argued that the cabinet was not aware 
of these systems882, having in mind the secret nature of these systems, as well as the 
major interference they allegedly have in the lives of civilians, it is not surprising UK 
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human rights groups launched a legal challenge following the revelations.883 The legal 
challenge argued a violation of the right to private life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, raising the question of whether such violation was in 
accordance with the law. The Uk Investigatory Powers Tribunal considered this question 
in Liberty 884 , highlighting that in order for such violation to be deemed to be in 
accordance with the law, the ‘law must indicate the scope of any such discretion 
conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient 
clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference’885. The 
ruling was that any interference to private life by the abovementioned  systems, as well 
as other similar systems, was in compliance with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, acknowledging however that where such arrangements are secret, they will not 
be sufficiently accessible to the public, noting that such accessibility is key for 
compliance under the European Convention on Human Rights886, despite this, it was 
decided that ‘inference of this finding is that the in accordance with the law deficiencies 
of the surveillance arrangement were remedied by the transparency effectively imposed 
on the agencies through the pursuit of legal redress’887. 
Moreover, the national security agencies in the UK work together with Europol and 
other foreign national security agencies and it has been argued that these various 
agencies require broad preventative powers in order to effectively combat terrorism and 
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safeguard national security, as well as protect individuals.888 The terrorist attacks in 
Paris, Tunisia and other places around the world highlight this and Andrew Parker, the 
head of M15, explains that it is hardly possible to avert every kind of attack, as terrorist 
groups employ complicated digital communication methods.889  
In 1999, the Home Office proposed that an Act should be adopted which permits the 
interception of communications.890 The adoption of RIPA was also necessary due to the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and to achieve compliance with Article of Council Directive 
97/66 (the Telecommunications Data Protection Directive).891  Prior to the enactment of 
RIPA, a piecemeal approach had been adopted towards the legal control and this posed 
the threat of litigation in front of the European Court of Human Rights.892  
Various covert investigation techniques, including intrusive surveillance, were not 
covered by legislation, which therefore rendered these illegal due to Article 8 of the 
ECHR.893 There was no power which permitted the interception of private calls and in 
Halford v UK894, this was considered to breach Article 8 of the ECHR.895 Interception of 
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communications made on portable telephones in the house, which were transmitted via 
public networks, was also unlawful following the House of Lords case in R v Effick896 
which decided that radio signals which were received on a handset, as opposed to on a 
base unit, were not part of the public telecommunications system.897 In light of the 
increase in crimes facilitated by technology or directed against technology, it was 
considered that interception plays an essential role in assisting law enforcement 
agencies.898 The Interception of Communications Act 1985 therefore became replaced 
by RIPA.899 
 
In AJA and Others v Metropolitan Commissioner900, it was explained that the RIPA 
provides government agencies with the following covert investigatory powers: Firstly, 
Part 1 of the Act (s.24(5)(2)) permits that communications are intercepted; Part II 
permits intrusive surveillance; Part III deals with requests for decryption; Part II 
contains provisions in respect of Covert Human Intelligence Sources; Part II deals with 
directed surveillance; and Part 1, Chapter 2 and s.24(5)(2) deal with acquiring meta data 
i.e. communications data, i.e. about the destinations and origins of phone message, 
though not their content.901 
 
Not as many agencies are allowed to intercept communications, to conduct intrusive 
surveillance and to demand decryption and stricter requirements are applied i.e. the 
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Secretary of State has to sign in person a warrant or the Secretary of State has to 
subsequently sign a warrant or a judge or the Surveillance Commissioner has to give 
prior approval.902 Only the main investigating bodies can evoke the power to intercept 
communications i.e. the police, the intelligence services and the Serious Organised 
Crimes Authority, whereas in respect of intrusive surveillance and decryption 
additionally, the Armed Forces, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Ministry of 
Defence are also permitted this, though some exceptions apply in respect of 
decryption.903   
A warrant can be granted when national security, the economic well-being of the UK 
requires this and to prevent and detect serious crime. 904  Those responsible for 
authorising any of these powers have to consider whether a less intrusive means could 
be used to gather the information.905 
 
In contrast, in respect of CHIS, directed surveillance and the acquisition of meta data it 
is not necessary that a warrant is obtained or that prior approval has to be sought.906 
Instead various officials, as well as public authorities can authorise this.907 These powers 
can be used for public health, public safety and non-serious crime and it is not required 
to consider whether other less intrusive means could be used.908  
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Part IV of RIPA also creates the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the Investigatory 
Powers Commissioner for Northern Ireland. and the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner. 909  S.65 of RIPA established a Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal, which can hear cases where the Human Rights Act 1998 has been violated, or 
complaints of abuse of powers, or cases of detriments and cases brought against the 
intelligence services.910 RIPA thus sets out a governance framework for interception, 
surveillance, data acquisition and decryption, which is discussed next. 
 
3.2.1 RIPA and Interception  
Interception is dealt with in Part I of RIPA. An interception is what is being collected 
during a transmission.911 A communication is intercepted by a person if the: 
  
contents of the communication [is made] available, while being transmitted, 
to a person other than the sender or intended recipient of the 
communication.”912  
 
Yet the main term “content” has been left undefined, but communications data has been 
defined, so that data which does not constitute communications data is considered 
content.913 
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S.21(4) of RIPA defines communications data as follows: 
 
(a) “any traffic data comprised in or attached to a communication (whether 
by the sender or otherwise) for the purposes of any postal service or 
telecommunication system by means of which it is being or may be 
transmitted; 
(b) any information which includes none of the contents of a communication 
(apart from any information falling within paragraph (a)) and is about the 
use made by any person— 
(i) of any postal service or telecommunications service; or 
(ii) in connection with the provision to or use by any person of any 
telecommunications service, of any part of a telecommunication system; 
(c) any information not falling within paragraph (a) or (b) that is held or 
obtained, in relation to persons to whom he provides the service, by a 
person providing a postal service or telecommunications service.” 
 
Another way to describe communication data is data which identifies the person making 
the communication; the person receiving the communication; the location where the 
communication took place; the communication services which were used; and the way 
in which these services were accessed. 914  Examples of interception may be text 
messages or emails and this results in the reader being able to see the content, as well as 
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the communications data.915 A transmission also includes stored data (s.2(7) of RIPA) 
and this was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v Coulson and another.916 As a 
result, voicemails, which were kept on a phone, can be intercepted. Information which is 
stored on clouds or on other devices can also be intercepted by virtue of the statutory 
provisions. 917  Hence, hacking and computer network exploitation (CNE) are 
permissible.918 
 
S.21(4)(c) of RIPA explains that subscriber information is all the information which the 
service provider holds, as a result of the person signing up to the service. Examples of 
subscriber information are details about the identity of the person who operates an email 
account or who can post on a website; installation and billing addresses; or demographic 
data which was provided. 919  S.21(4)(b) and 22(4) of RIPA define service use 
information. This consists of itemised call records or internet connections; length and 
time of service use; details about the data which has been downloaded and uploaded; use 
of redirection and forward services; and use of special services, such as conference 
calling.920 
 
S.21(4)(a) and s.21(6) of RIPA define traffic data as information which identifies the 
address, location, person or apparatus of the communication which has been transmitted 
and the information about the program or file that has been run or accessed whilst 
                                                 
915 Also see 20 of RIPA; D. Anderson, A Question Of Trust (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office 
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receiving or sending the communication. An example of traffic data is location data.921 
“[T]raffic data may identify a server or domain name (web site) but not a web page”922, 
but this creates some confusion since RIPA does not define content.923 Also, when a 
service provider stores dynamic IP addresses, then this becomes subscriber 
information.924Traffic data is considered most intrusive, whereas subscriber information 
is least intrusive and service use information falls in the middle.925 As a result, particular 
public authorities can only ask for subscriber and service use information.926  
 
Ministers issue warrants, as opposed to courts, though the number of individuals who 
can apply for a warrant is limited.927 Furthermore, sections 3-4 explain that for certain 
kinds of interceptions no warrant is needed, e.g. for prisoners or where the parties have 
consented to this. Yet when one party only consents and the surveillance is an 
authorised one under Part II of RIPA, then the stricter warrant criteria in Part I do not 
have to be discharged, but only the less strict criteria in Part II.928 This is controversial, 
as one party may consent that the communication is intercepted, but the other party does 
not know about this and to then allow that this escapes Part I is questionable. 929 
Furthermore, the way interception of telecommunications is defined results in devices 
on which one can eavesdrop or which result in the content being recorded without 
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causing an interference with the transmission signal to fall within Part II and not Part 
I.930 This is because for there to be a telecommunications interception, this has to result 
in a modification or interference with the operation or system, or result in the 
transmissions being monitored by the system or wireless telegraphy.931  
 
Sections 15 and 16 spell out protective safeguards in respect of intercept material.932 For 
instance, s.15(4) requires that such material has to be destroyed when there are no longer 
“authorised purposes.” 933  Retention of intercept material after a person has been 
charged may constitute an offence pursuant to s.19 of RIPA and in R v Preston,934 the 
House of Lords made clear that the purposes for which an intercept authorisation has 
been granted did not extend to prosecuting offences.935 Consequently, the objective of 
ensuring fairness within criminal court proceedings is not a reason to retain intercept 
material.936 Para.7.2 of the Interception of Communications Code of Practice937 explains 
that it is “rare” not to destroy intercept material before a criminal charge is brought.938 
Emmerson states that this makes it more difficult to identify a “miscarriage of justice” 
and this issue is heightened because it is prohibited that intercept material is disclosed, 
as further discussed below.939 
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Apart from RIPA, the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 also authorises enforcement 
agencies to intercept data.940 Under sections 48 and 49 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 
2006, the Commissioners of Revenue and Customs and the Secretary of State can 
authorise that wireless and other communications are intercepted when one of the 
statutory purposes applies, including when this is required for national security and to 
prevent crime.941 Furthermore, in the High Court case R (on the application of NTL 
Group Ltd) v Ipswich Crown Court 942 , it was confirmed that outside the RIPA 
safeguards, uncontrolled interception can take place. The court found that the police can 
demand that telecommunications providers intercept emails without a warrant, as 
required by s.5 of RIPA, but on the basis of broad policing powers conferred by s.9 of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.943 This calls into doubt the checks and 
balances system as set out in RIPA. 
 
 
3.2.2 RIPA and Surveillance 
Part II of RIPA regulates surveillance. S.48(2) of RIPA makes clear that surveillance 
includes: 
  
“(a) monitoring, observing or listening to persons, their movements, their 
conversations or their other activities or communications; 
                                                 
940 Also see the Prison Service Instructions and s.4(4) of RIPA; s.47 of the Prison Act 1952; D. Anderson, 
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(b) recording anything monitored, observed or listened to in the course of 
surveillance; and 
(c) surveillance by or with the assistance of a surveillance device.” 
 
Surveillance results in a pro-active, as opposed to a reactive policing approach, provides 
high-quality evidence and overcomes the issue that the public is reluctant to furnish 
information to the police.944 Yet Klitou highlights that it is important that surveillance is 
not employed for trivial offences, but rather serious crimes; hence, surveillance should 
be used to detect or prevent crime or for national security reasons.945 Yet the problem is 
that RIPA spells out broad investigatory powers and it is important that these are not 
abused.946 
 
Restrictions are imposed and, for instance, s.26 makes clear that RIPA only applies in 
case there is intrusive or directed surveillance.947 Yet Omerod observes that a failure to 
obtain an authorisation does not constitute an offence. 948Not all public bodies authorised 
to conduct directed surveillance are permitted to undertake intrusive surveillance.949 
RIPA defines those public bodies entitled to conduct intrusive surveillance as: any 
police force, GCHQ, M15 and M16, HM Revenue and Customs, and the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency.950 The circumstances allowing for intrusive surveillance are 
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more limited than that of directed surveillance.951Whilst the circumstances which are 
covered by RIPA is expansive, it only relates to surveillance in the UK, 952and it must 
comply with the ECHR.953Pursuant to the Police Act 1997 and s.71 of RIPA, codes of 
practices are published, which have to be followed in order to ensure that an authorised 
interference is lawful.954 The Interception of Communications Commissioner and the 
Chief Surveillance Commissioner are entrusted with overseeing RIPA.  
 
Directed surveillance denotes less intrusion than intrusive surveillance; it requires 
authorisation and the threshold is crime, whereas for intrusive surveillance the threshold 
is serious crime.955 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 amends RIPA and thereby 
ensures that the power of public authorities to conduct surveillance is further 
curtailed.956 In the context of cybercrime, it may be useful to clarify which offences 
should be considered serious.  Furthermore, s.28(3) of RIPA explains that an 
authorisation for directed surveillance can be granted when it is considered necessary:  
 
 
“(a) in the interests of national security; 
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(b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing 
disorder; 
(c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom; 
(d) in the interests of public safety; 
(e) for the purpose of protecting public health; 
(f) for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other 
imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department; or 
(g) for any purpose (not falling within paragraphs (a) to (f)) which is 
specified for the purposes of this subsection by an order made by the 
Secretary of State.” 
 
Harfield further explains that in relation to agencies other than the police, these statutory 
purposes are limited to particular agencies.957 Statutory instruments have been enacted 
to detail which particular agency can use directed surveillance for which particular 
purposes.958 
As mentioned, for intrusive surveillance to be authorised, a higher threshold of crime 
has to be present. Authorisation is therefore stricter, also because necessity, as well as 
proportionality have to be established and it is mandated to consider whether other 
means could reasonably be used.959 S.81(2)(b) and s.81(3) of RIPA define serious crime 
as: 
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“(a) that the offence or one of the offences that is or would be constituted by 
the conduct is an offence for which a person who has attained the age of 
twenty-one and has no previous convictions could reasonably be expected to 
be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years or more;  
(c) that the conduct involves the use of violence, results in substantial 
financial gain or is conduct by a large number of persons in pursuit of a 
common purpose.” 
 
S.26(2) of RIPA defines intrusive surveillance as:  
 
“covert surveillance that  
(a) is carried out in relation to anything taking place on any residential 
premises or in any private vehicle; and 
(b) involves the presence of an individual on the premises or in the vehicle 
or is carried out by means of a surveillance device.” 
 
When intrusive surveillance has been authorised, the Surveillance Commissioner has to 
be informed, who has to then approve this.960 Apart from RIPA, the Digital Economy 
Act 2010 also implicitly permits surveillance to enforce copyright.961  
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3.2.3 RIPA and Decryption 
When encrypted content is intercepted, then it cannot be used.962 Equally, when an 
encrypted device is legally seized, then it is important that enforcement officers have the 
power to demand that the key to decrypt the device is provided.963 This power was 
activated in 2007, but despite being extremely intrusive, it is not covert.964 S.49(2) of 
RIPA permits certain individuals, as defined in Schedule 2, to send a Part 3 notice to 
those persons, who can be reasonably considered to possess the encryption key, so that 
they can disclose it.965 However, a written permission has to be obtained from a Circuit 
Judge or a District Judge (Magistrates' Courts)966 or a warrant has to be issued.967 
However, the intelligence services do not have to ask for a warrant, but have the power 
to do this by virtue of statute.968 Some other exceptions apply, for instance, to the police, 
the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the Scottish Crime and Drug 
Enforcement Agency (SCEDEA), so that no warrant has to be sought, but this power 
arises by virtue of statute. 969  Accordingly, enforcement agencies can request secret 
decryption passwords or keys or can require persons to decrypt message, so long as the 
Secretary of State, senior officials or circuit judges have authorised this. 970  Those 
required to provide the key are frequently required to provide a secrecy undertaking, so 
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that they cannot discuss this with anyone, apart from their legal adviser.971 A failure to 
comply with a notice can result in an imprisonment for up to two years and up to five 
years in respect of matters which relate to national security972 and for not complying 
with the secrecy requirement.973 Hence, a “tipping off” offence has been created, which 
can be committed by those receiving a notice.974  
Third parties who provide encryption services, may frequently receive such notices.975 
For instance, internet service providers, which offer secure IP telephony services or 
virtual private network may be requested to make available the particular decryption 
keys or unencrypted data traffic. 976 When a digital investigation is carried out, various 
ways are used to access encrypted evidence, for instance, the suspect can be forced or 
persuaded to furnish the decryption key; passphrases or keys can be located; 
unencrypted copies of the data may be located; a smart password attack can be 
conducted; implementation vulnerabilities can be exploited, software and hardware 
surveillance can be conducted; or an exhaustive key search may be undertaken.977 From 
a technological perspective, it is also possible for enforcement agents to launch a “man-
in-the-middle” attack in respect of encrypted communications and to thereby obtain 
information.978 Service providers, such as Skype, could also be requested to use weak 
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encryption in respect of a particular target.979 Yet Goold and Neyland states that such 
co-operation does not yet take place.980 
 
 
3.4 Data Retention: The EU Data Retention Directive, the UK Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 and the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016 
Governments are interested in creating a “digital mass surveillance framework”, which 
collects, retains and processes data about all the interactions, transactions and uses of 
communication and information technologies.981 The European Commission reports that 
evidence from Europol and the Member States highlights the importance of retaining 
communications data for criminal investigations and prosecutions.982 Mandatory data 
retention ensures that valuable data is accessible for a certain time period. Operators 
may otherwise not store data in an easy to retrieve manner or at all, as they have no real 
business value. 983 This type of data includes, for instance, unsuccessful phone calls; IP 
addresses; or email data. 984 Without the storage of particular traffic data, it becomes 
virtually impossible to investigate and detect certain crimes. For instance, the German 
federal police reported that for nearly half of cases, they could not have conducted an 
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investigation without being able to access the historical traffic data.985 The terrorist 
attacks in London and Madrid in 2004/2005 particularly highlighted the importance and 
the EU therefore adopted a Framework Decision on Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters.986  As the law was not harmonised in the Member States, in 2006 the 
Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC) was enacted.987 
 
Providers of public communications networks and electronic communications services 
were required to keep data, so that the destination and source of fixed mobile and 
internet telephony and network, emails, text messages and internet access could be 
identified.988 The Directive required that internet and telephone traffic was to be retained 
for 6 months and up to two years, so that terrorism and organised crime could be 
combated.989 User names, numbers, time, date and duration, the international mobile 
subscriber identity and international mobile station equipment identity for mobile 
phones, including the place of the cell ID, had to be retained.990 Hence, in Europe 
telephone companies had to retain data about each mobile and land line call and other 
details, whilst internet service providers had to keep data about internet connections and 
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addresses, as well as details to trace emails and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) 
calls.991 Yet Article 5(2) of the Data Retention Directive proscribed the storage of data 
which showed the contents.992  
 
In 2012, the Irish High Court and the Australian Constitutional Court made a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU in order to ask whether the Data Retention Directive 
was compatible with fundamental rights.993 Granger and Irion comment that thereby the 
controversial “Big Brother policies” were challenged.994 The issue was whether data 
retention had to be analysed against the background of the right to privacy as guaranteed 
in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and the right to protection of 
personal data as guaranteed in Article 8 of the CFR and as a result imposed 
requirements on data retention. 995  For instance, Article 8 expressly provides that 
personal data “[m]ust be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or other legitimate basis laid down by law …” and that 
an “independent authority” has to monitor to guarantee this right.996 The constitutional 
principles contained in Articles 7 and 8 were firstly introduced through Directive 95/46 
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on the protection of individuals with regard to processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data (the Data Protection Directive) and Directive 2002/59 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector (ePrivacy Directive).997 The ePrivacy Directive states 
that electronic communications, as well as traffic data has to be kept confidential, 
though Article 15(1) permits Member States to retain data for a limited time, so long as 
these are “necessary, appropriate and proportionate measures within a democratic 
society to safeguard national security i.e. State security, defence, public security, and 
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of 
unauthorised use of the electronic communication system, as referred to in Article 13(1) 
of Directive 95/46/EC.”998 
 
Advocate General Cruz Villalon argued that the Directive should be declared invalid 
since it contravenes Article 7.999 He suggested that it should firstly be assessed whether 
the Directive is proportionate in relation to the general means employed and the measure 
which is meant to be achieved in accordance with Article 5(4) of the TEU; and, 
secondly, it should be analysed whether it complies with the Charter, particularly the 
proportionality provision in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.1000 He 
considered that the degree of interference with fundamental rights was substantively 
disproportionate. 1001  He evaluated whether the interference was permitted by law, 
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guaranteed the right to privacy, was not disproportionate i.e. was necessary and meeting 
legitimate objectives. He criticised the EU legislator and stated that “[t]he EU 
legislature [could] not when adopting an act imposing obligations which constitutes 
serious interference with the fundamental rights of citizens of the Union, entirely leave 
to the Member States the task of defining the guarantees capable of justifying that 
interference … It must … fully assume its share of responsibility…”1002  
 
In 2014, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU then issued its judgment in the Digital Rights 
Ireland case.1003 It found that the Directive impacted the right to freedom of expression 
and violated privacy rights in a disproportionate manner, which did not serve the public 
interest to ensure safety.1004 The court emphasised that too much insight was gained 
about the life of all normal citizens, despite the fact that no content was stored.1005 The 
court stated that the effect of the Directive was that persons felt that their entire private 
lives were constantly under surveillance.1006 
 
It found that the data retention requirement and affording national authorities access 
amounted to interferences. National authorities could use and access the data without 
any limitation being imposed, as they could define what constitutes serious crime, as 
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well as the procedural and substantive conditions.1007Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights were breached by the fact that data had to be retained for two 
years.1008 It was made clear that the Data Retention Directive is a derogation from the 
Directive on privacy and electronic communications (2002/58/EC).1009 Article 1(3) of 
the Directive on privacy and electronic communications contains an exception for 
judicial and police cooperation. The almost identical exception is found in Article 3(2) 
of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Nonetheless, the CJEU acknowledged that 
data retention is a suitable measure to combat serious crime and international terrorism, 
but made clear that this is subject to strict requirements, so that Article 8 (the right to 
privacy) and fundamental rights are safeguarded. 1010  It also confirmed that use of 
modern investigation methods was important to combat terrorism and organised 
crime.1011  
 
The court stressed that legislation which interferes with rights must spell out precise and 
clear rules, so that the scope of the measure and its application is defined and minimum 
safeguards are imposed, so that persons are afforded with adequate guarantees to protect 
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their data effectively against unlawful access, use and abuse of the data.1012 Firstly, there 
was no link with the retention of the communications data and particular security threats 
and professional secrecy was thereby also not protected.1013 Secondly, no limits were 
imposed and no objective criteria were developed in respect of access and use and there 
were no procedural and substantive conditions, despite it being crucial to strictly limit 
the purpose when averting and detecting particular serious offences or those necessary 
to pursue a criminal prosecution.1014 Hence, it is crucial that serious crime is defined and 
objective requirements are adopted, so that only certain persons are permitted to access 
and use the data when this is absolutely necessary.1015 Accordingly, a “blanket retention 
of traffic data” to combat terrorism and crime is not allowed.1016  Hence, a “strict 
scrutiny test” has been adopted and it has to be strictly assessed whether the measures 
are proportionate and necessary when there is a serious interference with fundamental 
rights, even when legitimate objectives are pursued. 1017  Following the decision, 
domestic law makers have to develop a governance system, which has the necessary 
“checks and balances.”1018 Consequently, data collection should be limited to situations 
where there exists a risk to public security; hence, should take place only for a certain 
time period, be restricted to a geographical area or a particular group of individuals.1019 
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Data retention has to be supervised by an independent authority, so that personal data is 
protected and secured.1020 When retained data is retroactively accessed and used, this 
should only be done when this is absolutely necessary and in accordance with 
procedural, as well as substantive conditions.1021 This means that the purpose has to be 
limited to serious offences and access requests should be approved by an independent 
body and only a few persons should be able to access and make use of the data.1022 
 
Member States can thus enact legislation, so long as these criteria are satisfied.1023 This 
is particularly important due to the increase in terrorism, which puts to the fore the 
question what substitute should be adopted, so that law enforcement agencies can retain 
data. 1024 The UK enacted emergency legislation in the form of the Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act 2014, which permitted police to access the communications of 
companies, so that they could monitor internet activity and listen to phone records. 1025 
The Act was adopted due to the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice ruling that the 
EU Data Retention Directive is invalid and as the UK Regulations were based on this, 
this resulted in a legal gap.1026 The case illustrates that the surveillance powers which 
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governments increasingly seek is difficult to reconcile with what courts consider 
proportionate and necessary.1027  
 
The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA 2014) was thus 
adopted, temporarily, as it was provided for it to be applicable until 31 December 2016, 
and it has since then been repealed, to ensure that authorisations, warrants and 
conditions imposed in respect of communications data and interception have 
extraterritorial effect, so that overseas service providers could also be required to 
comply.1028   
Hence, the main aim was to enable security services to request public 
telecommunications operators to keep communications data in accordance with 
RIPA.1029 A report had to be published on an annual basis, in which it was disclosed 
how much data had been intercepted, and a body had to be created to act as a watchdog 
to ensure that the powers were not abused.1030 Not as many public bodies were allowed 
to collect data and only relevant data could be accessed. Data retention was shortened to 
twelve months.1031 A diplomat was also appointed, who was responsible for negotiating 
data transfers with the US. 1032 S.8 provided that the provisions were only in force until 
late 2016. The Act became then replaced by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.1033 
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In 2012, the UK government announced the Draft Communications Data Bill, but this 
was criticised as being a “snooper's charter” and was not enacted. 1034  Electronic 
communications services providers would have had to collect more data and make this 
available to law enforcement agencies and public authorities.1035 Part 3 of the proposed 
Bill would have amended the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, so that 
relevant authorities could identify the device which used the Internet Protocol at a 
particular time or could identify the person.1036 
 
In November 2015, the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill was presented to parliament, 
which received royal assent in November 2016 and became adopted as the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016. 1037  Travis labels this a “snooper's charter” since it permits the 
security services to bug and hack and requires that the personal data of everyone is 
stored for one year, including the way the web and social and phone media is used.1038 
Furthermore, private and public datasets can be accessed by the Security and 
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Intelligence Agencies (SIAs).1039 Also, the intelligence services can create and analyse 
“Bulk Personal Datasets” and this provides them with intelligence about national 
security risks and helps with combating crime and protecting the economic well-
being.1040 This ensures that what was disclosed by Edward Snowden is legalised.1041 The 
Act states that data shall only be stored for a limited time, except when it is likely that it 
may be useful at a future date, but since the analysis of data is speculative, the risk is 
that this may result in a subjective determination.1042  
 
Lysnkey highlights that the issue is that individuals may be singled out because they 
have certain characteristics or are part of a group or have certain interests, which render 
them suspects. 1043  This may have an impact on them without them knowing or 
consenting to the processing of their personal data. 1044However, no content can be 
collected by phone and internet companies, though a ministerial intercept warrant can 
authorise the collection of content. 1045  Yet Murray and Keenan point out that this 
warrant issuing procedure is not overseen by an independent judiciary.1046 Instead, the 
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Secretary of State can grant a warrant whenever this is “necessary in the interests of 
national security”1047 “or for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime” or “in 
the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests 
are also relevant to the interests of national security.”1048 Murray and Keenan question 
whether this may result in “rubber-stamping” of the Home Secretary's decisions. It is 
also noteworthy that internet and phone companies receive a payment from the Home 
Office for the retention of the data and to give access to the police and security 
services.1049 
 
This investigatory legislation has faced severe backlash from a number of journalists 
and human rights organisations, including the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 
Amnesty International, Privacy International, Big Brother Watch, the Open Rights 
Group, and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties who in an unprecedented move have 
filed legal complaints against the UK government with the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) to challenge the legality of its mass surveillance.1050 The landmark case 
was heard on 7 November 2017, when the UK government was accused of violating the 
right to privacy, the right to a fair trial, the right to freedom of expression, and the right 
not to be discriminated against, which are all protected under the ECHR convention.  
Nine judges posed questions to the UK government related to what safeguards are in 
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place, who controls interception, how easily are warrants granted for communication 
interception, and on what basis is information selected for human analysis. 1051   A 
judgement is expected early 2018 and will have major implications for the Investigatory 
Powers Act, 2016. 
 
 
3.5 Admissibility of Intercepted Communication in Court Proceedings 
In the past, government secrets could be withheld by claiming “Crown privilege” and 
nowadays this is called “public interest immunity.”1052 Normally relevant documents 
have to be disclosed to the other side in court proceedings, but when public interest 
immunity is successfully pleaded, information does not have to be disclosed.1053 Hence, 
whilst the Crown Prosecution Service normally has to disclose all material which 
weaken the prosecution's case, this is not the case in respect of sensitive material i.e. 
material which if disclosed harms the public interest.1054 For instance, a disclosure may 
reveal particular techniques, which may be used in the future and may therefore not be 
disclosed.1055 Disclosure can be prevented by virtue of the public interest common law 
rules and s.21(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.1056 Under 
s.3(6) and s.7(5) of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 an application 
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for public interest immunity can be made by the prosecutor to the court, so that material 
is protected. 1057  This ensures that intercepted communications are only used for 
investigative purposes.1058   
 
However, public interest immunity contravenes the notion of “open justice” and 
therefore raises questions in respect of the right to a fair hearing and also in respect of 
freedom of expression.1059 Since the case of Conway v Rimmer,1060 the courts therefore 
balance whether confidentiality is in the public interest and do not simply accept the 
request by the enforcement agencies.1061 Courts can thus inspect documents, which are 
affected by a public interest immunity claim and then decide whether disclosure should 
be ordered.1062 
 
Once a public interest immunity has been issued, a person, who wants access to a 
document, can nonetheless challenge the decision to uphold public interest 
immunity.1063 He has to demonstrate to the court that this is necessary to provide him 
with a fair hearing or in a criminal case assists with the defence.1064 Whilst the court can 
scrutinise the documents, it is inclined to do this in order to prevent “speculative fishing 
                                                 
1057 Ibid 
1058 C. Rogers, R. Lewis, T. John, T.  Read, Police Work: Principles and Practice (Abingdon, Routledge 
2011) 132 
1059 J. Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law (10th ed, London, Palgrave 2015) 561 
1060 (1968) AC 910 
1061 A. Choo, Evidence (3rd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012) 204 
1062 Ibid 
1063  Goodridge v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary (1999) 1 All ER 896; Air Canada v 
Secretary of State for Trade (No.2) (1983) 2 AC 394; s.3 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996; J. Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law (10th ed, London, Palgrave 2015) 562 
1064  Goodridge v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary (1999) 1 All ER 896; Air Canada v 
Secretary of State for Trade (No.2) (1983) 2 AC 394; s.3 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996; Alder (ibid) 562 
228 
 
expeditions.” 1065  Covert surveillance operations, national security and safeguarding 
anonymous informers have been found to constitute reasons to reject disclosure 
applications. 1066  Similarly, commercially or financially sensitive information, for 
instance, between the Bank of England and the government or with private businesses or 
communications between the government and foreign governments are also reasons to 
refuse disclosure.1067 
 
In line with the public interest immunity principle, s.17 of RIPA makes clear that 
intercepted communications are not permitted during court proceedings, which is 
important for the secret and security intelligence agencies whose work could otherwise 
be affected. 1068  However, the prohibition to disclose intercept material in s.17 is 
extremely controversial because it results in a wide range of important material being 
excluded.1069 S.17 replicates the principle, which was previously set out in s.9 of the 
Interception of Communications Act 1985. 1070  Under this principle, no questions can be 
asked, no evidence can be provided, no disclosure or assertion can be made or any other 
things in relation or because of the legal proceedings which would reveal that a warrant 
application was made or that a public official has committed an offence.1071  However, 
certain exceptions exist, for instance, intercept material which comes from foreign 
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jurisdiction can be used and analogies can be drawn in reasoning.1072 When intercept 
material has been legally obtained by virtue of sections 3 and 4 of RIPA, then it can be 
used.1073 However, s.18 contains various measures, so that the court and prosecutor can 
discharge their duties in respect of Article 6 of the ECHR. S.18(7)(a) of RIPA states that 
the principle which proscribes disclosure does not apply when a prosecutor 
“determine[s] what is required of him by his duty to secure the fairness of the 
prosecution.”1074 Furthermore, sections 18(7)(b), 18(8) and 18(9) of RIPA empower the 
judge to order the prosecution to provide the material to him alone during a public 
interest immunity hearing, though only when there are “exceptional circumstances” and 
“disclosure is essential in the interests of justice.”1075 
 
S.18(10) enables the court after perusing the material to require the prosecutor to admit 
a fact, which is crucial to preserve justice, though the judge cannot require disclosure of 
the material or information about the way in which the material was obtained.1076 As a 
result, only a “constrained admission” can be obtained and Emmerson et al doubt 
whether this ensures a fair hearing and argue that this does not comply with the decision 
in Rowe and Davis v UK1077, in which it was established that equality of arms is 
required.1078 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter has shown that the UK has updated its cybercrime law regularly and new 
offences have been added, with a view to protecting critical infrastructure, which is vital 
in an age of cyber terrorism and warfare. Penalties have increased, so that cyber 
criminals can be convicted for life in very serious cases. This recognises that digital 
crimes can have as catastrophic consequences as physical crimes. It also acts as a 
deterrent. The law has also been aligned with EU law and the Cybercrime Convention, 
thereby resulting in a harmonisation. This is important to facilitate co-operation between 
enforcement agencies which often have to work together in order to bring cyber 
criminals to justice, who could otherwise easily exploit the borderless nature of the 
digital realm. The scope of jurisdiction has been widened, which is crucial to hold those 
to account who may reside outside of the UK, but perpetrate crimes within it, and 
extends to incorporate UK nationals who commit cybercrime in other countries whilst 
abroad.  
 
Enforcement agencies have been given broad policing powers which helps them to 
prevent, detect and prosecute individuals for the commission of the various computer 
misuse offences. These powers have been put on a statutory footing and a governance 
framework has been adopted, so that these powers are not used in an arbitrary manner. 
Warrants have to be issued or judicial approval has to be sought for more intrusive 
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covert policing techniques. For instance, s.8(4) of RIPA requires that a warrant has to be 
granted for bulk data interception. 
 
Interception, surveillance, communications data acquisition and decryption have thereby 
become key tools in the arsenal of enforcement agencies.  
Certainly, the task of policing the digital space has become more challenging for the 
police and other enforcement agents, as they have to continuously keep up to date with 
innovation and new threats. These measures are therefore undoubtedly extremely 
valuable measures in the fight against cybercrime. They ensure that the many digital 
traces which cyber criminals may leave behind can be captured. This helps to secure the 
digital crime scene and forms part of a pro-active policing approach. 
 
Without these powers, it would be extremely difficult to protect the public against the 
new threats from around the world. However, it is important that these powers are 
exercised in a lawful manner and comply with democratic values.  This raises important 
questions about the justifiable degree of interference with fundamental rights and values, 
most notably the right to privacy, as highlighted by the Grand Chamber decision of the 
CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and others.  Moreover, the public interest 
immunity protects the police from revealing their policing practices and thereby 
prevents their work from being undermined. However, this has an impact on the right to 
a fair hearing, and it is important that a careful balance is struck and that judges are 
given enough discretion to determine whether or not an application to have material 
excluded is warranted.  
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Chapter Four: The UAE’s Legislative Framework to 
Combat E-Crime 
 
4. Introduction 
Cybercrime often takes place across borders and for this reason it is imperative that 
countries have the necessary tools to protect themselves.1079 As the UAE has become a 
vibrant economic hub, has a very high take up of internet usage and ranked 6th in terms 
of e-participation and 7th in terms of online services in 20101080, it has also become a 
target of cybercrime attacks.1081   A 2013 report by Symantec identified that around 17% 
of the entire population in the UAE had become affected by cybercrime.1082 A 2014 
report by PwC informed that cybercrime is the second highest economic crime with 
41%, which is 4% higher than the global average.1083 This highlights that cybercrime 
has remained a prevalent crime in the UAE. 
 
Cyber attacks, for instance, in the form of denial of service, malware and phising, have 
increased and the IT security of government agencies have become targets, as well as 
                                                 
1079 J. A. Lewis, G. Neuneck, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Report, The cyber 
index, International Security Trends and Realities, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1-153, ix 
<http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyber-index-2013-en-463.pdf> accessed 17th April 2016 
2013 
1080 A. M. Al-Khouri, 'e-Government Strategies, The Case of the United Arab Emirates' (2012) 17 
European Journal of e-Practice, 126-150, 134 
1081 S. S. Basamh, H. A. Qudaih, J. Bin Ibrahim, An overview on Cyber Security Awareness in Muslim 
Countries (2014) International Journal of Information and Communication Technology, 21-24, 21 
1082 Symantec, Internet Security Threat Report, 2013, 18 
1083 PwC, Economic Crime in the UAE, 2014, 1-6, 2 
234 
 
industrial data.1084 In 2010 several customers of UAE Bank lost their savings due to 
internet fraud. 1085  Hence, financial services have been a particular target of cyber 
criminals.1086 Cyber security is thus a national priority, including in light of the fact that 
the UAE is adopting a smart grid and is building its first nuclear plant in Barakah, which 
is scheduled to be ready by 2020.1087 A digitised infrastructure creates security threats 
since systems are run on networks and with the help of software.1088  It is for these 
reasons that it is essential that the legislative e-crime regime equips enforcement 
agencies with sufficient powers to keep the digital realm safe. This also necessitates a 
proactive policing approach, so that cyber security risks can be minimised before attacks 
take place. 
 
The UAE government has already increased its budget in order to build and develop its 
cyber security capacity. 1089  In 2007, the UAE government launched the aeCERT 
security awareness campaign in order to safeguard online information and to block 
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immoral websites with a view of combating pornography and child abuse. 1090 
Additionally, UAE police have created cybercrime units and computer forensic teams, 
who are experts in analysing electronic evidence.1091 
 
An e-government strategic framework was adopted for the period 2012 to 2014 with a 
view of developing a knowledge-based economy though “world class practices in all 
areas of e-government.” 1092  A secure identity management infrastructure has been 
adopted, which has made it possible to conduct secure e-government transactions and to 
link the electronic identity to the particular individual.1093 Furthermore, government 
agencies have to also adhere to Cabinet Resolution No. 21 of 2012 concerning 
Information Security Regulations in the Federal Authorities, as well as Executive 
Council Resolution No.13 of 2012 regarding the Information Security in the 
Government of Dubai.1094  
 
Moreover, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority is responsible for 
telecommunications services, as well as the regulatory regime, including the internet 
access management policy.1095 A policy sets out which online categories cannot be 
displayed by internet service providers and thus requires that access to certain content is 
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blocked, such as websites to malicious codes, phising webpages, sites where spy-
software is downloaded, sites where illegal drugs are sold, gambling sites, sites with 
pornography, etc.  In 2013, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority also 
defended various government webpages against cyber attacks with the assistance of the 
Computer Emergency Response Team aeCERT. 1096   The Dubai Financial Services 
Authority is also trying to ensure that its regulatory rules comply with ISO 27032, which 
sets out guidance in respect of cyber security.1097 Those, who are operating businesses in 
the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), have a duty of care under Law No.2 of 
2015 concerning Commercial Companies and DIFC Law No.5 of 2005 imposes a 
similar duty. Moreover, the Dubai Financial Service Authority requires that regulated 
entities adopt operating systems and checks in order to mitigate risks, which includes 
cyber attacks, and when this is not done, a fine can be imposed by the regulator.1098  
 
Since 2012, the National Electronic Security Authority (NESA) is responsible for 
enhancing the national cyber security and critical information infrastructure.1099 It has 
various competencies, ranging from suggesting the state’s policy in the e-security field, 
and executing the same after its adoption; setting the state’s e-security standards and 
supervising their execution; preparing a  national  plan  to  face  any  risks,  threats  or  
attacks  on  the  e-security  in  coordination  with  the concerned parties; verifying the 
efficiency of the systems; protecting the communications network  and  information 
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systems of governmental and private bodies operating in the state; supervising  the  
commitment  of  the  concerned  parties  and the  implementation  of  the  e-security  
requirements issued by the Authority, and following up their implementation; fighting 
the crimes pertaining to computing, information network and information technology, of 
whatsoever type; coordinating with the regional and international concerned parties 
regarding the authority’s scope of work; providing technical and advisory support; 
receiving complaints and suggestions; preparing and funding the necessary studies and 
research in coordination with the concerned parties; setting  the  required  controls  after  
coordinating  with  the  concerned  parties  in  the  state,  in  order  to  authorise various 
activities, e.g. importing, exporting and using encryption and jamming hardware and 
software; testing the intrusion vulnerability of the communications network and 
information systems; suggesting legislations related to the e-security; spreading 
awareness; organising  and  participating  in  conferences  and cooperating  with  
regional  and  international organisations.1100 The NESA has also issued various papers 
in order to improve security, such as the Critical Information Infrastructure Policy, the 
National Cyber Security Strategy and the Information Assurance Standards and some of 
these policies have as its base ISO 27001, which spells out the international standards 
for information security management systems.1101  
 
Despite the various initiatives, El Guindy points out that the legislator and law 
enforcement agents face several challenges:1102  Cybercrime offences form only one 
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aspect of an effectiveanti-cybercrime strategy. It is therefore important that a more 
holistic approach is adopted in order to combat cybercrime effectively, particularly in 
light of the fact that even the existing cyber laws are relatively weak and unreliable, 
especially at the prosecution stage which raises much more complex procedural issues in 
comparison to traditional crimes. 1103  Challenges also exist because of insufficient 
technical capabilities, especially in relation to the procedural aspects of cybercrime 
investigations.1104 It is essential that digital evidence is preserved and its integrity is 
ensured and this necessitates more sophisticated search and seizure criminal law 
procedures.1105 Furthermore, as cyber-criminals may be located abroad, new technical 
capabilities have to be built, especially in the field of surveillance in order to track and 
identify criminals and this raises complicated questions in respect of the right to privacy 
and generally in terms of accountability. 1106  Another challenge is to create good 
organisational structures in order to facilitate co-operation, though in the UAE law 
enforcement officers already work together with the Computer Emergency Response 
Teams.1107 However, it may also prove important if legislation would address the topic 
of cooperation with other stakeholders, including with the private sector, as well as 
regional and international cooperation. 1108  At the 5th International Cybercrimes 
Conference 2014 in Abu Dhabi, it was also recommended that law enforcement 
agencies, information technology regulatory authorities and judicial authorities should 
cooperate more and that the state should enter into partnership agreements with 
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academic entities and the private sector. 1109  Furthermore, Al-Bawaba observes that 
“cybercrime laws in the UAE are dangerously vague.” 1110  It has to be therefore 
analysed whether the existing e-crime provisions are sufficient in order to safeguard the 
national security interests of the UAE. 
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4.1 The UAE’s Legislative E-Crime Framework  
The first law which the UAE adopted in order to specifically combat cybercrime was 
Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on combating cybercrime. This law contained 29 Articles 
which defined certain phrases and terms and set out various offences, including their 
punishment, particularly the issues of identity theft, internet fraud, hacking and causing 
harm to the public. For instance, Article 2 of Federal Law No.2 of 2006 provided that an 
“international act whereby a person unlawfully gains access to a website or information 
system by logging on to the website or system or breaking through a security measure 
carried imprisonment or a fine or either.” Those who facilitated or committed these 
offences could be imprisoned for a longer term or be required to pay a higher fine.1111 
Internet fraud was further rendered illegal by virtue of Article 10, which stated that 
anyone who “through the internet or the computer appropriates to himself or to another 
moveable property or procures a deed or signature upon a deed, using deception, a 
false name or impersonation with intent to defraud the victim, shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term of at least one year and a fine of at least AED 30,000.” 
Furthermore, Article 11 made clear that anyone “who uses the internet or computer to 
unlawfully access the number or details of a credit card or other electronic card shall 
be liable to imprisonment and a fine...” Moreover, “a person who unlawfully logs on to 
an internet website in order to change, delete, destroy or modify its design or take over 
its address shall be liable to imprisonment and a fine or either of the two.”1112  
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Not all cybercrimes are motivated by financial gain, for instance, worms and viruses i.e. 
malicious software simply cause financial loss. 1113  Another typical cybercrime is 
hacking i.e. gaining illegal access to a system without having an authority and this can 
be done for various purposes, including to commit identity theft, vandalism, to spread 
political ideas, etc. The law therefore also imposed very strict penalties for these kinds 
of offences, including arguably spam and viruses.1114 Article 5 provided that “a person 
who in any way hinders or delays access to a service, system, server or database 
through the internet or computer shall be liable to imprisonment and a fine.” Another 
Article which addressed the threat emanating from viruses, worms and hacking was 
Article 6. This Article made clear that “a person who uses the internet or computer in 
order to disable, destroy, wipeout, delete, damage, or modify programs, data or 
information on the internet or computer shall be liable to temporary detention and a 
fine of not less than AED 50,000 or either of the two.” However, this provision was 
insufficient to address information security issues in respect of cloud computing i.e. 
failed to explain whether a cloud provider, who does not protect its user, is responsible 
for the injuries caused by a hacker; and users of clouds, who suffered losses as a result 
of it, had to rely on the contractual provisions and the civil law.1115  
 
Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on combating cybercrime also criminalised acts which 
caused harm to the public or persons, such as online extortion, stalking, blackmail and 
defamation. For instance, Article 9 outlawed blackmail and threatening another through 
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the use of a computer or the internet and rendered it a crime punishable by 
“imprisonment for up to two years and a fine not exceeding AED 50,000 or either of the 
two.”  Another provision which combated that the internet was used to defame others 
was Article 16, which proscribed that the internet or a computer was used to breach 
family values and principles, or to publish pictures or news which invade the privacy of 
a person or their family life, even if they are accurate, and rendered this a crime 
punishable with at least one-year imprisonment and “a fine of at least AED 50,000 or 
either of the two.” Yet the law did not clarify what constitutes family values and 
principles, as well as what information should be considered private. This is despite the 
fact that this is an important issue, as it is difficult to police the digital realm without 
surveillance. 1116  Hence, there existed a problem since any type of government 
surveillance arguably contravened Article 16, particularly since surveillance results in 
the internet or a computer being used to invade the privacy of a person. However, the 
provision did not contain a caveat which clarified that surveillance by enforcement 
agencies did not breach this provision. Also, the fact that online defamation was always 
considered a criminal offence was a draconian approach. 
 
The Law also outlawed other crimes which harm public morality, such as internet 
gambling, pornography, paedophilia, drug and human trafficking, as well as cyber 
terrorism.1117 The provisions were therefore very far-reaching in scope. Furthermore, 
individuals who distributed “information that is contrary to public morals or operates a 
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venue for such purposes” could be imprisoned for at least six months and be made to 
pay AED 30,000 (approximately £5,659). 1118  Yet it would have been better if the 
concept of public morality had been further clarified in order to prevent a too broad 
construction. Without this, freedom of expression was stymied. Those who lured, incited 
or assisted females or males to engage in fornication or prostitution via a computer or 
the internet could also be criminally pursued and when this involved a minor, this 
attracted a minimum prison sentence of five years.1119 Those, who engaged in human 
trafficking or the sale of mind altering substances or narcotics could also be temporarily 
detained.1120 Those, who published information or created a website for terrorist groups, 
could be imprisoned for a maximum of five years.1121  
 
This first cybercrime law was certainly an important stepping stone to combat 
cybercrime, but in light of the increase in cybercrime, it was considered a top priority to 
further strengthen the e-crime framework.1122 In this context, the Head of the UAE 
Finance Public Prosecution, Counsellor Hassan Mohammed Al Hammadi observed that 
“[t]he lawmaker issued the Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on combating the cybercrimes, 
but practical reality proved the statute had failed to keep in line with the rapid 
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developments and the ensuing risks due to the amazing progress in modern 
technologies.”1123  
 
In 2012, the UAE therefore adopted Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 concerning Combating 
Information Technology Crimes, which replaced Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on 
combating cybercrime. This law has a total of 51 provisions, which proscribe a wider 
range of cybercrime offences. Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 also broadens the definition in 
respect of privacy violations by proscribing transmitting and disclosing audio and visual 
communications, taking photographs of individuals and saving, copying or publishing 
them, publishing statements, comments, news and information, including genuine and 
true information, and eavesdropping.1124  Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 also increases 
privacy protection for credit card and bank account numbers, electronic payment 
methods and other online data.1125 Yet the concept of “privacy” has not been defined 
and is therefore very wide.1126 The interplay with Article 31 of the constitution, which 
also contains a right to privacy and confirms that communications are confidential 
whether sent by post or through other means, is not yet clear. Federal Law No.3 of 1987 
(the penal code) also contains provisions which safeguard privacy, and which may be 
pleaded alongside the cybercrime provisions. For instance, Article 372 proscribes the 
publication of anything that causes contempt or hatred about a person. Article 373 
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renders it a criminal offence to falsely accuse a person in a way which discredits or 
dishonours him. It is also a crime to publish pictures, comments or news which disclose 
information about the family or private lives of individuals, even when the information 
is accurate and it is in the public interest to do so. Yet Federal Law No.5 of 2012 is even 
wider since under the penal code it is necessary to show that the person possessed an 
intention to cause harm or to disclose private information.1127 However, it is concerning 
that, for example, taking photographs of individuals and saving, copying or publishing 
them or publishing genuine information, can constitute a criminal offence. It does not 
send out the message of being a moderate Islamic country. It is therefore important that 
scholars develop the necessary caveats and exceptions. Guidance should be published to 
distinguish criminal conduct from, e.g. the harmless practice of posting pictures of 
friends on social media. Otherwise, the risk is that individuals are being convicted 
without having engaged in morally culpable conduct. 
 
Whilst the right to privacy has been protected by virtue of the criminal law, there exist 
no other data protection legislation, apart from data protection legislation which applies 
in the DIFC1128 and to a certain extent Federal Law No.6 of 2010 concerning credit 
information. This latter law imposes obligations on financial institutions and 
commercial banks to keep data confidential and to seek the consent of the data subject 
prior to any disclosure. A failure to adhere to this can result in criminal sanctions being 
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imposed under Federal Law No.3 of 1987 (the penal code).1129 Nonetheless, the data 
protection legislation of the DIFC does not apply to the rest of the UAE and Federal 
Law No. 5 of 2012 does not spell out any rights and remedies for data subjects.1130 
Accordingly, the legislator has not utilised the concept of data protection fully to render 
the digital realm safer, e.g. by requiring businesses to collect only as much data as is 
necessary, as this safeguards citizens against cyber-security incidents.1131 In this context, 
it must also be stressed that the legislator should consider privacy intrusions civil 
matters, except in serious cases. Nonetheless, Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 concerning 
Combating Information Technology Crimes certainly enhances protection against crime 
committed on the internet and on other digital devices and also increases the legal 
arsenal of tools to safeguard sensitive and confidential information more effectively.1132  
However, just like its predecessor, the 2012 law does not define cybercrime. This 
appears to be a sensible approach, as a specific definition may become outdated in light 
of rapid technological and criminal innovation. Indeed, Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 
refines the cybercrime offences. For instance, Article 2 of Federal Law No.2 of 2006 
required that it was shown that the accused had an intention to wilfully access an 
information system or website or to overstep authorised access, but Federal Law No. 5 
of 2012 no longer requires this.1133 Hence, it has become much easier to prosecute cyber 
criminals, as no mens rea has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The reach of the 
law has also been extended so that electronic sites, e.g. personal webpages, blogs and 
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social networking sites, are expressly covered.1134 Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 also 
imposes stricter penalties in comparison to Federal Law No.2 of 2006, which only 
imposed prison sentences for up to seven years and the fines also only ranged from AED 
20,000 (approximately £3,700) to AED 50,000 (approximately £9,400).1135  
 
Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 deals with the following broad categories: IT security, 
political stability and state security, proper conduct and morality, commercial and 
financial issues and miscellaneous matters.1136 The Articles which deal with IT security 
now outlaw a broader range of issues, such as hacking, changing webpages, distributing 
viruses and stealing data. Article 2 deals with the issue of accessing IT systems without 
having any authority and the sanctions are increased in case this concerns personal data 
or when this is done by an employee. Article 4 addresses the issue of accessing IT 
system without authority in order to obtain commercial or government information. 
Article 5 renders it illegal to access a webpage without having permission in order to 
delete, change or damage the content. Article 8 addresses the problem of disabling 
access, so that others cannot access the IT system. Article 9 criminalises the fraudulent 
use of a computer network protocol by using a false address or third-party address in 
order to commit a crime or prevent its discovery. Yet the issue with this provision is that 
it is very wide and can cover instances where an IP address is masked for hacking 
purposes, but could also cover use of off-shore virtual private network (VPN) in order to 
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access blocked content.1137 However, clearly use of a VPN should not attract the same 
punishment as hacking. 
 
Introducing virus programmes and spam emails 1138 ; obtaining passwords without 
authority1139; intercepting communications through IT systems without authority1140; and 
disclosing confidential information without authority through IT systems1141 have also 
been criminalised and sanctions have been spelled out.  
 
Political stability and state security are safeguarded through the criminalisation of the 
following acts: Gaining access without authority to commercial or government 
information 1142 ; posting online or operating a site which causes racism, hatred, 
sectarianism, sedition, undermining social peace or national unity or harming public 
morals or the public order1143; posting information or operating a site for an illegal 
organisation or a terrorist group;1144 posting information online or operating a site which 
endangers and harms the public order or reveals state security1145; publishing rumours, 
news or information online in order to harm the state1146; posting information online or 
operating a site to undermine the constitution or overthrow the government 1147 ; 
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publishing information on the internet which promotes non-adherence with laws1148; and 
employing an IT system to furnish others with data which contravenes the dignity or 
interest of the state.1149 
 
Proper conduct and morality on the internet are enforced through rendering it a crime to 
run or manage a website or publish, send or transmit pornographic material, gambling 
activities and whatever that which may afflict the public morals1150; to entice, aid, abet 
or engage in lewdness or prostitution by using  a computer network or any information 
technology means1151 ; to slander 1152 ; to violate the privacy of others, e.g. through 
photos, intercepting communications, publishing information1153; and to encourage sins, 
offend Islamic rituals and insult recognised religions. 1154  As observed above, 
criminalising privacy intrusion is a draconian approach. 
 
A 2013 Federal Supreme Court case1155 also illustrates that the provisions of Federal 
Law No.5 of 2012 may raise legal issues. This case concerned how Article 20 of Federal 
Law No.5 of 2012 should be interpreted. Article 20 provides that  
 
“Without prejudice to the provisions of the crime of defamation prescribed 
for under Islamic Sharia, any person who insults another person or assigns 
to another person an incident which makes such person a subject of 
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contempt by others through the use of website or means of information 
technology, shall be punished by imprisonment and a fine of no less than 
two hundred fifty thousand dirham and not exceeding five hundred thousand 
dirham or by either of these two penalties, and if the insult or defamation is 
against a public servant or a person assigned to public service on a certain 
occasion or during the performance of his job, the same shall be considered 
as an aggravating circumstances for the crime.” 
 
In this case, the second and third accused made statements about a Headmistress, which 
were defamatory i.e. negatively commented on her job performance on a website. The 
first accused assisted the second and third accused in committing the crime. The public 
prosecutor charged the second and third accused by virtue of Articles 45 and 47 of the 
Penal Code and Articles 1, 20 and 41 of Law No.5 of 2012. The Court of First Instance 
decided that each accused should be fined and their blackberry devices should be 
confiscated. The three accused appealed and the Fujairah Court of Appeal accepted the 
appeals and lowered the fines to AED 3,000 each, but otherwise upheld the judgment. 
The second and third accused nonetheless appealed the decision. The office of public 
prosecution lodged a memo in which it requested that this renewed challenge is 
dismissed. The two appellants challenged the decision on the basis that the law was 
wrongly applied since the words employed did not amount to contempt by others and 
that they only raised questions and also did not mention the name of the person. They 
particularly averred that it was wrong to evoke Article 20 of Law No. 5 of 2012 
concerning Combating Information Technology Crimes and that this renders the entire 
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decision defective. The Supreme Court stated that the principle is that it is up to the 
judge to be satisfied from the facts of the case and that so long as the judge did not 
wrongly apply the law to the facts, no challenge can be brought. Moreover, by law the 
court has to identify the person who has been defamed and insulted and analyse whether 
the words of insult have been directed at him/her and the circumstances have to be 
considered in order to ascertain whether there were any reservations or whether the 
name of the victim was not expressly mentioned. If it was clear to the court that the 
accused intended to insult the person, then this cannot be further challenged. In the 
instance case, the words, which were published through a Blackberry device owned by 
the accused, clearly made the Headmistress a subject of contempt through the published 
words and expressions. The law was therefore correctly applied, as the words were 
insulting, defamatory and degrading and undermined the person's dignity in the eyes of 
other people. The Court therefore ruled that the appeal of the appellants on the basis that 
Article 20 did not apply was baseless. This case highlights that it may be useful that the 
various sections of Federal Law No.5 of 2012 are clarified, for instance, guidance could 
be issued in order to avoid that the law is considered vague and ambiguous, as well as to 
provide further directions to the judiciary, as well as prosecutors. Also, it should be 
debated whether defamation cases should be considered civil, as opposed to criminal 
cases. This may also prove important in order to avoid criticism, e.g. by Amnesty 
International, that the new cybercrime law is being used to unduly curtail freedom of 
expression.1156 
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Cybercrimes relating to the commercial and financial sector are generally addressed 
through provisions dealing with financial matters and ecommerce, such as committing 
forgery of electronic documents 1157 ; using fraudulent means through the computer 
network to obtain benefits, personal property or signatures1158; gaining access without 
authority to electronic or credit card number, bank accounts or data or other electronic 
payment methods through information technology, electronic information systems or 
computer networks1159; forging, reproducing, counterfeiting debit or credit cards or other 
electronic payment methods.1160Additionally, the law addresses various miscellaneous 
matters, such as using blackmail to coerce someone into engaging in illegal 
behaviour.1161 
 
Article 47 also ensures that the law has extra-territorial application since it provides that: 
  
“the provisions of this Decree Law shall apply to any person who has 
committed any of the crimes mentioned therein outside the country, if its 
object is an electronic information system, computer network, website or 
information technology means relates to the federal government or any of 
the local governments of the Emirates of the State or any authority or public 
institution owned by any of them.”  
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It becomes increasingly clear from the wording of this section, extra-territoriality only 
applies when a cybercrime is directed against the state. Although it is probably better to 
adopt a wider approach, e.g. by assuming that “all crime is local.”1162 Hence, the 
adoption of a concept of “territoriality” could circumvent the difficult questions which 
arise from extra-territoriality.1163 This arguably also accords with the Penal Code, which 
contains provisions which provide for extra-territoriality when one of the elements 
which make up the crime has taken place on the state territory or if it has had a result on 
the state territory.1164 It may therefore be argued that all of the cybercrime offences have 
extra-territorial effect.1165 However, the trend is rather to provide for extensive extra-
territorial powers and it may therefore be best not to restrict the enforcement of Federal 
Law No. 5 of 2012 to only cybercrimes which have been committed against emanations 
of the state.1166 It may therefore be useful if specific guidance was developed for public 
prosecutor in order to clarify this issue, as it falls on public prosecutors to determine 
whether proceedings should be brought when crimes have been committed by persons 
abroad.1167 For instance, relevant threshold amounts could be set, as well as particular 
crimes could be classified as serious, e.g. attacks against critical national infrastructure, 
and these could then trigger automatic legal action against cyber criminals, who are 
located abroad. At the same time, the UAE should try and enter into extradition treaties 
with other countries, so that the extraterritorial reach of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 
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becomes a more effective deterrent against cyber criminals located abroad.1168 Without 
such steps, the problem is that most cybercrime offences cannot be investigated if they 
have not been committed against the state and took place abroad, which is mostly the 
case. 
 
In terms of the penalties, cyber criminals can be imprisoned, fines can be imposed and 
foreigners can also be deported.1169 Some of the offences attract life imprisonment, e.g. 
undermining the regime, and hefty fines, e.g. sending viruses can be punished with up to 
AED 3 million (approximately £565,000).1170 Devices, programs or other means used to 
perpetrate the crime can also be confiscated, as well as money and information and 
statements can be deleted and the court can also order that sites or domains are closed 
permanently or temporarily.1171 Those, who have been convicted under the law, can also 
be deprived of the right to use any computer network or electronic information system 
or any other information technology means, and a person can also be sent to a 
rehabilitation centre for a period which the court considers appropriate.1172 
 
Federal Law No.5 of 2012 certainly protects the UAE against a wide range of 
cybercrimes. It clarifies the various crimes and ensures that there exists legal certainty, 
also because the penalties have been clearly spelled out. Yet some of the provisions are 
                                                 
1168 J. Keane, This ain't CSI: How the FBI Hunts Down Cyber Criminals Around the Globe, Digital 
Trends, 2 August 2015 <http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/how-the-fbi-hunts-down-cyber-
criminals-around-the-globe/> accessed 29th April 2016 
1169 Article 42 of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning Combating Information Technology Crimes 
1170 P. Beheshti, Keeping IT safe (2016) Emirates Law Business & Practice, 5-7, 6 
1171 Article 41 of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning Combating Information Technology Crimes 
1172 Article 43 of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning Combating Information Technology Crimes 
255 
 
framed in very broad terms, for instance, it is illegal to record conversations.1173 In the 
future, it is therefore important to ensure that the law is not interpreted in a way which 
results in individuals, who have no intention to commit any crime, being prosecuted 
under this law.1174 Statutory exceptions must therefore be created, or guidance must be 
published. Without such steps being taken, the problem is that the law has an overreach, 
which may result in innocent behaviour being unfairly punished. Also, whilst on the one 
hand many of the provisions are unduly broad, this cannot be said of Article 47 which 
confers extra-territorial application. The deterrent character of the cybercrime offences 
has thereby been also diminished since cyber criminals who are located abroad are 
unlikely to be pursued. This sends out the wrong message, namely that individuals 
located in the UAE who may not even have committed crimes are prosecuted (e.g. for 
taking a picture of another and publishing it), whereas serious cyber criminals located 
abroad are not pursued. 
 
Whilst Federal Law No.5 of 2012 ensures that the cybercrime regime is much more 
comprehensive, there are still certain gaps. Fundamentally, it does not grant a power to 
law enforcement agents to conduct surveillance prior to any offence having taken place. 
Instead Article 43 states that “the court may order to put the condemned under 
surveillance”, but this does not permit a proactive policing approach. Yet the 
Department of Anti-Electronic Crimes and Abu Dhabi's State Security Apparatus, as 
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well as the police conduct surveillance.1175 For instance, it has been reported that the 
UAE entered into contracts with various security firms in 2008 in order to meet its 
security needs and to create a “mass civil surveillance system”, including to safeguard 
civil surveillance systems and oil installations. 1176  Etisalat, the national 
telecommunications company, has also worked with the government, so that 
blackberries have a surveillance malware installed.1177 Also, in November 2015, a press 
release on the webpage of the security and defence company Saab announced that the 
UAE had entered into a USD 1.27 billion contract in order to expand its surveillance 
capabilities.1178 Yet as pointed out by the United Nations' Special Rapporteur, mass 
electronic surveillance breaches privacy rights set out in various conventions and 
treaties.1179 It is therefore important for the UAE to adopt cybercrime legislation which 
equips law enforcement agents with the power to conduct surveillance, but which also 
contains the necessary safeguards against abuse. This also necessitates that the law 
addresses the scope of the surveillance powers and its relationship with the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. 
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Furthermore, Federal Law No.5 of 2012 does not impose a requirement to share 
information about cyber attacks or to notify the regulator, though Federal Law No.3 of 
1987 (the penal code) renders it a criminal offence not to notify crimes.1180 The e-crime 
legislation also fails to address how intellectual property is protected against cyber 
attacks1181, though intellectual property is generally protected and civil and criminal 
sanctions can be imposed.1182 There is also no specific crime for launching cyber attacks 
against critical infrastructure, as in the UK, as discussed in the previous chapter. It 
would therefore be useful for the law to add additional offences. 
 
Moreover, regional cooperation is essential to combat cybercrime. It is therefore 
important to increase efforts to utilise the mechanisms which have been created by 
virtue of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010 
(the “Arab Convention”). The purpose of the Arab Convention is to enhance and 
strengthen cooperation between the Arab States in the area of combating information 
technology offences to ward off the threats of such crimes in order to protect 
the security and interests of the Arab States and the safety of their communities and 
individuals. It attempts to implement in the national legislation of the States which have 
adopted this (such as  Jordan, UAE, Sudan, Iraq, Palestine, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman) 
provisions that criminalise a set of online offenses as well as incorporate procedural 
rules fascilitating the prosecution of cybercrimes and the collection of digital evidence. 
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The treaty also has a section for promoting and enhancing the cooperation between its 
members in dealing with transnational cybercrimes1183. Yet the provisions in the Arab 
Convention which detail the requisite procedures have not been transposed by UAE law. 
At a 2012 conference in Doha, it was also reported that only eight out of the twenty-two 
Arab countries had set up national Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams/Computer Emergency Response Teams and that at the regional level they were 
not cooperating with each other.1184 However, the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf, namely, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain, already 
cooperate with each other. 1185  The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which has 
eighteen member countries, has also created a Computer Emergency Response Team or 
Computer Security and Incident Response Team. 1186  Nonetheless, for regional 
cooperation to be effective, the national response team and enforcement agencies must 
also follow the stipulated procedures and which should be put on a statutory footing. 
 
The e-crime framework of the UAE is quite robust when it comes to the available 
offences and the various government initiatives have ensured a relatively high degree of 
protection. However, the cybercrime offences depend on the enforcement agents being 
able to collect digital evidence on which a prosecution can be founded. It is therefore 
important that digital evidence and the underlying procedural rules relating to digital 
evidence are not overlooked. The next section therefore analyses the UAE’s Criminal 
Procedure Law, which governs also electronic evidence. 
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4.2 The Criminal Procedure Law and Procedural Rules Governing 
Electronic Evidence 
The UAE is a very modern state and its citizens make constant use of electronic devices. 
When cybercrime is committed, it is vital that there are clear procedural rules in place 
for electronic evidence. The UAE Criminal Procedural Law Federal Law No. 35 of 1992 
is the relevant law in this area. This law spells out the relevant procedures for all 
criminal cases. It must be analysed whether the existing law is adequate when it comes 
to the collection of electronic evidence or whether it is necessary to adopt additional 
provisions.  
 
Under the Criminal Procedure Law, an investigation has three phases: During the first 
phase, evidence is collected, then an initial investigation takes place and finally, a 
hearing is conducted. Judges can determine whether evidence should be admitted. 
Evidence is crucial in order to link the criminal to the offence. The relevant cybercrime 
offences and remedies are spelled out by statutes, as discussed above. Judges enjoy 
much discretion when it comes to deciding what evidence is admissible. However, they 
are not allowed to decide cases based on subjectively held beliefs.  
 
Judges have to apply the relevant laws and “discretionary interpretation” is thus not 
allowed when there is a particular law, but when an issue is not addressed, judges make 
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use of general principles of justice and Islam and the Sharia.1187 Yet whilst judges do not 
have to provide reasons for a particular decision, this is normally done in practice and 
may even form the subject matter of an appeal. Judges may also consider other cases 
which have addressed a particular issue. However, there are no publicly available cases 
and there exists no formal system of judicial precedent.1188 Nonetheless, lower courts 
normally follow the decisions of higher courts.1189 
 
Also, a judge does not have to justify why evidence has been used. No facts have to be 
established, so long as the decision is based on evidence. This is further illustrated by a 
2011 Federal Supreme Court case. 1190  In this case, two accused were charged for 
deliberately exploiting a service of Etisalat by illegally entering and logging onto the 
Etisalat network in order to make international calls in a manner which violates Articles 
1, 7, 42(2), 72 and 76 of Federal Law No.3 of 2003, as amended by Federal Law No.5 of 
2007 regarding the regulation of Etisalat and the communications sector. The First 
Instance Court acquitted the accused. The public prosecutor appealed the decision and 
the appeal was accepted, though the decision confirmed the previous decision. The 
public prosecutor brought another appeal on the basis that bad reasoning had been 
employed and that the law had been wrongly applied. Reliance was placed on the 
accused confessing that they had inserted/installed a program on a phone through which 
they could make international calls for the same rate as local calls. A witness had also 
                                                 
1187 Gulf-Law.com, Background on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Legal System, 2014 <http://gulf-
law.com/uaecolaw_legalsystem.html> accessed 3rd April 2016 
1188 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Abu Dhabi 2010 (Oxford, Oxford Business Group 2010) 223 
1189 Ibid 
1190 Supreme No. 185/2011 
261 
 
confirmed that he had seen many people entering the room of the suspects in order to 
make international calls. 
 
The Federal Supreme Court ruled that the two previous courts had reviewed all the 
circumstances, had studied and scrutinised the evidence and had weighed it and 
compared it with the evidence of the prosecution and had come to the conclusion that 
the two accused should be acquitted. Hence, a court can acquit a person on the basis that 
it suspects that the charge is invalid or there is insufficient evidence. Also, a court can 
acquit a person when not all the elements of a crime have been proven, as this renders a 
charge invalid. In these circumstances, the appeal by the public prosecutor was 
misperceived and was therefore dismissed. Hence, the case illustrates the important role 
which evidence plays, as insufficient evidence will result in an accused not being 
charged. In light of the fact that cybercrime is technically more challenging to prove, it 
is important that procedural rules are established in order to avoid that cyber criminals 
escape their just punishment merely because of evidence having become inadmissible or 
being weak. 
 
Moreover, judges follow the principle of judicial understanding and this also bestows 
them with freedom to accept evidence as proof. Article 209 of the Criminal Procedure 
Law empowers judges to decide which evidence is important. In this context, an 
unpublished Federal Criminal Case1191 clarifies in respect of this provision that judges 
can make use of any evidence in order to ascertain the truth. The judge thus analyses the 
evidence and then assesses whether it breaches any law to consider it admissible. The 
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way in which judges reach their decisions is also taken into account by other judges and 
thus aids them with identifying reliable sources. Judges have to reach truthful and fair 
decisions and they have to be therefore provided with evidence which confirms that it is 
right to convict the accused.   
 
Furthermore, Article 179 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that “the court may of 
its own accord, during the examination of the case, order the producing of any evidence 
deemed necessary to reveal the truth.” In an unpublished Federal Criminal court 
case1192, it was observed that the judge is obligated to study the evidence in order to 
identify whether it confirms that the accused is guilty of the offence. Furthermore, when 
the evidence is called into doubt, then the judge has to duly consider this.1193 
 
At present, Article 5 of the Criminal Procedure Law states that the office of public 
prosecution is a branch of the judiciary and is responsible for investigating crime and 
bringing charges. It also falls on the public prosecutor to bring proceedings. 1194 
However, it not only falls on the prosecution to provide evidence and the court can order 
that particular evidence is disclosed.1195 The UAE Supreme Court has also affirmed that 
judges can look for evidence in order to establish facts.1196 Yet it does not fall on the 
accused to provide evidence to show that s/he is innocent, but instead this is the task of 
the prosecutor. However, Article 2 of the Criminal Procedure Law allows the accused to 
                                                 
1192 Supreme No. 10/2011 
1193 UAE Federal Criminal Case, Supreme No. 211/200 
1194 Article 7 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
1195 Article 179 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
1196 UAE Federal Criminal Case, Supreme No. 75/2011 
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present his/her own evidence in order to challenge the case of the prosecution. In this 
context, Article 229(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law states that:  
 
“the objection should result in reconsideration of the case regarding the 
opposing party/the claimant before the court which rendered the judgment 
in absentia and the opposer/opposing party should not be harmed by his 
objection and if the opposing party did not appear before the first hearing 
specified for considering his objection, the objection shall be considered as 
if it did not happen, and the objection by the opposing party to the judgment 
rendered in his absence shall not be accepted.” 
In a 2012 Federal Supreme Court case,1197 the accused was charged for offending the 
honour and insulting a victim under the relevant section of the Penal Code, Article 373 
and pursuant to the Sharia. The Court of First Instance decided without the accused 
being present that he should be fined and referred the case to the civil division. The 
accused challenged the decision and the court convened again, but without the accused 
being present and found again against him. The accused appealed this decision out of 
time and the court therefore refused the appeal. It was held that a decision reached 
without the accused being present, despite an objection having been lodged, is invalid. 
Hence, a court cannot consider objections which have been filed without the person 
being in attendance. However, this is not the case when a person was notified that the 
hearing takes place, but does not attend. In such a case, an appeal has to be brought. 
 
                                                 
1197 Supreme No. 165/2012 
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Accordingly, evidence is normally presented during court proceedings and this evidence 
is gathered during the investigation, interrogation, as well as at the hearing. Judges 
particularly rely on the oral presentation during the hearing. However, such an approach 
may not prove effective when complex technical evidence is presented, in the absence of 
judges receiving training on how to deal with electronic evidence and to distinguish 
which evidence should be considered admissible and not admissible and which evidence 
should be disclosed in order to protect the work of enforcement agents. In this context, it 
has also been proposed at the 5th International Cybercrimes Conference in Abu Dhabi in 
2014 that “specialized prosecutions in cybercrimes should be established in both the 
federal and local courts.”1198 Also, the lack of guidance for law enforcement bodies on 
how to investigate cases with an e-crime element and to collect electronic evidence 
means that judges are not in a position to determine whether evidence is reliable. The 
discretion which is conferred on judges therefore appears misplaced in the digital age. 
Instead it would be better if evidence was deemed valid so long as standardised digital 
evidence collection procedures have been complied with and this has been clearly 
documented. 
 
The UAE's approach is also very different to the UK's common law approach since the 
UK provisions are far more detailed1199, as discussed in the previous chapter. Whilst the 
approach which the UAE employs in terms of criminal procedure may have been 
                                                 
1198 ME-Newswire, Cybercrimes Conference recommends establishing specialized prosecutions in federal 
and local courts, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 5 April 2014 <http://www.me-newswire.net/news/cyber-crimes-
conference-recommends-establishing-specialized-prosecutions-in-federal-and-local-courts/en> accessed 
26th April 2016 
1199 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Peer Review 
Report Phase 1, Legal and Regulatory Framework United Arab Emirates (Paris, OECD 2012) 14 
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suitable for traditional crime, this is inadequate for the digital age. The lack of special 
procedural rules for electronic evidence could bring into disrepute the judiciary and 
undermine the rule of law and may affect the ability to guarantee a fair trial. This is 
because the way in which electronic evidence is gathered is very different from normal 
policing techniques.1200 In case an investigator fails to manage the digital evidence 
adequately, it may be of no value in court and standard procedures for the evidence 
collection, as well as preservation should be adopted in order to ensure that the custody 
chain is well documented.1201 It is therefore important that electronic evidence rules are 
developed, which provide guidance in terms of collecting, presenting and preserving 
evidence and additionally to formulate rules when electronic evidence has been obtained 
through different types of surveillance in order to regulate when this evidence can be 
disclosed to the other side and to spell out when enforcement agencies cannot rely on 
this type of evidence at all, e.g. because of entrapment. This is also important since the 
Sharia imposes a strict standard of proof in respect of criminal cases and when there is 
any doubt, this goes in favour of the accused. 1202  Normally, it has to be also 
demonstrated that the accused had the requisite mens rea in respect of the crime.  
 
 
The absence of clear evidence rules and the problems which this can cause is illustrated 
by a 2013 Federal Supreme Court case.1203 In this case, a criminal conviction was 
                                                 
1200 J. S. Dempsey, L. S. Forst, An Introduction to Policing (18th ed, Boston, Cengage Learning 2016) 499 
1201 K. M. Hess, C. H. Orthmann, H. L. Cho, Police Operations: Theory and Practice (6th ed, Boston, 
Cenage Learning 2013) 375 
1202 B. Ong, Standards of proof: is persuading the judge the 'ultimate threshold'? (2010) 5(2) Construction 
Law International, 35-38, 35 
1203 Supreme No. 120/2013 
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challenged on the basis that Articles 216 of the Criminal Procedure Law had not been 
met in respect of a conviction for a violation of Article 11 of Federal Law No.2 of 2006 
regarding information technology crimes control which provides that: 
 
“Each person who uses the website or other means of information 
technology to illegally access credit card numbers or information or other 
electronic cards, shall be punished by imprisonment and a fine, and if his 
intention of such use is to obtain others' funds or the service of such cards, 
he shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of no less than six months 
and by fine or by either of the two above mentioned punishments, and the 
punishment shall be a period of no less than one year and a fine of no less 
than thirty thousand dirham or by either of the two above mentioned 
punishments if concluded from such use to the seizure of others' funds for 
himself or others.” 
 
Article 216 requires that the elements of the crime are satisfied and that there exists 
evidence to establish each element and inferences can only be drawn when there is 
sufficient evidence. Accordingly, it falls on the judge to prove and confirm all the facts 
and that the accused had the requisite intention, as defined by the legislation under 
which s/he is being charged. This has been interpreted to mean that the accused has to 
use the website or any other means of information technology to illegally access 
information or credit card numbers in order to seize the funds of others. In this case, the 
office of public prosecution had charged the appellant for stealing movable funds (credit 
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card) and used a webpage with the intention to access the credit card information and 
seized funds and paid for a traffic violation for his car. The defendant challenged the 
decision of the Court of First Instance on the basis that the elements of the crime had not 
been explained; the judgment was general and ambiguous; did not explain the 
circumstances of the alleged crime; and did not state on which evidence reliance was 
placed. Hence, the legal issue was whether it was insufficient for the First Instance 
Court to merely state that the accused had used the website and had accessed the credit 
card of the victim and seized money. It was argued that the court failed to identify how 
the elements of the crime had been carried out by the accused in order to establish his 
guilt and that as a result the decision was unsafe. The Supreme Court found that for a 
person to be convicted, each element of the crime has to be proven and has to be 
supported by evidence and inferences can only be drawn when the evidence clearly 
suggests this and there exists a sound basis for this. Accordingly, Article 216 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law requires that the presiding judge proves in his decision that the 
required acts are made out and that the accused had the requisite intention for the crime 
to be made out. The first instance court failed to explain how the appellant used the 
website or other means of information technology to access the credit card numbers. 
Moreover, the decision did not specify how the elements of the crime had been met. For 
this reason, it was held that the conviction should be overturned. Similar arguments can 
be made in respect of the other offences stipulated in Federal Law No.2 of 2006 and 
which may enable cyber criminals to escape their just punishment. The decision 
therefore highlights that the legislator has omitted to specify procedures designed to 
assist with evidencing digital crime. This is despite the fact that Articles 22 to 29 Arab 
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Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences require that state parties 
adopt procedural provisions for cybercrime offences. 
 
Whilst Part III of the Criminal Procedure Law spells out the procedures which have to 
be followed during an investigation, these procedures are too basic for the digital age. 
Chapter IV allows the police to carry out searches1204 and to seize1205 evidence and these 
searches and seizures have to be overseen by a prosecutor. Yet the way in which this has 
been stipulated is outdated for the digital realm. For example, Article 75 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law provides that when a crime is suspected, enforcement officers can search 
his/her office or home and when evidence is found in respect of the crime, this has to be 
seized. However, it is insufficient to search an office or home, but for example, service 
providers must be obligated to furnish information. Article 30 of the Criminal Procedure 
Law also illustrates that the provisions are too rudimentary: 
 
“the judicial police shall inquire about crimes, search for their perpetrators 
and collect the necessary information and evidence for investigation and 
indictment.” 
 
Evidence, which has been confiscated, has to be placed in a sealed container and must 
be sent to the forensic laboratory. It is therefore important to reform these provisions, 
also in order to ensure that they are aligned, with the Arab Convention on Combating 
Information Technology Offences. The way in which the process of investigation is 
                                                 
1204 Articles 51-59 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
1205 Articles 60-61 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
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explained must be updated,1206 as well as how general evidence and information should 
be gathered about a crime. 1207  As highlighted by the analysis of the UK legal 
framework, the topic of surveillance and interception must be addressed, which 
currently has not been done. The Arab Convention on Combating Information 
Technology Offences also mandates this, for instance, Article 29 calls for ‘interception 
of content information.’ The requirement to follow documentation procedures1208 must 
be fleshed out, as the UK has done1209, for instance, through a guide for digital evidence 
which also details the procedures which managers of e-crime investigations must follow.  
 
Without such steps being taken it is unlikely that the prosecution can demonstrate that 
digital evidence is admissible. It will be difficult to show that the evidence is legitimate 
and judicial since the procedures have not been clarified to deem digital evidence 
admissible. Instead, a search only requires that a search warrant has be obtained, as 
made clear by Article 53, which provides: 
 
“The judicial police officer may not inspect the dwelling of the accused 
without a written authorization from the public prosecution unless the crime 
is in the process of being committed and there are strong indications that the 
                                                 
1206 Chapter 1 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
1207 Article 30 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
1208 Article 36 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
1209 The Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence 2012, 
<http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2011/201110-cba-digital-evidence-v5.pdf> accessed 2 May 
2014; the Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic 
Evidence, <http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence.pdf> 2 
May 2014; the Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Managers of e-Crime 
Investigation, <http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2011/201103CRIECI14.pdf> accessed 2 May 
2014 
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accused is hiding in his house, objects or papers which may lead to the 
truth.” 
 
A search warrant can be issued when a crime has been committed; it is serious; and the 
act constitutes a criminal offence as stipulated in Article 72. However, no searches can 
be conducted without a crime having been committed. Such an approach is problematic 
in the digital age where a proactive policing approach is important.1210  
 
There are three types of crimes and a search warrant can only be granted for what are 
felonies, but not in respect of misdemeanours. Article 28 makes clear that a felony is an 
offence which attracts at least three years’ imprisonment or more. Article 29 explains 
that a misdemeanour is an offence which attracts between one week and up to three 
years or a fine which does not exceed AED 1,000. In contrast, a petty misdemeanour 
only attracts imprisonment between one and ten days or a fine. 1211  However, the 
limitation to only grant a search warrant for felonies may be too restrictive to adequately 
police the digital space. 
 
Furthermore, no details are provided about what should be seized, but instead a broad-
brush approach has been adopted by the Criminal Procedure Law, Article 61 which 
states that: 
  
                                                 
1210 T. J. Holt, A. M. Bossler, Cybercrime in Progress: Theory and Prevention of Technology-enabled 
Offenses (Abingdon, Routledge 2016) 124 
1211 Article 30 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
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“the judicial police officers have to sequestrate the objects which may have 
been used in the perpetration of the crime, resulted therefrom or if the crime 
has been committed thereon; in addition to whatever may lead to the truth in 
the matter.” 
 
Yet when evidence is obtained from a network or a cloud, no tangible property is seized, 
and it is unclear whether this provision, despite its wide ambit in terms of what can be 
seized, is broad enough. The scope of what can be search and seized is set out by the 
search warrant, but such an approach is too limiting for the digital world in the absence 
of powers which permit surveillance.  
 
Moreover, as only evidence can be searched and seized, which has been “used in the 
perpetration of the crime”1212 issues may also arise since it is unclear whether this also 
includes, e.g. networks employed to facilitate the crime. Another problem is the way in 
which Article 51 is worded, as an inspection is defined as “the search of the body, 
clothes or luggage for any trace or things related to the crime or required for the 
investigation.” This is clearly an outdated definition, which is insufficient to cover the 
digital realm. Yet it may be argued that a broad construction of what can be deemed 
“things” ensures that this also extends to digital devices, networks, software, etc. 
Nonetheless, it would be better to revise this provision. 
 
The public prosecutor is in charge of the search warrant, though s/he can pass it to the 
officer in charge of the investigation in accordance with Article 33 of the Criminal 
                                                 
1212 Article 61 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
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Procedure Law. When the public prosecutor does not personally execute the search 
warrant, those who have been provided with it, have to follow the exact steps detailed 
by the prosecutor on the search warrant. Yet the Criminal Procedure Law does not 
contain any provisions which require that only officers, who are adequately trained, 
conduct searches and seizures of electronic evidence. This may call into doubt the 
evidence and should be addressed.  
 
Article 53 of the Criminal Procedure Law permits the public prosecutor to determine 
whether a place should be searched on or off-site. However, this provision is too narrow 
to confer powers to continuously monitor networks through back entrances made 
available by the private sector, e.g. social media, such as Facebook. This is also the case 
because of the requirement that a crime has to have already taken place.  
 
Nonetheless, a search warrant is not always required, and the Criminal Procedure Law 
also permits surveillance without a search warrant. Article 54 of the Criminal Procedure 
Law states that: 
“the judicial police officer, even in cases other than a crime that is in the 
process of being committed, may inspect dwellings of persons put under 
surveillance, either according to a provision of law or a decision by a judge, 
should there be strong indications that they may be suspected of 
perpetrating a felony or a misdemeanour.” 
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The way the provision is phrased is problematic since surveillance should be much 
wider than inspecting dwellings of persons when the crime is currently being 
committed. Most transactions are carried out through digital devices and over networks 
and interpreting this section to include surveillance of social media activities of a 
person, his/her internet activities and searches, etc. may strain the language of this 
section too much. It would therefore be better to revise this provision altogether or at 
least to complement it. This is also important in light of the fact that the police conduct 
internet surveillance and similarly, the Department of Anti-Electronic Crimes and Abu 
Dhabi's State Security Apparatus have also established a specialised unit in order to 
conduct surveillance; however, this activity is currently unregulated and has not been 
put on a statutory footing.1213 
 
Such an approach is also warranted, as  currently “members of the public authority (i.e. 
law enforcement authorities such as police) may not enter into any place of residence 
except under the circumstances specified in this law or in case of a request for 
assistance from inside or under a serious threat on life or property”.1214 As cybercrime 
does not normally involve a serious threat to life or property from inside a residence, 
investigative powers of the enforcement agencies are severely limited by the narrow 
scope of the Criminal Procedure Law, which is still focused on traditional crimes. 
 
                                                 
1213 A. Al Neyadi, A. Al Kaabi, L. al Kabi, M. Al Ghufli, M. Al Sahmsi, M. Khan, 'Internet Governance & 
Cybercrimes in UAE (2015) 4(11) International Journal of Scientific & Technology Research, 350-357, 
352 
1214 Article 3 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
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Moreover, a search warrant is also not needed when “the crime is in the process of being 
committed and there are strong indications that the accused is hiding in his house 
objects or papers which may lead to the truth.” 1215  However, the issue with this 
provision is also that it does not permit a pro-active policing approach. Again, the way 
in which this section is worded is rather outdated, as only a purposive approach permits 
that intangibles fall within the scope of this provision. 
 
The current Criminal Procedure Law does not address electronic evidence sufficiently 
and should be substantially revised and complemented. 
 
4.3 Summary 
The UAE’s e-crime framework is expansive; as the government has launched many 
different initiatives, which are also coordinated by the NESA. The replacement of 
Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on combating cybercrime with the new Federal Law No. 5 of 
2012 concerning Combating Information Technology Crimes has been an important step 
to improve the legislative e-crime regime. However, whilst the UAE has recognised the 
importance of data protection for the DIFC, the same cannot be said for the rest of the 
UAE. Nonetheless, Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 increases privacy protection by 
outlawing various activities, though this approach is insufficient to achieve 
comprehensive data protection. Data protection can be an important tool against cyber-
security incidents since businesses can be required to only store as much data as is 
necessary. As a result, cyber criminals can then obtain less data in case they succeed 
                                                 
1215 Article 53 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
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with an attack. Data protection principles can also act as a barrier of defence against 
cybercrime.  
 
The scope of the offences is also very broad, and it would be useful to issue guidelines. 
This may also prevent that unnecessary legal challenges are brought. Similarly, it is 
important to clarify whether the cybercrime offences have extra-territorial effect in light 
of the provisions of the penal code, despite the cybercrime law suggesting that this is 
limited to cyber attacks directed against emanations of the state. In this context, it is also 
important that public prosecutors receive more guidance. Additionally, the government 
should try and enter into extradition treaties with other countries, as otherwise the extra-
territorial provisions may not be enforceable.  
 
One of the most pressing issues is to ensure that the surveillance activities by 
enforcement agents are put on a statutory footing and that formal powers are spelled out. 
Otherwise, the UAE risks being in breach of international law, as surveillance breaches 
the right to privacy, which is also guaranteed by the UAE constitution. Federal Law No. 
5 of 2012 concerning Combating Information Technology Crimes also contains various 
provisions which are aimed at protecting privacy. Yet the thorny issue of how to balance 
surveillance powers and privacy rights has not been addressed. The issue is that 
surveillance powers can be abused, and it is therefore important that legal safeguards are 
developed. Just like search warrants have to be issued, it is important that a debate is 
started about how the surveillance powers can be kept in check in a way which accords 
with fundamental values, such as the rule of law.  
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There are some other gaps within the legislative provisions. At present, Federal Law No. 
5 of 2012 concerning Combating Information Technology Crimes fails to address the 
issue of attacks against critical national infrastructure. In light of the UAE adopting a 
smart grid and building its first nuclear power plant and having many oil installations, it 
is therefore important that an appropriate offence is added to the existing ones and 
which should be added to the category of offences which deal with state and political 
security. 
 
The UAE should also consider whether an explicit legal requirement should be imposed 
on certain sectors to notify security breaches to the authorities. This would create an 
information loop and could ensure that precautions are taken against particular attacks. 
Closer cooperation with the private sector is also important and the NESA should work 
on signing agreements with the private sector, particularly social media companies. 
Also, as Intellectual Properties (IP) have assumed much more importance in an 
information society, the legislator should also study whether a specific offence should 
be added to Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 in order to criminalise serious IP violations and 
whether enforcement agencies should be equipped with more powers to investigate 
serious cases of IP violations. The government should also continue to lobby other 
Middle Eastern states, so that the procedures for the Arab Convention on Combating 
Information Technology Offences are agreed and co-operation is further increased based 
on common standards and mutually agreed offences. 
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Another pressing issue, which should be addressed by the legislator, is to update the 
Criminal Procedure Law Federal Law No. 35 of 1992. Only specialised police officers, 
who are trained in recovering digital evidence, should collect digital evidence. Equally, 
public prosecutors and judges should receive training and they could then be responsible 
for bringing cybercrime prosecutions and hearing cybercrime cases. 
 
At present, the provisions are unclear in respect of the gathering of evidence which is 
stored on a cloud or network, as the way in which certain provisions are worded relates 
to traditional crime and tangible property, as opposed to intangible property. The way in 
which an inspection is defined also highlights that the law is outdated. New provisions 
have to be adopted for digital surveillance, including authorisation procedures, similar to 
the search warrant regime, so that there is sufficient oversight. The investigative powers 
should also be broadened to include new powers to gather data and to require internet 
service providers to store search records. Providers of encryption services should also be 
legally mandated to hand over encryption keys to enforcement agencies when this is 
needed to investigate a cybercrime. 
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Chapter Five: Understanding How to Strengthen E-
Crime Legislation in the UAE Through Interviews with 
Senior E-Crime Experts  
 
5. Introduction 
As explained in Chapter Two, whilst the doctrinal black letter law method constitutes a 
considerable part of the thesis, a mixed methods approach was adopted overall.   In the 
preceding chapters doctrinal legal analysis has been used to analyse the formulation of 
legislation, regulations and statutes related to e-crime in the UK, the EU and the UAE.  
However, legal scholarship acknowledges that doctrinal analysis implicitly incorporates 
external factors, such as when the historical or social context of legislation is evaluated 
in order to better comprehend and interpret specific legal rulings. 1216   Taking this 
viewpoint into account, the research explicitly supplements the black letter law method 
with empirical data from the UAE for an increased understanding of the effectiveness of 
the legislation under discussion and to examine the extent to which it is being complied 
with.  As explained in Chapter Two, this is a mixed methods strategy allowing for 
triangulation, it is used as a vehicle to illuminate and capture a more complete and 
contextual portrayal of the research phenomenon and to examine it from multiple 
dimensions and perspectives.1217 
                                                 
1216 P. Chynoweth, ‘Legal research’, Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment  
(Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) 28-38 
 
1217 T. D. Jick, ‘Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action’ (1979) 24 (4)  
Qualitative Methodology  602-611 
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The chapter presents the findings from the in-depth interviews with the most senior 
experts in the UAE from the police, the office of prosecution, the judiciary, the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority and Interpol. Five interviews were 
conducted. After the fifth interview, no new data was obtained, and data saturation was 
therefore reached.1218 The themes were exhausted and a varied data set was obtained.1219 
The research participants were all given a consent form asking them to agree to take part 
in the research. A flexible guided interview approach was adopted, which enabled the 
researcher to respond to unanticipated replies.1220 The researcher thus used a schedule, 
but this only served as a guide since it was more important to have a good rapport in 
order to probe further and identify the interviewees particular concerns.1221 A content 
analysis was undertaken to analyse the data and themes, patterns and categories were 
identified, and the data was reduced to explain its meaning.1222 The text was closely read 
and interpreted in light of the context and codes and clusters were created, as explained 
in Chapter 2.1223 
 
 
 
                                                 
1218 D. E. Gray, Doing Research in the Real World (London, SAGE Publications Ltd 2014) 147; P. I. 
Fusch, L. R. Ness, Are We There Yet? Data Saturation in Qualitative Research, 9(1) The Qualitative 
Report 2015, 1408-1416, 1409 
1219 G. Guest, A. Bunce, L. Johnson, How Many Interviews Are Enough?: An Experiment with Data 
Saturation and Variability, 18 Field Methods 2006, 59-82, 65 
1220  J. Willis, Qualitative Research Methods in Education and Educational Technology (Charlotte, 
Information Age Publishing Inc 2008) 205 
1221 S. J. Yates, Doing Social Science Research (London, SAGE 2003) 165 
1222 L. M. Given, The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods, Volume 2 (London, SAGE 
2008) 120 
1223 Ibid 
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 5.1 Discussion and Analysis of The Qualitative Interviews 
The interviews provided comprehensive and in-depth insights about the effectiveness of 
UAE’s legislative framework to combat e-crime. This is particularly useful to 
understand more fully the research phenomenon, especially in light of the relevant 
literature. 
5.1.1 Key Findings and the Relevant Literature 
The interviewees generally agreed that the UAE had taken important steps to secure the 
digital realm by passing Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on the Prevention of Information 
Technology Crimes, as well as Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 on Combating Cybercrimes. 
It was thought that the listed cybercrime offences were expansive and could be 
interpreted to cover most crimes, together with other offences in the Penal Code. 
Moreover, the recent reforms to the UAE Penal Code by virtue of Federal Law No.7 of 
2016, which impose stricter penalties and higher fines, further heighten deterrence.1224 
This is because these provisions can also be applied to the digital realm. Nonetheless, it 
was recommended that the e-crime law is updated and important improvement 
recommendations were made. As expressed here by Interviewee A: 
 
[T]echnology is in continuous development and so are crimes, therefore 
laws should be re-drafted, discussed and reviewed every now and then, due 
to the development of crimes which may have not been covered by the 
previous laws. [T]echnology is in a continuous process of development that 
requires laws to be up to date, so that the law does not remain static...  
                                                 
1224 H. Dajani, Sweeping reforms to UAE penal code include harsher penalties and up to Dh1m in fines, 
The National, 25 October 2016 <http://www.thenational.ae/uae/sweeping-reforms-to-uae-penal-code-
include-harsher-penalties-and-up-to-dh1m-in-fines> accessed 15th February 2017 
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International co-operation was deemed one of the pressing priorities in order to bring 
cyber criminals to justice. It was pointed out that cybercrimes were very often cross-
border crimes. However, presently co-operation, including through diplomatic channels, 
was considered a challenge for a multitude of reasons, including cybercrime laws in 
other countries. It was explained that issues can arise, for instance, when the accused is 
in a European country and the service used for committing the crime is in the US and 
the victim is in the UAE. Three sets of legislations govern this case. Without an 
international cybercrime treaty, these cases are difficult to resolve.1225 However, to date 
conclusion of a UN-based cybercrime treaty has been deferred, as evidenced by a recent 
draft resolution adopted at a meeting by the Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice in April 2013.1226  The resolution states that member states should 
“continue to consider...ways and means to strengthen international cooperation in 
combating cybercrime.” 1227  Yet the Arab Convention on Combating Information 
Technology Offences 2010 ensures that there is at least some cooperation amongst Arab 
League nations. 1228  However, it was observed that cooperation amongst the Arab 
countries has to be strengthened, so that it is on par with the cooperation which exists in 
Europe as a result of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 2001. 
                                                 
1225 J. Clough, Principles of Cybercrime (2nd ed, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2015) 25 
1226 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Draft resolution: strengthening international 
cooperation to combat cybercrime, UN ESCOR, 22nd sess., Agenda Item 7, UN Doc E/CN.15/2013/L.14 
(2 April 2013) 2, Article 2; J. Clough, Principles of Cybercrime (2nd ed, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2015) 25 
1227 Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Draft resolution: strengthening international 
cooperation to combat cybercrime, UN ESCOR, 22nd sess., Agenda Item 7, UN Doc E/CN.15/2013/L.14 
(2 April 2013) 2, Article 2; J. Clough, Principles of Cybercrime (2nd ed, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2015) 25 
1228 Judge Stein Schjolberg, A presentation at the Europol-INTERPOL Cybercrime Conference, Europol, 
The Hague, 24-25 September 2013, 1-15, 3 <http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/documents/Europol-
INTERPOL.pdf> accessed 15th February 2017 
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Furthermore, whilst cooperation is also facilitated, e.g. through organisations, such as 
Interpol, countries are not required to provide assistance when this is requested. 
Disagreement by countries over what should be considered a cybercrime made 
cooperation difficult.  As explained here by Interviewee B: 
 
“[C]ybercrime is a cross-border crime and this a great challenge... each 
country has its own law which differs from that of other countries, a matter 
which leads to disagreement over what is considered to be a crime...” 
 
The interviewees therefore emphasised that international and regional efforts are 
paramount and have to be pursued in tandem with national strategies in order to 
effectively combat cybercrime. On this point Interviewee A stated:  
 
“Why not work on an international agreement under the umbrella of the 
United Nations to address cybercrimes similar to the European Agreement.” 
 
All of the interviewees stressed that the most pressing matter for the UAE was to enact a 
law which regulates the processes and procedures for e-crime investigations and 
prosecutions, including in respect of preventative measures. It was explained that there 
is no law which details how cybercrime should be dealt with. Federal Law No. 35 of 
1992 concerning the Criminal Procedural Law was deemed inadequate, as it only 
addresses crimes in general. Aljneibi also shares this view and states that the current 
Criminal Procedures Law, whilst being a useful framework, cannot be extended to 
electronic evidence procedures, as more specific regulations are required for electronic 
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searches, seizures, examination and retention.1229 The interviewees were concerned that 
without enactment of such a law, this legislative gap would enable criminals to continue 
escaping punishment.  
 
Moreover, it was generally thought that surveillance is important, but that it has to be 
strictly controlled in order to avoid that the privacy of individuals was unduly violated. 
This accords with the literature which also makes clear that surveillance methods have 
to be regulated by law.1230 The lack of clear laws to regulate surveillance, data retention, 
decryption requests, equipment interferences and related law enforcement powers was 
thus perceived as another pressing issue. It was recommended by the interviewees that 
these powers should be clearly detailed in a statute with appropriate controls. Banning 
encryption was not considered a wise strategy and all the interviewees were against a 
ban. The above factors were summed up by Interviewee B in this way: 
 
“In my opinion, the acquisition of data/information about a person or entity 
should be organized by law, as well as decryption/ decoding, because 
without legal authorization such actions may not be taken by control bodies. 
Regarding its importance, it sure is of great importance in the detection of 
crimes, but this should be done taking into consideration privacy, as it is 
important to detect crimes of course, however, this should be done without 
committing another crime which infringes privacy; my knowledge of the 
                                                 
1229  K. A. Aljneibi, The Regulation of Electronic Evidence in the United Arab Emirates: Current 
Limitations and Proposals for Reform, PhD Thesis, February 2014, 1-326, 194 
<http://e.bangor.ac.uk/4992/1/Aljneibi%20khaled%20thesis.pdf> accessed 15th February 2017  
1230 N. Taylor, Policing, privacy and proportionality, European Human Rights Law Review 2003, 86-100, 
91 
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email of the accused does not mean that I have to penetrate/intrude such 
email without obtaining permission from the competent authorities... As I 
have mentioned earlier, I agree with encryption and I am against the 
prevention of encryption, but this should be in accordance with legal 
procedures.”  
 
 
The interviewees also thought that the digital age required special data protection laws, 
as this was considered “to prevent penetrations/breakthroughs”, as observed by 
interviewee A. Hence, data protection regulation was perceived as a means to safeguard 
individuals against cybercrime. Similarly, Wong observes that data protection laws are 
part of a holistic strategy to create cyberdefence and resilience.1231 Such laws are also 
essential in an age of preventative policing where the “professional law enforcement 
model of policing...[has shifted] to cyber policing” which is inherently more 
proactive. 1232  Otherwise there is the risk that “notions of criminal justice” and the 
“democratic balance of power” become distorted. 1233  The adoption of measures to 
safeguard the right to privacy and data protection which curtail policing powers and 
result in technological transparency thus also promote accountability, fairness, 
proportionality and equality.1234 Similarly, evidence rules, which prevent admission of 
                                                 
1231 R. Wong, Data Security Breaches and Privacy in Europe (London, Springer 2013) 36 
1232 N. Kozlovski, A Paradigm Shift in Online Policing - Designing Accountable Policing, Yale Law 
School, 2005, 1-22, 20-21 <https://crypto.stanford.edu/portia/papers/Kozlovski.pdf> accessed 1st March 
2017 
1233 Ibid, 21 
1234 Ibid 
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intercept material, are important to ensure that due process standards are embedded 
within the law. 
 
 
5.1.2 Legislation for Cybercrime Offences  
In comparison to other countries in the region, the UAE was one of the first countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa to criminalise IT crimes through the passing of Law 
No. 2 of 2006.1235 It was pointed out that prior to 2006, the Federal Law No. 3 of 2003 
on Telecom Law had to be relied upon, alongside the Penal Code, in order to prosecute 
cyber criminals. However, it became increasingly clear that this law was insufficient to 
safeguard UAE society from the threats of cybercrime. The majority of interviewees 
thought that the cybercrime laws were good. The six-year time period after which the 
2006 law was reviewed was deemed an appropriate timeframe.  Nevertheless, 2018 will 
mark the end of the current six-year time period. All of the interviewees stressed that the 
existing legislation should be reviewed in light of rapidly advancing technology and new 
criminal behavioural patterns.  This aspect was elucidated by Interviewee E in this way: 
 
“[T]he problem lies with failure by the law to cope with the pace of 
technological development and the behavioural patterns of the criminal, so 
we find that the first law related to cybercrimes was issued in 2006 and then 
replaced by another law issued in 2012, and during these six years the 
patterns of crimes have changed and new ones have appeared, and since the 
                                                 
1235 N. Kshetri, The Global Cybercrime Industry: Economic, Institutional and Strategic Perspectives 
(London, Springer 2010) 148 
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issuance of the law four years back, new behavioural patterns have emerged 
which may not be legally characterized pursuant to the law, therefore, the 
law needs to be continuously amended.” 
Consequently, the existing provisions should be continuously reviewed, discussed and 
amended. Otherwise, the risk is that the law will not keep pace and there will be a 
legislative gap which allows criminals to escape their just punishment. In this context, 
Interviewee A noted: 
 
“I cannot say that there are no shortcomings in the legal provisions. This is 
because new developments in IT occur on a daily basis.”  
 
The literature also confirms that cybercrime laws have to be regularly updated.1236 
Hence, the challenge for the UAE is not to have time elapse between identifying 
possible abuses through technologies and changing its cybercrime legislation, so that the 
law remains fit for purpose.1237 This adjustment process necessitates recognising how 
new technology is being abused; identifying gaps within the legal provisions and 
drafting new laws, ideally in line with international strategies and standards. 1238 
However, in this context it is also important to bear in mind that traditional offences can 
be extended, as these are technology neutral.1239 Hence, the fact that the crime has been 
                                                 
1236 R. Broadhurst, P. Grabosky, Cyber-Crime: The Challenge in Asia (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press 2005) 145 
1237 M. N. Sirohi, Transformational Dimensions of Cybercrime (Delhi, Alpha Editions 2015) 50-51 
1238 Ibid 
1239 UK House of Commons: Science and Technology Committee, Malware and cybercrime: Twelfth 
Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1537 (London, TSO Shop 2012) 21 
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committed through the digital environment does not mean that no charges can be 
pursued.1240 As pointed out by Interviewee D:  
 
“Federal No. 5 of 2012 is flexible and can also be addressed to new 
crimes…Public prosecutors and judges must be qualified and have extensive 
experience in characterising crime.” 
 
As discussed in Chapter one, in the UK cyber criminals can also not just be charged 
under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Instead other legislation can be used to prosecute 
cyber criminals, for instance, the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and 1964 deals with 
electronic pornographic offences and the Sexual Offences Act 2003 deals with online 
and offline sexual grooming.1241 It would therefore be useful if public prosecutors and 
judges who specialise in cybercrime received training in evoking existing penal 
provisions for crimes which can be committed online. This will avoid the problem of 
criminals escaping punishment for lack of an adequate characterisation of the particular 
offence, which was identified as a problem by the interviewees. 
Whilst it is possible to apply traditional offences to the digital realm, some of the 
interviewees argued that the offences in Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 should be extended 
and/or further clarified. They explained that that at present certain crimes are only 
indirectly addressed by the legislation. For instance, there is no provision contained in 
the law to cover situations where a person impersonates another person on social media 
                                                 
1240 Ibid 
1241 J. X. Kelly, Computer Misuse Overview, JISC Legal Information, 2007 
<http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/LegalAreas/ComputerMisuse/ComputerMisuseOverview.aspx> accessed 17 
June 2014 
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i.e. establishes an account in the name of another person, including a public figure. 
Whilst these crimes can nevertheless be prosecuted by placing reliance on the Penal 
Code and other cybercrime provisions, it was noted that the issue is that this crime 
cannot be characterised. It was therefore considered better if a provision was enacted 
which proscribes fraudulent online impersonation. Otherwise, judges are afforded broad 
discretion to convict those who are accused of these crimes. Whilst this discretion is 
curtailed by the oversight by the Court of Cassation, the law will be improved if this was 
addressed in a specific provision. This will also enhance legal certainty and thus 
promote the rule of law.1242 
 
Moreover, it was pointed out that the law omits to specify the meaning of privacy, 
despite Article 21 criminalising the invasion of privacy through use of a computer 
network and/or electronic information or any information technology means through, for 
example, eavesdropping, photographing others or publishing news. This was considered 
a serious problem by the interviewees since those who had been charged for taking 
pictures of persons and thereby abusing their privacy had all been acquitted. This is 
because Article 31 of the UAE Constitution cannot be extended to these types of 
situations, as reference is only made to “freedom of communication by post, telegraph 
or other means of communication and the secrecy thereof shall be guaranteed in 
accordance with the law.” The other provision which indirectly safeguards privacy is 
Article 379 of the Penal Code.1243 However, this provision can also not be applied to this 
                                                 
1242 P. H. Neuhaus, Legal Certainty versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28(4) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 1963, 795-807, 795 
1243 Article 379 of the Penal Code states “…Any individual who, by reason of his profession, craft, 
circumstance or art is entrusted with a secret and who discloses it in cases other than those permitted by 
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new context, as it only covers circumstances where a person discloses secrets without 
the individual with the secret agreeing to this. Accordingly, the legislator should clarify 
what amounts to a privacy infringement. 
 
In this context, it would be important to additionally clarify Article 2(3) of Federal Law 
No. 5 of 2012 Concerning Combating Information Technology Crimes which intends to 
confer data protection in respect of “personal data” and “personal information objects.” 
This is because the law criminalises the commission of various acts against such data in 
Article 2(2), for instance, deletion, disclosure, alteration or publication. Moreover, at 
present such data is not protected against the acts listed in Article 2(1), as Article 2(3) 
only spells out punishment for acts done in respect of personal data and personal 
information objects “mentioned in paragraph (2) of this Article.” This unduly narrows 
the scope of protection for personal data and personal information objects. It would be 
better if the scope was extended to also cover the acts in Article 2(1) i.e. to access 
personal data and personal information on “a website, an electronic information system, 
computer network or information technology without authorization or in excess of 
authorization or unlawfully.” Furthermore, currently the law only stipulates that cyber 
criminals can be fined or imprisoned, but omits to afford remedies to victims. It would 
be better if those who have suffered reputational or psychological damage could seek 
damages.1244 The interviewees therefore recommended that either Federal Law No. 5 of 
2012 should define the concept of private life or that a privacy and data protection law 
                                                                                                                                               
the law, or who uses it for his own advantage or another person’s advantage, shall be [punished] unless 
the individual to whom the secret pertains has consented that it be disclosed or used.” 
1244 Information Resources Management Association, Cybercrime: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and 
Applications (Hershey, Information Science Publishing 2012) 1358 
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should be enacted. Manoharan and Holzer also observe that the “UAE lacks an online 
privacy law.”1245 
 
One of the interviewees stressed that Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 needs to be re-drafted, 
as various articles overlap. The interviewee explained that this caused confusion when 
investigations were conducted and made it difficult to characterise the crime at trial. For 
example, Article 2 of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 addresses more than one behavioural 
pattern, namely access without permit, violating the limits of the permit and staying at 
an unauthorised location. Several other provisions include more than one behavioural 
pattern. This makes it difficult to interpret the provisions, especially when the acts are 
similar, for instance, as is the case with Articles 12 and 13. Article 12 deals with 
obtaining bank data, as Article 13 does, but it was pointed out that the latter provision 
has been interpreted differently. Article 12 criminalises “gain[ing] access, without legal 
right, to credit or electronic card numbers....” for the purposes of “us[ing[ these data and 
numbers to take over the funds of others...” Similarly, Article 13 criminalises “forg[ing], 
counterfeit[ing] or reproduc[ing] a credit card or debit card....” [and] (2) us[ing it], 
without authorization to obtain....funds..” Whilst an analysis of these provisions shows 
that there is a difference between using someone’s credit card and making a copy of it 
and the latter act warrants more serious punishment, future legislation should be clearly 
drafted. This is also important, as it was noted that the terminology and vocabulary 
employed by the legislative provisions could be clearer. Otherwise, the problem will 
persist that many accused escape their punishments because of overlapping provisions.  
                                                 
1245 A. Manoharan, M. Holzer, Active Citizen Participation in E-Government: A Global Perspective 
(Hershey, Information Science Reference 2012) 469 
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It was suggested that the law should not only list examples of incriminating, but also 
non-incriminating acts to provide more guidance. In the alternative, it could become a 
standard practice to issue explanatory notes whenever federal laws are passed, as the UK 
does.1246 On this issue, Interviewee A stated: 
 
“Over time, the Supreme Court may also issue judicial principles, so that 
the provisions are further explained and interpreted. This will help with 
applying the provisions to new IT crimes. Whilst such principles are not 
binding, as in jurisdictions, such as the UK, they are explanatory.” 
 
One of the interviewees explained that under Law No. 2 of 2006, the punishment for 
cyber criminals who targeted critical infrastructure was 10,000AED (around £2,200), 
whereas under Federal Law No. 5 of 2012, offenders can also be imprisoned. 
Additionally, offenders can be charged for felonies, depending on the magnitude of the 
act. However, attacks on critical infrastructure are not specifically addressed by Federal 
Law No. 5 of 2012. Whilst the law lists various offences, it appears difficult to apply 
them to situations where computers are impaired in order to cause serious damage or the 
risk of serious damage, e.g. to the soon completed nuclear power station in the UAE or 
oil installations.1247 For instance, the provision which deals with terrorism (Article 26) 
simply outlaws “establishing, managing or running a website or publishing 
                                                 
1246 For instance, see the Serious Crime Bill, Explanatory Notes, 2014, 1-85, 2 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0001/en/15001en.pdf> accessed 20th 
January 2015 
1247 S. Hinson, Nuclear power on schedule in the United Arab Emirates, Weinberg Foundation, 10 January 
2017 <http://www.the-weinberg-foundation.org/2017/01/10/nuclear-power-on-schedule-in-the-united-
arab-emirates/> accessed 28th February 2017 
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information...for the interest of a terrorist group...” Whilst Article 44 makes clear that 
Articles 4, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30 and 38 also constitute crimes against state security, an 
analysis of these provisions shows that these do not cover attacks against critical 
infrastructure. Also, critical infrastructure may be privately owned, so that a provision 
which only criminalises causing serious damage or risk of serious damage to state-
owned critical infrastructure would be insufficient. It is therefore very important that an 
additional provision is added which criminalises the impairment of a computer in order 
to cause or to cause risk of serious damage to UAE’s national security, the economy, the 
environment or human welfare, as the UK has done by virtue of section 3ZA of the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990, as discussed in Chapter 1. This is also imperative in light of 
many cyber criminals trying to attack critical infrastructure and critical services in the 
UAE.1248 In this context, Maj Almarashda states that “[t]he protection of the critical 
national infrastructure involving oil, gas, water and electricity in the UAE is lagging. 
The result is this could cause major disturbances to key services.”1249 Equally, Dr Saud 
Al Junaibi points out that the UAE’s capacity to utilise data detection systems to protect 
critical infrastructure could be further improved. 1250  Adoption of a specific legal 
provision, which punishes hackers who attack critical infrastructure, is therefore an 
important step to heighten cyber security, alongside other practical strategies and 
measures. 
                                                 
1248 C. Malek, UAE needs better protection of critical infrastructure, The National, 19 November 2014 
<http://www.thenational.ae/uae/technology/uae-needs-better-protection-of-critical-infrastructure> 
accessed 22nd August 2015 
1249 E. Samoglou, UAE researcher calls for more stringent cyber security, The National, 1 April 2015 
<http://www.thenational.ae/uae/technology/uae-researcher-calls-for-more-stringent-cyber-security> 
accessed 24th February 2017 
1250 C. Malek, UAE needs better protection of critical infrastructure, The National, 19 November 2014 
<http://www.thenational.ae/uae/technology/uae-needs-better-protection-of-critical-infrastructure> 
accessed 22nd August 2015 
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All of the interviewees agreed that one of the main challenges is that cyber criminals are 
often not located within the UAE. Several of the interviewees therefore suggested 
extending the scope of Article 47 of Federal Law No.5 of 2012. It was pointed out that 
Federal Law No.5 of 2012, Article 47 only confers extra-territorial jurisdiction in cases 
where cybercrime directly prejudices the interests of the state. In such an instance, a 
person can be prosecuted, even if the act was not committed in the UAE. However, this 
provision is an exception and can only be evoked when a person commits cybercrimes 
against the state. Nonetheless, it was stated that Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 is a marked 
improvement to Federal Law No. 2 of 2006, which did not contain such a provision. 
However, the scope of this provision is curtailed, as companies, e.g. private banks, 
cannot demand that cyber criminals are extradited. In contrast, in the UK extra-territorial 
jurisdiction is much more comprehensive, as extra-territorial jurisdiction can also be 
sought when the private sector is the victim of a cybercrime offence. Furthermore, those 
who live in the UK, but commit a cybercrime in another country, as well as UK 
nationals who reside abroad and who commit a cybercrime in the UK, fall under the 
jurisdiction when there is a significant link to a relevant jurisdiction.1251  Also, UK 
nationals can be prosecuted when there is no significant link to the UK, so long as the 
offence is one in the country where the person resides.1252  
 
The UK approach is beneficial for and promotes cooperation with other countries. As 
stressed by Interviewee D, the main problem with combating cybercrime is “lack of 
                                                 
1251 Ss4-5 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990; Serious Crime Act 2015, Explanatory Notes, para.137 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/notes> accessed 1st December 2015   
1252 S.5(1a) and (1B) of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
294 
 
sufficient international coordination.” However, at present Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 
does not promote international cooperation, as enforcement agents cannot rely on the 
UAE to assert “legal power beyond its territorial borders” in order to ensure that cyber 
criminals are brought to justice.1253 The UAE’s stance towards combating cybercrime is 
therefore less aggressive than that of the UK. Yet as cybercrime has not yet been 
regulated at the international level, this may be warranted. In this context, some of the 
interviews also observed that other countries may not recognise the UAE asserting 
jurisdiction over nationals in their jurisdiction, Interviewee A said: 
 
“This raises the question whether other countries will give up their 
territorial jurisdiction and allow other countries to extend theirs.”  
 
The application of domestic laws to activities which are unrelated to the UAE territory 
may be deemed objectionable by other countries, especially when UAE law does not 
transpose international law.1254 For instance, some of the interviewees explained that 
certain offences are not deemed crimes in other countries. Interviewee D furnished the 
following example: 
 
“The law in the United Arab Emirates, for instance, punishes taking a 
picture of a person without his/ her permission at a public place and in some 
countries this is not considered a crime being taken at a public place….We 
                                                 
1253 A. J. Colangelo, What is extraterritorial jurisdiction? 99 Cornell Law Review 2014, 1303-1352, 1303 
1254 Ibid, 1332-1333 
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also have freedom of the press, but within the limits of not insulting and 
defaming others, while in some countries this is considered permissible.” 
 
Nonetheless, it would be better if the law reassured other countries that criminals can be 
pursued for acts which constitute an offence under the law of the country in which it 
occurred, so long as it corresponds with one of the offences set out in Federal Law No. 5 
of 2012.  
 
At present, extra-territorial jurisdiction cannot only be evoked pursuant to Article 47 of 
Federal Law No. 5 of 2012, but also by virtue of Federal Law No. 3 of 1987 (the Penal 
Code), as explained by some of the interviewees. Article 23 of the Penal Code makes 
clear that “no criminal action shall be instituted against a person who commits a crime 
in a foreign country except by the public prosecutor...” However, the Penal Code does 
not specify in which cases the public prosecutor can derogate from the general rule and 
assert extra-territorial jurisdiction. Yet it is clear that this is currently the case when any 
of the offences in Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 have been committed against “the federal 
government or any of the local governments of the Emirates of the State or any authority 
or public institution owned by any of them”, as made clear by Article 47. 
 
Moreover, Federal Law No. 39 of 2006 dealing with international judicial cooperation 
on criminal matters provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction. Whilst this law does not 
expressly include IT crimes, its scope appears wide enough to cover cybercrimes 
offences for which the sentence is at least one year, as made clear by Article 7. 
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However, Interviewee C pointed out that the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction was 
hindered by the lack of specific procedural rules. This makes it difficult to establish 
beyond reasonable doubt that a person is guilty, which is a prerequisite to extent 
jurisdiction abroad pursuant to Article 11 of Federal Law No. 39 of 2006. Article 11 of 
Federal Law No. 39 of 2006 makes clear that a diplomatic channel has to be used for 
requests to surrender criminals and extradition of criminals is therefore not automatic.  
As explained by Interviewee D: 
 
“If the criminal is out of the United Arab Emirates and committed a crime 
and such crime caused damage to any person or company or any other 
entity within the country and such impact extends to the United Arab 
Emirates, we enter into a diplomatic coordination procedures and seek legal 
authorisation from the competent authorities in the country where the 
criminal act occurred. However, there are countries that are developed and 
advanced with which coordination is possible...but generally there are 
difficulties in international coordination and cooperation by other 
countries.” 
 
It was pointed out that this problem can only be overcome through the conclusion of 
international and bilateral agreements which obligate member countries to enhance 
judicial cooperation, including by extraditing offenders. These agreements should be 
binding on the country and spell out clear and unified procedures. Yet some 
interviewees doubted that these agreements would always ensure that countries provide 
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judicial assistance to other countries which wish to obtain evidence or seek to extradite 
criminals. It was explained that one such agreement is the Riyadh Arab Convention on 
Judicial Co-operation. Article 38 of the Riyadh Arab Convention on Judicial Co-
operation makes clear that “persons found…charged with having committed a crime by 
the competent authority or convicted of having done so by a judicial body of any other 
contracting parties” can be extradited to other contracting parties. Yet at present use of 
this Convention is hindered by the contracting parties not having agreed “a joint 
interpretation of the provisions of the Convention in order to enhance its 
application.”1255  
 
Nonetheless, the conclusion of binding mutual legal assistance treaties was deemed 
another important strategy. The UK has also entered into various international mutual 
legal assistance agreements, such as the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters between Member States of the European Union 2000 and its Protocol, as well as 
bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties with various countries.1256  Similarly, the UAE 
has entered into bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties, for instance, with India in 
1999,1257 in 2006 with the UK in 2006,1258  with Australia in 2007,1259 with Indonesia in 
                                                 
1255 K. Balz, A. S. Almousa, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements and Arbitral 
Awards under the Riyadh Convention 1983, Third Years of Arab Judicial Co-operation, 4(2) International 
Journal of Procedural Law 2014, 273-288, 273                         
1256 C. Nicholls, C. Montgomery, J. B. Knowles, A. Doobay, M. Summers, Nicholls, Montgomery, and 
Knowles on The Law of Extradition and Mutual (3rd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013) 314 
1257 Dubai Courts, 2017 
<http://www.dubaicourts.gov.ae/portal/page/portal/dc/Legislation_Details?_piref292_457219_292_45521
4_455214.called_from=1&_piref292_457219_292_455214_455214.law_key=611> accessed 28th 
February 2017 
1258 C. Nicholls, C. Montgomery, J. B. Knowles, A. Doobay, M. Summers, Nicholls, Montgomery, and 
Knowles on The Law of Extradition and Mutual (3rd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2013) 314 
1259 WAM, UAE, Australia sign two extradition and legal assistance treaties, 30 July 2007 
<http://wam.ae/en/details/1395227894411> accessed 28th February 2007 
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20141260 and with Italy in 2015.1261 The UAE should thus increase its efforts to further 
enter into bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties. In addition to entering into bilateral 
and multilateral treaties, the UAE should afford reciprocal treatment to other countries 
through its cybercrime legislation, especially when no treaties have been concluded with 
a particular country. 1262  This will help realise joint gains in the fight against 
cybercrime.1263 Alternatively, it could include a provision which makes clear that cyber 
criminals will be punished who have perpetrated cybercrimes in any other country, so 
long as the offence is also one in the UAE i.e. it could adopt a similar provision as the 
UK, as discussed above. 
It was suggested by the interviewees that at the international level an independent inter-
governmental Cybercrime Action Task Force could be set up to promulgate policies to 
protect the digital realm against cyber criminals, similar to the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF). Hence, it was advocated that worldwide recommendations are issued, so 
that coordination is improved, criminals can be extradited, funds can be recovered, and 
the same procedures are followed when investigations and searches are conducted and 
information is exchanged. It was observed that these standards ought to also apply to 
companies, such as internet service providers, so that fast and uncomplicated procedures 
are in place to facilitate coordination and cooperation. This was considered to make 
                                                 
1260 Indonesian Embassy, Indonesia and UAE signed Agreement and Extradition and Mutual Legal 
Assistance, 3 February 2014 <http://indonesianembassy.ae/indonesia-uae-signed-extradition-agreement-
and-mutual-legal-assistance/> accessed 28th February 2017 
1261 UAE Interact, UAE and Italy sign two agreements on judicial cooperation, 18 September 2015 
<http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/UAE_and_Italy_sign_two_agreements_on_judicial_cooperation/7112
8.htm> accessed 28th February 2017 
1262 M. E. Smith, Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004) 17 
1263 Ibid 
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cybercrime detection easier and was thought to deter cyber criminals, thereby leading to 
a reduction in cybercrime rates.  
 
Cooperation with other countries was therefore considered paramount. However, one of 
the interviewees observed that cooperation amongst GCC countries was not as advanced 
as in Europe where the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (the 
Budapest Convention) applies. This is despite the adoption of the Arab Convention on 
Combating Information Technology Offences 2010 (Arab Convention), which includes 
provisions to promote cooperation between the Arab States. Similar to the Budapest 
Convention, which requires countries to adopt reciprocal laws and investigate these in 
their respective territories,1264 Article 5 of the Arab Convention mandates that state 
parties criminalise the acts spelled out in the Convention in Articles 6-21. Like the 
Budapest Convention1265, the Arab Convention spells out in respect of which cybercrime 
offences state parties can ask that a person is extradited, namely those listed in Articles 6 
to 19 and any other offences committed by means of information technology.1266 The 
Arab Convention also contains provisions which require state parties to provide mutual 
assistance, including through information sharing, so that cybercrime investigations are 
facilitated.1267 Practically, this means that internet service providers have to provide 
                                                 
1264 Also see Article 23 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention; J. B. Hill, N. E. Marion, 
Introduction to Cybercrime: Computer Crimes, Laws, and Policing in the 21st Century (Santa Barbara, 
ABC-CLIO LLC 2016) 236 
1265 Also see Article 24 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
1266 Articles 22(2)(a)-(b) and Article 31 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology 
Offences 2010 
1267 Also see Articles 25-26 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 
2010; also see Articles 25-26 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
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information when this is required.1268 Its provisions are very similar to the Budapest 
Convention, except that it does not require state parties to assist countries with which no 
treaty has been entered into.1269 Article 22(1) of the Arab Convention also obligates state 
parties to “commit itself to adopting, in its domestic law, the legislations and procedures 
necessary to specify the powers and procedures set forth in Chapter III of this 
Convention.”  
 
However, as explained by all the interviewees the UAE lacks a procedural law/code and 
technical measures. For instance, it was noted that cybercrimes have a procedural 
aspect, but that it is not explained how cybercrime should be dealt with, e.g. how 
electronic investigation should be conducted, how evidence should be collected, 
examined and retained. This was considered problematic, especially in light of the fact 
that there exist procedural and practical difficulties when conducting digital 
investigations, evidencing cybercrime and identifying offenders. In this context, 
Interviewee C remarked: 
 
“The procedural difficulties are related to following up/tracking evidence 
and coordinating with the competent authorities when detecting 
cybercrimes, especially if the evidence is out of the country. It is also 
difficult to identify the actor/doer/ offender especially if he/she is out of the 
country and to freeze seized funds if such funds are out of the country. 
Additionally, social media, applications and software companies, such 
                                                 
1268 J. B. Hill, N. E. Marion, Introduction to Cybercrime: Computer Crimes, Laws, and Policing in the 
21st Century (Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO LLC 2016) 237 
1269 Also see Articles 27-28 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
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Instagram, Twitter, WhatApp and Facebook, often refuse to cooperate even 
with officials from their own country, whether at the stage of data collection 
or at trial. They refuse to provide user data under the excuse of protection of 
privacy.” 
 
Also, evidence can be easily copied and without rules in place which stipulate how 
digital evidence ought to be handled, evidence may be doubted. Criminals may thus 
escape their punishment. The majority of interviewees stressed that the procedural rules 
in the Federal Law No. 35 of 1992 concerning the Criminal Procedural Law are too 
general and cannot be transposed to the digital world. They are therefore inadequate for 
cybercrimes, as Interviewee C asserted: 
 
“Special procedures are required, as the patterns of cybercrime are 
different from traditional crime. For example, the inspection permit for IT 
crimes are of a special nature to which we cannot apply the traditional 
criminal code as retention of evidence during the inspection of the device is 
different.” 
 
The failure by the UAE to adopt procedural laws, codes or guidance also makes it not 
possible to transpose the following obligations in the Arab Convention, namely to adopt 
procedures to ensure the expeditious custody of data stored in information technology 
(Article 23) and the expeditious custody and partial disclosure of users tracking 
information (Article 24). The UAE also lacks “procedures to enable the competent 
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authorities to issue orders to...submit certain information...stored on information 
technology...[or from] any service provider...” (Article 25), “procedures ...to enable its 
competent authorities to inspect or access” stored information (Article 26); 
“procedures...to enable the competent authorities to seize and safeguard” stored 
information (Article 27); procedures to gather users tracking information (Article 28); 
and legislative procedures to enable the authorities to intercept content information 
(Article 29). In contrast, in the UK the NPCC has published the Good Practice Guide for 
Digital Evidence 2011, the Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic 
Evidence and the Good Practice Guide for Managers of e-Crime investigation. 1270 
Hence, the procedures are clearly spelled out which have to be followed when e-crime is 
being investigated and electronic evidence is being handled, in contrast to the UAE 
where this has not yet been done. 
 
According to the interviewees, the main shortcoming with UAE’s e-crime legislation is 
therefore that no procedures have been enacted and this makes it difficult to enforce 
cybercrime offences. Similarly, Kshetri observes that enacting cybercrime laws is 
straightforward, but that the challenge is to create enforcement mechanisms.1271 There 
was overwhelming agreement that procedural rules should be developed and that a law 
should be adopted which informs how electronic evidence should be dealt with.  
                                                 
1270 The Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence 2012, 
<http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2011/201110-cba-digital-evidence-v5.pdf> accessed 2 May 
2014; the Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic 
Evidence, <http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence.pdf> 2 
May 2014; the Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Managers of e-Crime 
Investigation, <http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2011/201103CRIECI14.pdf> accessed 2 May 
2014 
1271 N. Kshetri, The Global Cybercrime Industry: Economic, Institutional and Strategic Perspectives 
(London, Springer 2010) 148 
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Procedures should be spelled out and it should be made clear that a failure to follow 
these procedures results in the prosecution not being permitted to rely on the evidence. It 
was mentioned that Qatar had enacted a cybercrime law, which addressed procedural 
aspects. It was strongly recommended that a permanent cybercrime committee is formed 
which is composed of members from the police, prosecution, the judiciary, the 
communication authorities, corporations and security agencies. Such permanent 
committee would be authorised to review laws and would consider whether provisions 
have to be amended. Importantly, such a committee ought to be entrusted with 
promulgating procedural rules. These rules would not necessarily have to be in form of 
law, but instead this could be in the form guidance, as in the UK. Yet as also made clear 
by Article 29 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 
2010, additionally legislative procedures have to be adopted to enable the authorities to 
intercept content information. Consequently, it is also important for the UAE to enact 
surveillance and data retention laws. 
 
5.1.3 Surveillance and Data Retention Laws  
Cybercrime can arguably only be successfully combated through technology-driven 
strategies. Law enforcement agencies must therefore be granted “new powers of search 
and seizure” in order to investigate crime.1272 As many aspects of daily life now take 
place online, this means requiring internet service providers (ISPs) to offer intercept 
technology, so that enforcement agents can legally access data transmissions and are 
assisted when searching data traffic and can request information about customers and 
                                                 
1272 L. Huey, R. S. Rosenberg, Watching the Web: Thoughts on Expanding Police Surveillance 
Opportunities under the Cyber-Crime Convention, Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice 2004, 597-606 
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access retained data.1273 This effectively means “convert[ing ISPs] into integral cogs in 
the apparatus of online law enforcement” and “establishing 'policing' networks with 
elements of the private sector...that have the tools and capacity to achieve desired results 
beyond the state...”1274  Certainly, this implies a trade-off with the rights of normal 
internet users.1275 However, as observed by the interviewees surveillance takes place 
already to a certain extent in all countries. For instance, there are cameras on the streets 
in most cities around the world in order to monitor people. Whilst some may perceive 
this to be an interference with their personal freedom, this was considered a necessary 
precaution to protect the public against crime. Similarly, mass surveillance means that 
the same logic is applied to the virtual world. Information Communication Technologies 
(ITCs) are employed to control crime and to reap policing efficiency. 1276  The 
interviewees therefore considered interception of communications necessary to protect 
against the dangers which technology poses to the UAE. In this context, Interviewee D 
commented: 
 
“Granting surveillance powers will facilitate detection of crimes… The 
existence of complicated procedures and long correspondences to obtain 
permission leads to a loss of evidence and helps criminals to escape, 
especially cyber criminals. Granting such powers will have a big effect on 
detecting criminals and will limit cybercrime, as evidence can be obtained 
quickly.” 
                                                 
1273 Ibid 
1274 Ibid 
1275 M. N. Sirohi, Transformational Dimensions of Cybercrime (Delhi, Alpha Editions 2015) 52 
1276 M. S. Nuth, Taking advantage of new technologies: For and against crime, 28 Computer Law & 
Security Report 2008, 437-446, 437 
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The need for surveillance powers is also underscored by the fact that at present there is a 
large number of cases registered against unknown persons in the UAE. This is because 
the authorities are often unable to access data and to identify offenders, especially when 
crimes are committed in other countries. Also, as discussed above, both the Arab 
Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010 and the Convention 
on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe mandate electronic monitoring and data 
surveillance, which is important as part of a pro-active policing approach.1277 Already in 
2000, the UK passed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the 
Terrorism Act 2000 which confer broad powers on government bodies to conduct 
surveillance 1278 , as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. Additionally, it enacted the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 which further legalises various tools for hacking and 
snooping by enforcement agents.1279 In contrast, the UAE has to this present date not 
enacted a legislative framework for surveillance and data retention. This was identified 
as a serious problem by all the interviewees.  
 
This is not to say that no surveillance takes place. Interviewee E stated: 
 
“The police contact the service providers and request it to provide 
information after a court orders this. I do not know of a system which 
                                                 
1277 N. Abouzakhar, ECCWS 2015 14th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Hatfield 
UK (Reading, Academic Conferences and Publishing International Ltd 2015) 302 
1278 P. Mobbs, Privacy and Surveillance, How and when organisations and the state can monitor your 
actions, GreenNet Civil Society Internet Rights Project, 2003, 1-11, 5 
<http://www.internetrights.org.uk/briefings/irtb05-rev1-draft.pdf> accessed 29 June 2014 
1279 E. Macaskill, 'Extreme surveillance' becomes UK law with barely a whimper, 19 November 2016 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/19/extreme-surveillance-becomes-uk-law-with-barely-a-
whimper> accessed 28th February 2017 
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specifies the method of requesting information other than by a court order 
and everything is done through a specific court order.” 
 
Moreover, it was explained that the telecommunications services provider Etisalat and 
the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority have large powers to conduct 
surveillance and to intercept data. Specialised staff and competent authorities can 
intercept all data in the country in order to investigate crime. Also, at most police 
stations, there is a section which deals with IT crime. Officers, who work for this 
section, have powers to conduct digital investigations and to collect electronic evidence. 
Additionally, the Minister can authorise more comprehensive and invasive powers to 
collect information, e.g. the police or the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. 
Yet several of the interviewees observed that these powers had only been granted 
through internal regulations.  
 
However, it was noted that surveillance only takes place after an authenticated source 
reports that a crime has been committed. The same reactive approach can be found in 
Article 43 of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012, which states that “the court may order to put 
the condemned under surveillance...” This is different to the pro-active UK approach, 
which is much more sweeping, as discussed in Chapter one and three. For instance, the 
UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) ran the Tempora programme 
under which all individuals were subjected to bulk surveillance, irrespective of whether 
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or not they were under a suspicion of having committed a crime or not.1280 Yet the 
interviewees were divided about whether interception of communications and bulk 
collection of communications data are impermissible, as some felt that this should only 
be specified in the inspection permit. Accordingly, only specific data should be 
obtained. All of the interviewees cautioned that surveillance requires legal authorisation. 
Some argued that granting enforcement personnel too expansive surveillance powers is 
unwise, also since it conflicts with protecting the privacy of individuals. For instance, 
Interviewee C asserted: 
 
“Allowing surveillance under the pretext of preventing cybercrimes should 
not be allowed since this results in privacy infringement. However, 
conditional surveillance is warranted in respect of some crimes, e.g. 
terrorism and serious criminal cases and cases where state security is being 
prejudiced.” 
 
It was explained that conditional surveillance should mean that a judicial body 
authorises the surveillance and the specific powers on each occasion. In contrast, 
another interviewee opined that the police require more comprehensive and invasive 
powers to collect information, so long as this is within the limits of not infringing the 
privacy of persons and in a manner which accords with the stipulated procedures. All 
the interviewees agreed that a balance has to be struck between surveillance powers and 
protecting the privacy of individuals. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights 
                                                 
1280 O. Bowcott, UK-US surveillance regime was unlawful 'for seven years', The Guardian, 6 February 
2015 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/06/gchq-mass-internet-surveillance-unlawful-
court-nsa> accessed 28th February 2017 
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has made clear that the power to conduct surveillance is not unlimited, but that the 
“interest of a state in protecting its national security must be balanced against the 
seriousness of the interference with the applicant's right to respect for his or her private 
life.”1281  
 
Article 31 of the UAE constitution states that “freedom of communication by post, 
telegraph or other means of communication and the secrecy thereof shall be guaranteed 
in accordance with the law.” However, without a law which defines the parameters of 
this freedom and guarantee, surveillance is arguably illegitimate, as pointed out by one 
interviewee. He therefore emphasised that a surveillance law should be enacted, so that 
the powers of enforcement agents are explained, as well as the limits when investigating 
crimes. Several of the interviewees noted that surveillance is presently subject to Federal 
Law No. 35 of 1992 concerning the Criminal Procedural Law. Yet all of the 
interviewees thought that this law was inadequate and that this constituted a problem.  
 
The interviewees therefore recommended that surveillance powers are put on a statutory 
footing, so that basic constitutional rights are not prejudiced and the circumstances and 
procedures are clearly spelled out. Without this it was felt that there was a legislative 
gap which made combating cybercrime more challenging. The interviewees explained 
that such a surveillance law should detail which information can be acquired and in case 
other information is collected, this should be rendered unlawful. In such a case, the 
information should not be relied upon.  
 
                                                 
1281 Rotaru v Romania (2000) 8 BHRC 449 
309 
 
In the context of surveillance, it was emphasised that data retention is also necessary. 
Interviewee B explicated that data retention was of “great importance in the detection of 
crime.” The police and other agencies may need data later in order to identify offenders. 
Other interviewees also stressed that data retention was extremely necessary. Whilst in 
Europe data retention was in response to the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London1282 
and there have been no terrorist attacks in the UAE to date, they are nonetheless 
“likely”, as “[t]errorists continue to issue statements threatening to carry out attacks in 
the Gulf region.”1283 Accordingly, the UAE should consider permitting data retention to 
protect “national security, defence, public security or the prevention, investigation, 
detection, and prosecution of criminal offences of unauthorised use of the electronic 
communications system.”1284 
 
However, as explained by Interviewee C, “We have no legal powers to retain data.” 
Instead this is currently done through internal regulations adopted by the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. It was unclear whether the timeframe for 
keeping data and the type of data are detailed in these regulations. Hence, a rather 
informal approach has been adopted. This is problematic, as highlighted by the recent 
findings by the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal which ruled that the secretly run 
Tempora programme by GCHQ was illegal.1285 Nonetheless, the Investigatory Powers 
                                                 
1282 T. Konstadinides, Destroying democracy on the ground of defending it? The Data Retention Directive, 
the surveillance state and our constitutional ecosystem, 36(5) European Law Review 2011, 722-736, 724 
1283 UK Government, Foreign travel advice, United Arab Emirates, Terrorism, 2017 
<https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/united-arab-emirates/terrorism> accessed 28th February 2017 
1284 Article 15 of the now defunct European Union Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector; C. Walker, Terrorism 
and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2011) 75 
1285 O. Bowcott, GHC surveillance hearing to begin, The Guardian, 14 July 2014 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jul/14/court-gchq-surveillance-tempora-ipt-nsa-snowden> 
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Tribunal held that principally the RIPA permits mass surveillance in respect of all fibre 
optic cables which leave or enter the UK.1286 This is because data which has been 
acquired through “bulk interception cannot be used to search for and examine the 
communications of an individual in the UK unless GCHQ first obtain a specific 
authorization naming that individual, signed by a secretary of state.”1287  
  
All interviewees concurred that it would be better if a law was enacted which required 
telecommunication providers and ISPs to retain data and which specifies the controls 
when data is retained. It was thought that the data should remain with the service 
provider Etisalat. The punishment should be specified i.e. whether criminal or 
administrative sanctions should be imposed in case Etisalat wrongly deletes data. Such a 
law should also address whether joint or several liability should be imposed on Etisalat 
or staff in cases where Etisalat is required to retain data, but staff unintentionally delete 
data. The sanctions for unlawfully accessing retained data without special authorisation 
must also be detailed. It was pointed out that Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 can be evoked 
in cases where staff illegally access, publish or circulate data. The service provider can 
also be punished by virtue of the Federal Law by Decree No. 3 of 2003 on Telecom Law 
and staff can be pursued for data infringement. Accordingly, abuse of broad 
enforcement powers results in staff exposing themselves to criminal liability. Other 
provisions also regulate privacy infringements by staff and other types of abuse of 
                                                                                                                                               
accessed 1st March 2017; O. Bowcott, UK-US surveillance regime was unlawful 'for seven years', The 
Guardian, 6 February 2015 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/06/gchq-mass-internet-
surveillance-unlawful-court-nsa> accessed 28th February 2017 
1286 Privacy International, Investigatory Powers Tribunal rules GCHQ mass surveillance programme 
TEMPORA is legal in principle, 18 December 2014 <https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/46> 
accessed 1st March 2017 
1287 M. O. Jalaalzaai, Fixing the EU Intelligence Crisis: Intelligence Sharing, Law Enforcement and the 
Threat of Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Terrorism (New York, Algora Publishing 2016) 96 
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powers. Yet it should be reviewed whether the sanctions in Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 
and Federal Law by Decree No. 3 of 2003 on Telecom Law are appropriate in cases 
where enforcement agents access data. It may be important to devise certain exceptions, 
for instance, in urgent cases where cyber attacks pose the risk of loss of life, serious 
damage to national security, serious injury or illness.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the UK RIPA spells out powers when communications are 
intercepted.1288 Additionally, it explains the procedures when intrusive surveillance can 
be conducted,1289  as well as which requirements have to be met to use Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources. 1290  It also discusses the powers in respect of directed 
surveillance. 1291  Similarly, the UAE should spell out different procedures for the 
different types of surveillance powers, it may want to equip law enforcement agents 
with. In this context, it should also grant fewer bodies the right to conduct more 
intrusive surveillance, e.g. directed surveillance.1292 
 
In terms of the type of data, which should be retained, Interviewee B thought that this 
should particularly consist of data which identifies a person's identity, as well as the 
activities which he performed whilst accessing the internet. Another interviewee thought 
that different types of data ought to be retained, i.e. medical authorities should retain 
health data, Etisalat should retain personal data about their customers, including calls 
                                                 
1288 See Part 1 of the RIPA, especially s.24(5)(2) 
1289 See Part 2 of the RIPA 
1290 See Part 2 of the RIPA 
1291 See Part 2 of the RIPA 
1292 S.24(5)(4) of RIPA; J. Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law (10th ed, London, Palgrave 
2015) 569 
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and messages, employers should keep data about their employees, etc. Mobile phone 
data was particularly deemed important, including the address of the person who owns 
the phone, as well which other persons s/he has contacted, whether in the UAE or 
abroad. It was suggested that the remaining data could be retained by specialised 
technicians. However, Interviewee D expressed a difference of opinion:  
 
“It is difficult to separate data and in my opinion interception should be 
comprehensive as one may find something which indicates that a person has 
committed a crime. Interception should be limited to whatever proves the 
commission of the crime by the person or which helps detecting the crime. 
The police should be trusted when they deal with persons’ data and should 
therefore not use such data beyond the limits of the case which they are 
investigating and such data should be kept top confidential.” 
 
This view largely accords with the approach taken under UK law, where for instance, a 
minister has to issue a warrant in order to intercept communication data1293 and where 
such material has to be destroyed when there are no longer “authorised purposes” or an 
offence is committed.1294 
However, additionally it was emphasised that the content of websites should be 
monitored, as some propagate terrorist ideas or advertise fake jobs designed to lure 
people into the country and these should be blocked. 
                                                 
1293 S. Foster, The Judiciary, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press 
2006) 141 
1294 S.15(4) and s.19 of RIPA; B. Emmerson, A. Ashworth, A. Macdonald, Human Rights and Criminal 
Justice (3rd ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 328 
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It was suggested that regulations could be issued by the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authority for Etisalat and Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company (Du) in 
order to assist law enforcement agents with surveillance. These could set out controls 
and the compliance departments of these firms could be required to verify compliance. 
Controls for staff access would have to be detailed and whilst they would not have to be 
absolute, this could consist of staff, who access a piece of information, being required to 
state the reason for this. It was recommended that the extent of access should be 
commensurate with the investigatory needs of the law enforcement agent. 
 
Furthermore, Interviewee D stressed that investigatory authorities ought to cooperate 
and coordinate with Etisalat and Du, as well with social network providers, so that their 
networks can be intercepted when data is required for investigations.  
 
It was discussed that any new law ought to set out the timeframe for the data retention. 
One interviewee stated that the duration should depend on the type of data i.e. if it is 
important data it should be retained, even if it does not relate to a crime. Accordingly, 
data which may be needed to detect crimes later on should be kept for longer periods. It 
was thought that retention of basic data may burden the service provider and should only 
be retained for a shorter period, e.g. for six months, whereas important data should be 
kept for three years. In contrast, Interviewee B thought that data should be retained 
between six months and up to one year, whereas Interviewee C thought that the 
maximum period should be three months. It was also suggested that laws in other 
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countries should be studied when setting the timeframe and that the costs for retaining 
the data should be taken into account. Interviewee D pointed out that a longer data 
retention period was obviously better, but that it should fall on the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority to determine the period. For instance, the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority could issue a retention notice which requires Etisalat and Du to 
retain data and this notice could specify the retention period, as well as any other 
conditions. Hence, a similar set up could be adopted as in the UK, where the Secretary 
of State is in charge of this.1295 
 
All the interviewees agreed that it is important to adopt legal powers which detail the 
procedures for decryption requests. It was explained that just like with traditional 
crimes, where the police may have to break a door in order to get access to a crime 
location or to catch an offender, the same applies to the digital realm. Otherwise, fences 
may be created to detect crime. Specialists must therefore decrypt data, especially when 
serious investigations are pursued or to obtain evidence which proves that a crime has 
been committed. It was pointed out that this was not a task for the police in general, but 
a matter for the electronic evidence laboratory. 
 
The interviewees made clear that at present there exists no power to request companies 
to provide data from customers in order to decrypt it. It was thought that such a power 
would be difficult to reconcile with the right to privacy. It was suggested that decryption 
requests should require an authorisation from the courts. Also, the Commander-in-chief 
of the police could issue a warrant or sign one subsequently, similar to the UK where 
                                                 
1295 S.1 of the UK Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
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this power lies with the Secretary of State, judges and the Surveillance 
Commissioner.1296  
 
Interviewee C suggested that in cases where the authorities fail to decrypt a digital 
device, the accused ought to be requested to prove his/her innocence i.e. that the device 
contains no evidence which incriminates him/her. The accused would thus have to prove 
that he/she did not commit the crime and has nothing to hide on his/her digital device 
and is ready to provide access. A refusal by the accused would not constitute evidence 
that s/he has committed the crime, but together with any other evidence, would support 
the case against the accused.. The vital importance of the presumption of innocence was 
highlighted in Woolmington v DPP1297 where the ‘golden thread’, as it is called, was 
established by Viscount Sankey making it clear in unambiguous terms that the onus of 
proof should lie on the prosecution. Despite the ‘golden thread’ it would be ‘misleading 
to imagine that reverse burden provisions are in some way anomalous in criminal 
law.’1298 Even though such a reversal of the onus does raise some questions with respect 
to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights in Salabiaku v France1299 clarified that not all provisions that impose the 
legal burden on the accused will infringe Art.6(2) and that such provisions are not 
                                                 
1296 S.24(5)(4) of RIPA; J. Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law (10th ed, London, Palgrave 
2015) 569 
1297 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462. 
1298 Ben Fitzpatrick, ‘Reverse burden and Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
official secrets’ (2008) 72(3) JCL 190, 193.  
1299 Salabiaku v France  (1988) 13 EHHR 379. 
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prohibited, however they should be confined within reasonable limits,  In  the case of R 
v Lambert1300 Lord Hope held that: 
 
 ‘It is now well settled that the principle which is to be applied requires a balance to be 
struck between the general interest of the community and the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the individual.  This will not be achieved if the reverse onus 
provision goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish the objective of the statute’1301  
The Court in Lambert specified that in order for such a reversal to be accepted it will 
need to be just and proportionate for the aim it seeks to achieve Also, having in mind the 
nature of the situation in question it is likely to be considered not only proportionate but 
also reasonable for the onus to be reversed, as it would indeed be more easy and 
practical for innocence to be proved, instead of the opposite1302 
Hence, a reverse onus could operate, in such situations subject to what has been 
discussed above, yet this alone may not be sufficient to effectively combat cybercrime. 
It would be better if additionally, enforcement officers had the power to request those 
who may reasonably have the key to decrypt legally seized devices, so long as a warrant 
has been issued to that effect or a judge has permitted this.1303 This approach has been 
adopted by the UK and makes it possible for devices to be decrypted through 
cooperation, e.g. with manufacturers. In the UK, these decryption requests are often 
                                                 
1300 R v Lambert [2002] AC 545. 
1301 R v Lambert [2002] AC 545 (Lord Hope). 
1302 Gatland v Commisioner of Police of the Metropolis [1968] 2 WLR 1263. 
1303 S.49(2) of RIPA; Schedule 2, Articles 1(1)(a) and 2 of RIPA 
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accompanied by secrecy undertakings, so that those which have been requested cannot 
disclose that this has been done to the person.1304 
 
All the interviewees made clear that it was not a good strategy to weaken or ban 
encryption.  
On the subject Interviewee E said:  
“I think [Encryption] is important for communication companies and for 
various bodies that possess data such as banks and companies.  Data should 
be encrypted for the purpose of secrecy and data protection because the 
absence of encryption may lead to very easy access to information by 
criminals, in addition to that, the users will not feel their information is 
securely retained and through a secured network…”  
 
Also, in the UK there exists no ban on end-to-end encryption, though this was initially 
proposed.1305 Instead companies can be ordered to decrypt devices in practicable cases 
by virtue of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.1306 It was discussed that there has been 
an interest in creating backdoors for law enforcement officers to access encrypted 
content, including commercial data, when a crime has occurred. Yet it was thought that 
a court should grant such a power in specific cases and that specific procedures should 
                                                 
1304 B. J. Goold, D. Neyland, New Directions in Surveillance and Privacy (Cullompton, Willan Publishing 
2009) 50 
1305 K. Collins, UK surveillance law marks a 'worse than scary' shift, CNET, 29 November 2016 
<https://www.cnet.com/uk/news/snoopers-charter-investigatory-powers-bill-royal-assent-surveillance-
uk/> accessed 1st March 2017; A. J. Martin, UK gov says new Home Sec will have powers to ban end-to-
end encryption, The Register, 14 July 2016 
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/14/gov_says_new_home_sec_iwilli_have_powers_to_ban_endto
end_encryption/> accessed 1st March 2016 
1306 Ibid (Collins) 
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be in place to regulate this. In the UK, security and law enforcements agents can hack 
particular phones, devices or computers i.e. can engage in “equipment interference and 
can also bulk hack foreign targets when this is authorised.1307 For this purpose, an 
Equipment Interference Draft Code of Practice has been issued by the Home Office.1308 
Any future legislation should therefore spell out in which cases law enforcement agents 
have the power to make decryption requests, as well as the procedure. The same would 
have to be done for equipment interferences, so that the power is clearly spelled out, as 
well as the procedures and ideally a code of guidance should be issued.  
 
5.1.4 Privacy and Data Protection 
As discussed above, the failure to define the concept of privacy infringement and 
personal data has resulted in cyber criminals escaping their just punishment. Privacy 
infringement was considered a crime by the interviewees, as is also made clear in 
Article 21 of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012, which criminalises using a “computer 
network... or any information technology means for the invasion of privacy...” Yet a 
balance has to be struck between “freedom from unauthorized intrusion” 1309  and 
security. It was thought that this can only be achieved through clear legal provisions 
which detail the powers of law enforcement bodies. Surveillance, interception, data 
retention, decryption and other law enforcement powers were deemed necessary in order 
                                                 
1307 J. Vincent, The UK Now Wields Unprecedented Surveillance Powers - Here's What It Means, The 
Verge, 29 November 2016 <http://www.theverge.com/2016/11/23/13718768/uk-surveillance-laws-
explained-investigatory-powers-bill> accessed 1st March 2017 
1308  Home Office, Equipment Interference, Draft Code of Practice, Autumn 2016, 1-97 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557861/IP_Bill_-
_Draft_EI_code_of_practice.pdf> accessed 1st March 2017 
1309  Merriam Dictionary <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/privacy> accessed 20th January 
2015; H. Sarfaraz, Surveillance, privacy and cyber law, 20(7) Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review 2014, 189-194, 189 
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to investigate whether or not a crime had been committed. In this context, interviewee A 
stated:  
 
“Preventative policing ought not prejudice the privacy of individuals. Only 
if information suggests that a person is involved in a crime should his data 
be accessed after the competent authorities have authorised this.” 
However, in light of the fact that predictive policing is “the future of law enforcement”, 
policing has to become “less reactive.”1310  Predictive policing means that different 
types of information are gathered and technology is employed to obtain intelligence, so 
that crime can be fought.1311 As observed by Professor Elizabeth Joh “soon it will be 
feasible and affordable for the government to record, store and analyse nearly 
everything we do” and the police will get alerts through computer programs which 
analyse huge data sets in order to identify suspicious activities.1312 Cybercrime has 
arguably led to this new policing model since it has called into doubt the effectiveness 
of the traditional reactive policing paradigm.1313 The standard law enforcement model is 
based on deterrence, successful crime investigation and controllable injury caused by 
disorder, as also discussed in Chapter 1.1314 Yet in the digital world, criminals can be 
anonymous, cannot be traced, employ encryption and the crime can be distributed, 
                                                 
1310 B. Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement? 266 National Institute of Justice 
Journal 2010, 16-19, 16-17 
1311 J. W. Osterburg, R. H. Ward, Criminal Investigation: A Method for Reconstructing the Past (7th ed, 
Abingdon, Routledge 2014) 266 
1312 J. Sadowski, Police data could be labelling 'suspects' for crimes they have not committed, The 
Guardian, 4 February 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/04/us-police-data-
analytics-smart-cities-crime-likelihood-fresno-chicago-heat-list> accessed 1st March 2017 
1313 N. Kozlovski, A Paradigm Shift in Online Policing - Designing Accountable Policing, Yale Law 
School, 2005, 1-22, 7 <https://crypto.stanford.edu/portia/papers/Kozlovski.pdf> accessed 1st March 2017 
1314 Ibid, 8 
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automated and international.1315 A preventative and thus proactive policing model is 
technologically and economically more effective.1316 However, this requires that the 
tension between predictive policing facilitated through surveillance and data collection 
and analysis of such data is bridged, for instance, through “a thorough privacy policy, 
training personnel to use it properly, enforcing accountability and continually refining 
the policy.”1317 Trustworthy processes have to be adopted which are transparent and can 
be audited. 1318  This requires that procedures are enacted, which all interviewees 
identified as one of the main shortcomings within the current e-crime framework of the 
UAE. 
 
The great majority of interviewees therefore emphasised that it was important for the 
UAE to improve its data protection laws, both procedurally, for instance, through the 
adoption of a “thorough privacy policy”1319 by law enforcement agents and in terms of 
the available sanctions. For instance, such a policy could include a collection limitation 
principle (i.e. personal data should only be collected through fair and legal means and 
where possible with the knowledge of the data subject); a purpose specification principle 
(i.e. the use should be made clear prior to the data collection and further use should be 
limited accordingly); a use limitation principle (i.e. the use can only be for the specified 
purpose); a data quality principle (i.e. the data has to be accurate, relevant and up-to 
                                                 
1315 Ibid 
1316 Ibid 
1317 B. Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement? 266 National Institute of Justice 
Journal 2010, 16-19, 18 
1318 Ibid 
1319 Ibid 
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date); and an individual participation principle (i.e. the data subject should be entitled to 
certain rights, e.g. to find out which data is held about him/her.1320  
 
One of the first steps which should be taken is to clarify the concept of privacy, personal 
data and data protection in order to remedy the current problems with Federal Law No. 5 
of 2012, as discussed above. Yet the interviewees considered that this alone is a too 
narrow approach and favoured more sweeping reforms; Interviewee C said: 
 
“Data collection by companies is not regulated in the UAE.” 
The data protection legislation for the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) does 
not apply to the rest of the UAE.1321 This was identified as a lacuna in an era where 
companies collect vast amounts of data about individuals and thereby expose them to 
security risks. The interviewees concurred that data protection and privacy help 
preserving network and information security. A data protection reform would promote 
cultural awareness and would reinforce that employees, including enforcement agents, 
have to deal carefully with data. Companies would take precautions when they handle 
personal data, which in turn makes it more difficult for cyber criminals to access such 
data. In this context, the interviewees recommended that companies which handle 
personal data should notify security or data protection breaches to the authorities, as 
well as crimes. 
 
                                                 
1320 W. L. Perry, B. McInnis, C. C. Price, S. C. Smith, J. S. Hollywood, Predictive Policing: The Role of 
Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations (New York, RAND Corporation 2013) 50 
1321 S. Paterson, B. Hopps, N. Lovell, United Arab Emirates, Cybersecurity, Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, 
17 March 2016, 1-6, 2 
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The majority of the interviewees urged the legislator to enact a federal law which 
addresses data and privacy protection, as expressed here by Interviewee E: 
 
“A special data protection law has been issued recently in Qatar, which 
appears perfect since it complies with the best international practices and is 
modelled closely on the European law which is considered to be one of the 
best laws for data and privacy protection.” 
 
Hence, steps should be taken to ensure that the UAE does not fall behind other states in 
the Middle East, especially since this was thought to heighten the risk of cybercrime, 
e.g. through careless handling of personal data by companies. This is vital in realising 
“accountable policing” in an age where proactive policing tactics through surveillance 
and other preventative strategies have increasingly become more commonplace.1322  
 
5.1.5 Evidence Rules on the Admissibility of Digital Evidence and 
Intercept Material in Criminal Proceedings 
The interviewees considered that criminals ought not be informed about intercept 
material in cases where the criminal thereby finds out how evidence is gathered. 
Otherwise, criminals will be aware of the way in which information is collected and 
avoid these sources. This would make it more difficult for law enforcement agents to 
detect crime and would pose a threat to the security of the nation. It was explained that 
                                                 
1322 N. Kozlovski, A Paradigm Shift in Online Policing - Designing Accountable Policing, Yale Law 
School, 2005, 1-22, 20-21 <https://crypto.stanford.edu/portia/papers/Kozlovski.pdf> accessed 1st March 
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the Department of Evidence deals with the detection of electronic data and evidence, 
which judges take into account. In this context, Interviewee E remarked that: 
 
“Evidence is generally accepted by the court. The court may consider it 
important to protect the source of the evidence or the technical method 
through which the evidence has been obtained, but that is up to the 
discretion of the court.” 
 
It was acknowledged that problems had been encountered with the current evidence 
rules on the admissibility of digital evidence and intercept material in criminal 
proceedings. This is because judges are afforded a wide discretion by the failure to enact 
provisions which stipulate the circumstances and process for the prosecution to not 
disclose evidence. Without this, there is the risk that the impression is created that there 
exists no “open justice.”1323 The right to a fair hearing implies that the accused receives 
the evidence which is used against him, so that he can defend himself. 1324  When 
derogations are made from this important principle, these should be clearly stated since 
this promotes the rule of law.1325 For instance, in the UK the accused can challenge the 
decision that public interest immunity has been granted.1326 The surveillance law i.e. 
s.17 of the RIPA also states that intercepted communications are not permitted during 
court proceedings. Moreover, the judge can request that the intercept material is 
                                                 
1323 J. Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law (10th ed, London, Palgrave 2015) 561 
1324 G. Martin, R. Scott Bray, M. Kumar, Secrecy, Law and Society (Abingdon, Routledge 2015) 4 
1325 Ibid 
1326  Goodridge v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary (1999) 1 All ER 896; Air Canada v 
Secretary of State for Trade (No.2) (1983) 2 AC 394; s.3 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996; J. Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law (10th ed, London, Palgrave 2015) 562 
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inspected by him/her and can order the prosecutor to admit a fact in order to uphold 
justice.1327  
 
Similar procedures could be adopted as part of the internal regulations which judges 
follow. These could apply to the competent circuit for cybercrimes, which had been 
created at all federal courts in the country by virtue of a resolution of the Ministry of 
Justice in 2012 in order to strengthen e-capacity. It was explained that prior to this, 
cybercrimes were dealt with by misdemeanour circuits, alongside other traditional 
misdemeanours. These procedures could also be taught as part of the qualification 
programs in technology and electronic evidence, which have been developed for judges.  
 
Additionally, several of the interviewees recommended that judges are furnished with 
simple technical reports which explain how the crime has been committed. This would 
assist them when determining whether or not is guilty of the crime. In the alternative, it 
was suggested that technical teams ought to detect the crime for the court and should 
then discuss the crime and evidence in order to convince the judge that the evidence 
incriminates the accused. 
5.2 Summary 
This chapter analysed the interviews with various senior experts who deal with 
cybercrime cases in the UAE, namely the police, the office of prosecution, the judiciary, 
the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority and Interpol. Their particular experiences 
were presented in light of the literature discussed in previous chapters. Problems were 
                                                 
1327 Sections 18(7)(b), 18(8) and 18(9) and s.18(10) of RIPA 
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highlighted with the existing legislative e-crime landscape in the UAE, as well as their 
improvement suggestions. The cybercrime offences legislation was particularly studied 
as this is the main framework. The topics of surveillance, data retention and decryption 
were discussed. It was analysed whether privacy and data protection laws are needed in 
order to heighten network and information security, as well as in light of the new 
preventative policing paradigm. The lack of evidence rules on the admissibility of 
intercept material was also addressed. These topics were understood viewed through the 
lens of e-crime practitioners in the UAE and which further enriched the insights which 
have been gained from the study of the literature in Chapter 1 and the doctrinal analysis 
of the respective legislative frameworks in the UAE and UK. It is against this 
background that the next chapter will spell out recommendations, which are intended to 
strengthen the existing legislative e-crime landscape in order to combat cybercrime 
more effectively in the UAE.  
With these findings in mind, the following chapter concentrates on the legal framework 
the UAE could adopt to strengthen its fight against cybercrime.  
 
 
Chapter Six: Developing a Legal Framework to 
Combat E-Crime in the UAE 
 
6. Introduction 
Having critically and empirically explored how e-crime regulations can be improved to 
combat cybercrime in the UAE in Chapter Five, this chapter presents the legal 
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framework which the UAE could adopt in order to combat e-crime. The 
recommendations are based on the black-letter law analysis and the comparative 
findings, as well as the practical suggestions from the interviews. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, cybercrime is on the increase in the UAE and businesses and individuals 
have been targeted by cyber-criminals. At present, the policing approach is not 
sufficiently proactive and cyber-security risks could therefore be combated more 
effectively. Whilst various steps have already been taken to secure the digital realm, 
challenges still exist. The legal framework is not yet particularly sophisticated when one 
compares it with that of the UK. This is because at present, the main approach has 
simply consisted of criminalising various acts and the response has been reactive. For 
example, investigations only take place when offences are being reported. In contrast, in 
the Western word, predictive and intelligence-led policing facilitated through 
surveillance and data collection and analysis of such big data is being employed to 
secure the digital realm.1328 Such an approach is facilitated by the substantive law, 
which spells out the regime which governs surveillance and data retention, including the 
checks and balances which are required to prevent abuse of powers. Moreover, UK 
privacy and data protection rights provide another layer of protection since they compel 
organisations to pay greater attention to securing personal data. As personal data are the 
target of cyber-criminals in order to commit fraud, a more robust and comprehensive 
approach has been adopted. In contrast, in the UAE data protection has only received 
scant attention and data protection law is not being fully utilised to heighten data 
security. The legal regime of the UK is therefore very different to that in the UAE, also 
                                                 
1328 B. Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement? 266 National Institute of Justice 
Journal 2010, 16-19, 18 
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because much more guidance and legal rules have been developed which inform about 
the relevant procedural rules, which apply to criminal cases that have an e-crime 
element. Much more cooperation also exists within the EU, whereas the regional regime 
in the Gulf States is still in its infancy. The challenge for the UAE is, therefore, to adopt 
a more sophisticated legal framework and the following recommendations are intended 
to assist with this. 
 
6.1 Surveillance: Towards a More Preventative and Intelligence-Led 
Policing Model 
In the context of cybercrime and crime with an e-element, intelligence-led policing is 
arguably the best approach.1329 Intelligence-led policing is future-oriented, as risks and 
issues are analysed and targeted strategies are devised accordingly.1330 The topic of 
crime control is therefore addressed differently than under traditional reactive policing 
approach.1331 This is because the focus is on “forward looking” tactics1332 which are 
more appropriate for cybercrime as these crimes predominantly take place 
anonymously, without any warning and extremely quickly from any location in the 
world. 1333  Intelligence is therefore the only means available in the fight against 
cybercrime.1334 Monitoring by law enforcement agents and the private sector is therefore 
                                                 
1329 M. Dawson, D. R. Kisku, P. Gupta, J. K Sing, W. Li, Developing Next-Generation Countermeasures 
for Homeland Security Threat Prevention (New York, IGI Global 2016) 87 
1330 M. Maguire, T. John, 'Intelligence Led Policing, Managerialism and Community Engagement: 
Competing Priorities and the Role of the National Intelligence Model in the UK' (2006) Policing and 
Society 16(1), 67-85, 67 
1331 Ibid 
1332 Ibid 
1333 M. Dawson, D. R. Kisku, P. Gupta, J. K Sing, W. Li, Developing Next-Generation Countermeasures 
for Homeland Security Threat Prevention (New York, IGI Global 2016) 87 
1334 Ibid 
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unavoidable, as without this it is impossible to deter cyber criminals and to sufficiently 
protect the public and the digital space in advance. The analysis of the UK cybercrime 
framework highlighted that it has whole-heartedly embraced the preventative policing 
approach, which relies heavily on intelligence gathering through mass surveillance. In 
contrast, a much more traditional policing style is still being pursued in the UAE. 
However, this is insufficient for the digital age, as also confirmed by the interviewees 
and the literature. 
The failure to shift towards a new policing model is partly attributable to the fact that the 
UAE has not yet formally equipped law enforcement agencies with the requisite 
surveillance powers. Hence, one significant issue at present is that the UAE’s 
surveillance system has not been sanctioned by law, which is a serious oversight in light 
of the planned expansion of its surveillance capabilities.1335 Article 43 of Federal Law 
No. 5 of 2012 only provides a reactive surveillance power to law enforcement agencies, 
as opposed to a proactive one. In other words, the law does not permit that surveillance 
can be conducted prior to the commission of any offence, but only provides for this once 
offenders have been convicted. This is in marked contrast to the expansive and elaborate 
surveillance powers which, have been granted to many public bodies in the UK, as 
discussed in Chapter Three. The democratic basis is therefore lacking in the UAE to 
conduct mass surveillance through the use of technology, which can flag up suspicious 
activities. As a result, policing effectiveness is undermined since it is more difficult for 
law enforcement agencies to identify whether criminals, as well as spies and terrorists, 
                                                 
1335 Saab, Saab receives order for new advanced airborne surveillance systems from UAE, 10 November 
2015 <http://saabgroup.com/media/news-press/news/2015-11/saab-receives-order-for-new-advanced-
airborne-surveillance-systems-from-uae/> accessed 28th April 2016 
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employ technologies to further their own objectives.1336 Whilst it was pointed out by the 
interviewees that some surveillance takes place, it was acknowledged that without the 
enactment of a surveillance law issues also arise since this contravenes Article 31 of the 
UAE constitution, which guarantees the right to privacy. Without the enactment of a 
surveillance law, the UAE also opens itself up to accusations that the rule of law, as well 
as human rights are not afforded.  
It is for these reasons that urgent recommendations are presented in this chapter, so that 
it is ensured that the e-policing approach is no longer reactionary but up to date with the 
latest technological advances. In this context, it must be emphasised that this particularly 
means utilising “big data” in order to identify potential high risk individuals.1337 In other 
words, it necessitates that personal data is being collected on a mass scale, which in turn 
raises complex right to privacy issues.1338 This also represents a much more technocratic 
policing approach i.e. one which is driven by quantitative assessments performed by 
computers and artificial intelligence programs. 1339  For instance, law enforcement 
agencies in the UAE, could use Clouderaa and Apache Hadoop software packages in 
order to analyse big data more effectively.1340  
Having in mind that the UAE puts greater emphasis on the protection of privacy it is 
likely that the steps I propose will be heavily criticized, therefore it is important for any 
suggestion to carefully scrutinize the steps implemented as well as the proportionality of 
                                                 
1336 C. A. Theohary, J. W. Rollins, Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism: In Brief, Congressional Research 
Services, 27 March 2015, 1-15, 2 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43955.pdf> accessed 3rd September 
2017 
1337 E. E. Joh, 'Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment' (2014) Washington Law 
Review 89, 35-68, 35 
1338 Ibid, 68 
1339 Ibid, 67 
1340 CTOlabs.com, 'White Paper: Big Data Solutions For Law Enforcement', June 2012, 1-8, 1 
<https://theartofservicelab.s3.amazonaws.com/All%20Toolkits/The%20Big%20Data%20Solutions%20To
olkit/Act%20-
%20Recommended%20Reading/Big%20Data%20Solutions%20For%20Law%20Enforcement.pdf> 
accessed 1st September 2017 
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using such steps. For example, the use of the steps may not be appropriate or even 
proportionate in all scenarios, therefore we would have to consider the scenarios in 
which such approach should apply, such as a ‘ticking bomb’ scenario1341.  
Even in the UK, where privacy is does not appear to be as paramount as in the UAE 
back in January the Court of Appeal ruled that the UK’s DRIPA was inconsistent with 
EU law1342. Having in mind that the DRIPA has expired, as indicated above, the Court 
of Appeal’s judgment is important with respect to current surveillance practices and it 
will have a major effect on the successor of DRIPA, the Investigatory Powers Act.  
The DRIPA permitted access to communications data when the objective was not 
restricted solely to fighting serious crime. Additionally, the Court held that DRIPA 
lacked adequate safeguards since it permitted access to communications data without 
subjecting such access to a prior review by a court or independent administrative 
authority, having this in mind I am of the opinion that, with the appropriate safeguards 
and with clear guidelines as to when such approach may be used, my suggestions can be 
implemented in order to lead to an improved legal framework with respect to 
cybercrime.  
The shift in the e-crime policing strategy must firstly be facilitated through the 
enactment of a comprehensive surveillance law, similar to the one which the UK has 
adopted in the form of the RIPA. This would ensure that the interception of 
communications is put on a statutory footing, as also strongly recommended by the 
interviewees. Such a law should spell out which bodies are granted the new policing 
powers. For example, the following provision could be adopted: 
 
“(1) The military, the secret service, police and customs shall be permitted 
to intercept communications; conduct intrusive surveillance; require parties 
to decrypt data; use Covert Human Intelligence Sources; conduct directed 
                                                 
1341 S. Martin, (2016) ‘Spying in a Transparent World: Ethics and Intelligence in the 21st Century’ Geneva 
Papers, 19/16 Research Series.  
1342 SSHD v Watson and Others [2018] EWCA Civ 70. 
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surveillance and acquire communications data; conduct targeted hacking, 
subject to various safeguards. 
(2) Etisalat and the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority shall acquire 
and intercept communications data and can require parties to decrypt data. 
(3) The Dubai Financial Services Authority and the Abu Dhabi Global 
Market Financial Services Regulatory Authority are permitted to make 
decryption requests and can conduct intrusive surveillance. 
(4) The powers spelled out in paragraphs (1)-(3) can be evoked by the 
various bodies if the Ministry of Interior or a federal judge has authorised 
this by signing a warrant or a court order either in advance or subsequently, 
except when the power has been used by the secret service and the military. 
In the latter case, it is sufficient that the Ministry of Defence is notified that 
any of these powers have been exercised.” 
 
Many of the interviewees also cautioned that mass surveillance is a double-edged sword 
since it fundamentally undermines the right to privacy. It is for this reason that it is 
advocated that only law enforcement agencies, the state-owned communications service 
providers and the entities in charge of overseeing the financial system should be 
equipped with these powers. This may prevent that powers are being overused by 
bodies. Otherwise, citizens may feel that their privacy is unduly interfered with, to the 
extent that they feel no longer safe from intrusion in their own homes, especially with 
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the introduction of smart-technology which can also be used for surveillance 
purposes.1343  
 
It is also essential for each of these new types of powers to be clearly defined by the 
UAE surveillance law. An interception could be defined as follows: 
 
“An interception takes place when a communication is accessed by someone 
who is not the recipient or sender of the communication. This can include 
instances where devices are bugged and hacked or contain technology 
which makes interception possible, including on a mass scale.”  
 
The term ‘communication’ should be construed broadly, so that it includes content, 
stored data, such as voices and voice messages, subscriber information (e.g. the name of 
the subscriber and address details), service use information (e.g. information about who 
was called when and for how long, as well as how the web and social and phone media 
is used), as well as traffic data (e.g. information about the place from where the 
communication was sent). 
 
However, the length of time during which these types of communications should be 
available to relevant agencies should be statutorily limited. Hence, data should be 
destroyed promptly after the particular investigatory purpose has been fulfilled. A 
failure to do so could constitute a criminal offence.  
                                                 
1343 T. Timm, The government just admitted it will use smart home devices for spying, The Guardian, 9 
February 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/09/internet-of-things-smart-
devices-spying-surveillance-us-government> accessed 2nd September 2017 
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The term ‘surveillance’ must also be statutorily defined, for example, as “any action 
which is taken, including through any technological means, which results in the 
communications, activities, conversations or whereabouts of persons being listened to, 
observed or recorded.” A surveillance law ought to permit both intrusive and directed 
surveillance. Each type of surveillance should be defined, for instance, as: 
  
“(a) An intrusive surveillance takes place when the private property of a 
person is being entered in order to install a device.1344 
(b) A directed surveillance takes place when a person’s activities, 
conversations or movements are being monitored.” 
 
The meaning of the term Covert Human Intelligence Sources should also be defined, as 
follows: 
 
“Using an individual to create a relationship with someone in order to gain 
information or access information.” 
The term decryption must also be explained in the proposed surveillance law, for 
example, in the following manner:  
 
“Decryption means requiring those who can be suspected to have the key 
for an encrypted device to disclose this key so that the device can be 
accessed.” 
                                                 
1344 D. Anderson, A Question Of Trust (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office 2015) 143  
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Those empowered to make use of this decryption power should be expressly specified in 
the law. It must also be addressed what happens when there is a failure to comply with a 
request to provide a key or password: Firstly, it must be ensured that those requested to 
comply with a decryption request do not inform the password/key holder that they have 
provided access. This can be achieved by requiring them to sign an undertaking to that 
effect. Secondly, compliance must be promoted with decryption requests by rendering a 
failure to comply illegal. The applicable fine and sentence must therefore be stipulated 
by the surveillance law. A suspect who is required to provide a password, but who 
refuses to do so could receive a harsher sentence and/or fine. Hence, a refusal to comply 
with a decryption request by a defendant could be considered an aggravating factor. This 
would heighten deterrence. Additionally, law enforcement agencies could be permitted 
to conduct cyber-attacks in order to gain access to encrypted contents. Yet the latter 
leads down a slippery slope since it opens the door to abuse which is very difficult to 
monitor. However, this could be addressed by the above-mentioned safeguards which 
could apply to equipment interferences which could also be used to gain access to 
encrypted data. 
 
When the national security of the UAE is also under threat, the secret service and 
military ought to be entitled to conduct targeted hacks. Put differently, they should be 
able to interfere with the equipment of cyber criminals, for example, when there is a 
suspicion that they plan to attack a vital infrastructure of the UAE, such as the soon to 
335 
 
be completed nuclear power station in Barakah. Such a provision could be worded as 
follows: 
 
“The secret service and military can conduct equipment interferences in 
circumstances when there exists a reasonable suspicion that criminals or 
other rogue agents plan to attack the UAE or important infrastructure or to 
conduct acts of terrorism, subject to this having been authorised by the 
Ministry of Defence and a panel of specially appointed judges.” 
 
Moreover, an oversight regime must be created when these different law enforcement 
powers are being evoked. The Ministry of Interior or a federal judge hearing cases in a 
secret court1345 could be entitled to grant a warrant or approve the use of these powers 
through an authorisation or court order when this is necessary to protect the national 
security, to promote the economic well-being or to combat and investigate serious crime 
in the UAE. In the case of an equipment interference, oversight is best ensured through 
the Ministry of Defence and a panel of specially appointed judges. 
 
A provision which contains a non-exhaustive list of the types of crimes which should be 
considered serious, such as attacking critical state infrastructure, ought to be also 
inserted into the surveillance law. In the alternative, any offence which attracts a 
sentence of at last three years could be considered serious, except in respect of 
equipment interferences for which a much higher threshold would have to be met. 
                                                 
1345 W. W. Keller, Democracy Betrayed: The Rise of the Surveillance Security State (Berkeley, 
Counterpoint 2017) 43 
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The adoption of a provision in these terms ought to also contain a sub-paragraph with a 
proportionality and necessity requirement. In other words, the Ministry of Interior or a 
federal judge - or in the case of an equipment interference, the Ministry of Defence and 
the panel of specially appointed judges - should consider whether the requested power is 
necessary to realise the stated aim or goes above what is necessary. If the latter is the 
case, then a warrant or court order should only be issued for a less intrusive power. Yet 
when a warrant or court order is only sought subsequently, the power has already been 
exercised. In such instances, the Ministry of Interior or a federal judge ought to be 
entitled to impose certain conditions in respect of how the obtained evidence can be 
used if they deem this essential in order to protect the due process rights of the 
defendant. 
 
A less stringent authorisation regime should be adopted for Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources, directed surveillance and the acquisition of communications data. This is 
because the intrusion is less severe than when intrusive surveillance takes place. A list 
should be drawn up of those public agencies which are granted these particular powers. 
A less stringent authorisation regime could be adopted. The head of the various public 
bodies could be empowered to approve use of these powers when this is important to 
safeguard national security; to preserve national unity; to protect the economy; to 
safeguard public health and safety; and for any other purpose approved by decree. 
However, even the requirement to obtain a warrant or court order may not be sufficient 
to prevent that these far-reaching powers are not abused. This is because requests by law 
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enforcement agencies may just be rubber-stamped i.e. may never be denied. One way to 
overcome this issue is to further subject the surveillance regime to judicial oversight, as 
the case in the UK. In the UK, various commissioners have been appointed, as well as a 
tribunal. Such a set up ensures that abuse of powers and human rights are curtailed. The 
adoption of a surveillance law therefore also requires that a new office and tribunal are 
created, which is entrusted with overseeing that any surveillance law is being complied 
with and also in a way which complies with the rights conferred by the UAE 
constitution and the Sharia. This would go some way to create a checks and balances 
system.  
 
Surveillance is only useful if data is also retained, as it is unrealistic to expect law 
enforcement agencies to immediately evaluate the information which is being obtained 
through the surveillance. It is for this reason essential that the topic of data retention is 
also addressed. The interviewees also agreed that data retention is of great importance in 
the detection of cybercrime. The UK has therefore adopted specific legislation which 
spells out the legal parameters of the data retention regime, as discussed in chapter three. 
However, as observed in chapter four, there exists no such law in the UAE. It is for this 
reason proposed that the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority issues regulations 
which impose a legal obligation to retain historical data, such as unsuccessful phone 
calls, IP addresses, email and location data, as well as how the web and social and phone 
media is used. Such data should be retained in an easily accessible format. Such a duty 
will help law enforcement agents to protect the “national security, defence, public 
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security or the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences 
of unauthorised use of the electronic communications system.”1346 
 
The telecommunications service provider Emirates Telecommunications Corporation 
(Etisalat), telecom operator Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company (Du) 
and ISPs should therefore be required by law to retain data and to make it available to 
law enforcement agents when they request this. They would therefore have to retain data 
and could be sanctioned for a failure to ensure this. Hence, these organisations could be 
responsible for creating bulk personal datasets. These datasets could be further enriched 
through private and public partnerships, as further discussed below. 
 
However, as access to this data violates Article 31 of the UAE constitution, it is 
important that access is not granted point blank. It should therefore be also rendered a 
criminal offence for employees of these organisations and unauthorised persons to 
unlawfully access retained data. Whilst Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 and Federal Law by 
Decree No. 3 of 2003 on Telecom Law can be construed to apply to these types of cases, 
it would be better to address these types of cases through a specific provision. For 
instance, a provision could be adopted which delineates that: 
“Employees and others performing services for Etisalat, DU and ISPS and 
who have access to retained data are not allowed to access the retained data 
without being authorised. A breach of this provision attracts a minimum fine 
                                                 
1346 Article 15 of the now defunct European Union Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector; C. Walker, Terrorism 
and the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2011) 75 
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of 18,000 AED and/or a minimum prison sentence of three months which in 
serious cases of unauthorised access can be extended to up to ten years.” 
 
However, a defence of an implied authorisation from a superior should be added. This 
would allow that those who merely follow instructions from superiors are not unfairly 
punished.  
 
A special authorisation regime must also be detailed, which law enforcement agents 
would have to follow in order to request access. The access grounds could be to protect 
the national security, to promote the economic well-being or to combat and investigate 
serious crime. These could constitute objective criteria against which access grounds can 
be assessed. For instance, a request to investigate a traffic violation could not be 
justified. Additionally, it could be required that the access request is limited to a 
particular time period, restricted to a geographical area or an individual or particular 
group of individuals. However, access should be automatically provided when 
technology flags up suspicious conduct, which exceeds a certain threshold. Human 
feedback could be also given after cases have been automatically identified through data 
analysis software. This would help to assess to what extent the software is useful in 
combating cybercrime. 
 
Exceptions must also be devised in urgent cases where cyber attacks pose the risk of 
loss of life, serious damage to national security, serious injury or illness. However, it 
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could be made a requirement to subsequently provide written justifications for the 
request. 
 
It is recommended that no manual process should be used, but instead a technical 
platform appears better with a built-in procedure to make access requests. Each access 
request could thereby be permanently recorded on this platform and officers or artificial 
intelligence powered software could provide the reasons why access requests were 
sought.  
 
A commissioner could be appointed at the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority 
with quasi-judicial functions and who could oversee the access requests and 
automatically flagged up cases. Such a commissioner would thus be in charge of 
scrutinising whether access is too-far reaching. The commissioner could issue guidance 
to law enforcement agents on how to use the power to access retained data and could 
award damages to individuals in case of serious privacy violations. Privacy undertakings 
could be imposed on those individuals who are being awarded damages in order to 
protect the work of law enforcement agencies. The commissioner could also be 
responsible for liaising with technology companies which make available the data 
analysis technology in case too many cases are being flagged up arbitrarily.  
 
Law enforcement agencies responsible for serious breaches could also be fined and 
individual officers could be reprimanded.  Such an approach would overcome some of 
the issue encountered with data retention in Europe where the Court of Justice of the 
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European Union declared the data retention regime unlawful. This was because the 
interference with privacy rights was disproportionate. In other words, by requiring that 
access requests are made and by examining who is flagged up automatically by 
technology, it is ensured that individuals do not have to fear that their entire private lives 
are constantly under surveillance or they are not unfairly identified as potential suspects. 
This is because retained data would not be accessed by law enforcement agents, except 
in specific cases where this is necessary and a proportionate response in relation to a 
suspected threat or crime. Furthermore, particular persons could be appointed from 
different public bodies and who could make these access requests or who receive the 
automatic software notifications about potential suspects. These individuals could be 
trained in privacy and data protection and anti-discrimination laws. This may go some 
way to ensure that access requests are not being abused and that technology does not 
result in unfair profiling of certain groups. 
 
Moreover, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority should carefully consider for 
how long data should be retained. In Europe, the length used to be set at six months and 
up to two years.1347 In the UK, this was shortened to twelve months. The interviewees 
explained that a longer period is obviously more useful for law enforcement agents, 
though they also recommended to have regard to the data retention period which has 
been adopted by other countries. 
 
                                                 
1347 C. R. Martin, S. L. Weakley, Internet Law and Practice in California (Oakland, CEB 2015) 
para.21.18A 
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Apart from these steps, a legislative debate must also take place since the internet of 
things makes it possible to spy on a much-larger scale than ever before.1348 For instance, 
Samsung's Smart TV captures whatever users talk about in their homes through voice 
recognition technology and various other devices, such as Xbox Kinect, have built-in 
listening devices.1349 This is a severe violation of the right to privacy and companies 
should not be allowed to collect such highly sensitive and private communications. Yet 
law enforcement agents may want to have access in appropriate cases. In other words, it 
is important that guidance is issued for companies which sell products with built-in 
listening devices, so that Article 31 of the UAE constitution is not violated. 
  
It must also be addressed how it is ensured that law enforcement agencies have access to 
such communications, as such data is certainly extremely valuable to combat crime, 
including cybercrime. The question of whether foreign companies which sell these 
products within the UAE should be able to spy on UAE residents must also be 
discussed. Whilst the terms and conditions for these products may disclose that the 
devices are being used for these purposes1350, it is debatable whether this complies with 
privacy rights. This is because these practices constitute an interception and so long as 
this is not sanctioned by law, it should constitute an offence pursuant to Federal Law 
No. 5 of 2012 and which cannot be circumvented through a contractual provision.  
 
                                                 
1348 Ibid 
1349 Ibid 
1350 T. Timm, The government just admitted it will use smart home devices for spying, The Guardian, 9 
February 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/09/internet-of-things-smart-
devices-spying-surveillance-us-government> accessed 2nd September 2017 
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Equally, it is important that privacy guidance is published for social media companies, 
such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, which analyse private data and use it for 
commercial purposes.1351 Such an approach is important as frequently these social media 
companies work together with other companies, such as Geofeedia, a private company, 
which provides surveillance services available to over 500 US law enforcement 
bodies.1352 Again whilst the terms and conditions to which users must agree may provide 
for this, such practices highlight that the right of privacy has become much more elusive 
in the digital age. 
Yet in order to avoid criticism of unconstitutional law enforcement behaviour, it is 
important for the surveillance law to also address in which circumstances corporations 
can employ technology for surveillance purposes. One such condition should be that this 
is only done to assist law enforcement bodies. Access must also be restricted to law 
enforcement agents. In the EU, it was announced in May 2017 that the European 
Commission will spell out new powers for law enforcement officers, so that they can 
access even encrypted data, e.g. on WhatsApp. This may be achieved through legal 
rules, but also through the conclusion of private agreements between businesses and law 
enforcement agencies.1353  
 
The surveillance law should therefore also permit law enforcement agencies to require 
private and public bodies to provide access to their data in real-time and to feed this into 
                                                 
1351 D. Cameron, Dozens of police-spying tools remain after Facebook, Twitter crack down on Geofeedia, 
The Daily Dot, 11 October 2016 <https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/geofeedia-twitter-facebook-
instagram-social-media-surveillance/> accessed 1st September 2017 
1352 Ibid 
1353 C. Stupp, EU to propose new rules targeting encrypted apps in June, 29 March 20017 
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/data-protection/news/eu-to-propose-new-rules-on-police-access-to-
encrypted-data-in-june/> accessed 1st September 2017 
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a data fusion centre.1354 For example, the FBI employs data fusion i.e. feeds data from 
the private and public sector into one place in order to generate useful intelligence 
through big data analysis.1355 
For this purpose, UAE law enforcement agents could enter into private and confidential 
agreements. However, such private sector cooperation must also be closely supervised. 
This is because technology is not error proof and arbitrary conclusions may be drawn 
which disadvantage certain individuals.1356 
 
Law enforcement agents should therefore only access data in particular cases (e.g. when 
they investigate serious crime or this is necessary to protect the national security or the 
economy or public health), despite the fact that data is being collected about everyone. 
Technology would also alert them automatically when suspicious behaviour is being 
flagged up.  The relevant provision in the surveillance law could be worded in the 
following terms: 
 
(1) “The military, the secret service and police are empowered to gain 
access to data sets held by businesses and public bodies and which they can 
feed into a data fusion center. 
                                                 
1354 D. Lambert, 'Intelligence-Led Policing in a Fusion Center', Federal Bureau of Investigation, December 
2010 <https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/december/intelligence-led-policing-in-a-fusion-center> accessed 1st 
September 2017 
1355 Ibid 
1356 Statewatch, 'Note on big data, crime and security: Civil liberties, data protection and privacy concerns, 
3 April 2014, 1-6, 6 <http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-242-big-data.pdf> accessed 1st September 
2017 
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(2) For these purposes, they can enter into private and confidential 
agreements in order to acquire or have access to data in real-time for 
intelligence-led policing purposes. 
(3) These private and confidential agreements must be provided to the 
Ministry of Interior alongside a regularly updated list of those individuals 
which have been flagged up by intelligence software as high risk through the 
analysis of the various data sets. 
(4) A special committee must be convened at the Ministry of Interior which is 
responsible for scrutinising on a regular basis whether those individuals 
which are identified as high-risk are being unfairly discriminated or denied 
any particular rights. Recommendations must be made to law enforcement 
agencies in cases of less favourable treatment which cannot be justified in 
the name of national security.” 
 
Such a provision would go some way to address criticism about the indiscriminate use 
of mass surveillance facilitated through “big data approaches.”1357 
 
Data transfer agreements should also be entered into with other countries, as cybercrime 
often takes place across borders. Otherwise, there exists the risk that cybercrime cannot 
be fully investigated, despite mass surveillance. As discussed, in chapter three the UK 
has operated a “worldwide spying network” through Echelon1358 and recently adopted 
                                                 
1357 Ibid, 1 
1358 S. Millar, R. Norton-Taylor, I. Black, Worldwide spying network is revealed, The Guardian, 26 May 
2001 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/may/26/richardnortontaylor.ianblack> accessed 1st 
September 2017 
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the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which further permits to intercept communications 
data worldwide.1359 However, it is argued that such an approach would be inappropriate 
for the UAE since it interferes with the sovereignty of other nations. It is therefore 
recommended that the better approach is to enter into data transfer agreements or 
treaties with other countries in order to obtain data, except in extremely serious, but 
isolated cases where an equipment interference is necessary in order to protect the 
national security of the UAE. The enactment of surveillance powers also requires that 
the relationship with the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy is clarified, as 
discussed in the following section.  
 
6.2 Privacy, Data Protection and Security 
One fundamental problem is that surveillance powers interfere with the right to privacy 
and data protection. ‘O’Leary argues that ‘[t]he risk of abuse is considered inherent in 
any system of secret or mass surveillance and such systems clearly interfere with rights 
to privacy and data protection’1360. However, by adopting a statutory regime which also 
contains various safeguards, it can be ensured that privacy and data intrusions are 
minimised. In other words, mass interception and surveillance by itself may not breach 
privacy and data protection rights, so long as law enforcement officers access data in 
limited cases where this is a proportionate and necessary response in order to combat 
crime or to ensure public security. This is because the right to privacy is no absolute 
                                                 
1359 J. Vincent, The UK now wields unprecedented surveillance powers - here's what it means, The Verge, 
29 November 2016 <https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/23/13718768/uk-surveillance-laws-explained-
investigatory-powers-bill> accessed 1st September 2017 
1360 S. O’Leary (2018) ‘Balancing rights in a digital age’ Irish Jurist, 59, 59-92. 
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human right.1361 As discussed in Chapter Four, like the UK, the UAE guarantees the 
right to privacy by virtue of Article 31 of the constitution, Article 378 of the Federal 
Law 3 of 1987 (Penal Code) and Article 21 of Federal Decree Law No. 5 of 2012 on 
Combating Cybercrimes and to a lesser extent affords data protection rights, though 
mainly in respect of entities which operate in the Dubai International Financial Centre. 
Yet Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 fails to state what is meant by ‘privacy.’ In contrast, the 
analysis of the UK legal framework showed that much more legal guidance exists in 
order to interpret the right to privacy, so that this right is less elusive than in the UAE.  
 
Furthermore, whilst Articles 372 and 373 of Federal Law No.3 of 1987 (the penal code) 
require that it is shown that a defendant had an intention to cause harm or to disclose 
private information, this is not required by Federal Law No. 5 of 2012. It is also not 
clear how the constitutional right to privacy in Article 31 of the UAE should be 
interpreted in the context of e-crimes. One issue which can arise as a result of this is that 
harmless social media posts are being caught by Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 and result in 
criminal convictions.1362 This is because Article 21 criminalises  
 
“(1) Eavesdropping, interception, recording, transferring, transmitting or 
disclosure of conversations or communications or audio or visual materials.  
(2) Photographing others or creating, transferring, disclosing, copying or 
saving electronic photos.  
                                                 
1361 E. Claes, A. Duff, S. Gutwirth, Privacy and the Criminal Law (Oxford, Intersentia 2006) 74 
1362 Clifford Chance, The right to privacy online in the UAE - To post or not to post? Briefing Note, 
February 2016, 1-3, 2 
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(3) Publishing news, electronic photos or photographs, scenes, comments, 
statements or information even if true and correct.” 
 
As it has become a normal occurrence to record and photographs and to publish such 
media on sites, such as Facebook, it appears that the provision is too far-reaching in 
scope and can be used to convict innocent individuals. Another issue is that merely 
photographing others, even without publication, constitutes an offence.1363 For instance, 
a person who takes a selfie in a public space and also photographs a third person may 
open him/herself up to potentially being prosecuted for a criminal offence. This is a too 
draconian approach which creates legal uncertainty. It is desirable that the mens rea 
requirement in the penal code is extended to Article 21 of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012. 
This would ensure that Article 21 has no overreach. In the alternative, it could be 
considered whether breaches of the right to privacy should be decriminalised. In other 
words, a violation of the human right to privacy would only result in the award of civil 
remedies. If such a stance was favoured, it would be important to remove the privacy 
provisions from Federal Law No. 5 of 2012. Such clarifications may also help to ensure 
that the right to privacy is more aligned with that of Western states.  
 
Apart from sufficiently clarifying and fleshing out the concept of privacy, personal data 
and data protection, another challenge for UAE courts and academics is to develop the 
requisite jurisprudence in the context of balancing privacy against security interests. One 
way to commence the debate about the right to privacy and security would be to amend 
Article 31 of the UAE constitution. This Article currently provides that “[f]reedom of 
                                                 
1363 Ibid 
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communication  by  means  of  the  posts,  telegraph  or  other  means  of 
communication and their secrecy shall be guaranteed in accordance with the law.” 
However, it is unclear to what extent adoption of a law can abrogate the right to freely 
communicate in secret. 
 
In contrast, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is more elaborate 
since sub-paragraph 2 not only mandates that any interference must be in accordance 
with the law, but also “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.” This provides a better yardstick for judges to balance 
privacy rights against security interests. It would therefore be useful if an additional 
caveat similar to that contained in Article 8(2) of the ECHR was added to Article 31 of 
the UAE constitution. However, security should not be viewed as the ultimate trump 
card, as it otherwise may promote the creation of a totalitarian regime. The interviewees 
also cautioned against mass surveillance becoming the ‘new normal’, as this effectively 
means no longer guaranteeing the human right to privacy. Instead, the starting point 
should be that the right to privacy, as well as the right to liberty and security constitute 
two equally important human rights.1364 One important consideration which UAE judges 
should take into account when balancing privacy rights against security interests, is to 
consider how serious an offence is.1365 Arguably, only serious offences justify that the 
                                                 
1364 S. Stalla-Bourdillon, J. Phillips, M. D. Ryan, Privacy vs. Security (London, Springer 2014) 65 
1365 Ibid 
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right to privacy is being interfered with.1366 For instance, when the offence is cyber 
terrorism then it is clearly a proportionate response to interfere with the personal privacy 
of the suspect.1367 This is because public security it at stake. However, the same appears 
not to be a proportionate response in the case of harassment where surveillance does not 
appear justified. Apart from considering whether the procedural safeguards spelt out in 
any surveillance law have been complied with, as well as the seriousness of the offence, 
UAE judges should also consider how sensitive the personal data is which has been 
collected.1368 
 
Moreover, the literature review in Chapter One highlighted that the UK’s data protection 
regime is much more far-reaching than in the UAE.  All entities which collect personal 
data must comply with the Data Protection Act 1998. As a result, businesses are legally 
compelled to safeguard personal data. In this way, privacy and data protection are 
reconciled with cyber security. 1369  This is also the case because data processing 
exceptions have been created for the police and judiciary.1370 
 
In contrast, in the UAE individuals have not been afforded data protection rights and 
remedies, except when breaches have been committed in respect of credit information or 
by financial institutions which operate in the DIFC, as identified in Chapter four. The 
concept of data protection should therefore be developed. The interviewees also strongly 
                                                 
1366 Ibid 
1367 Ibid 
1368 Ibid 
1369 M. G. Porcedda, Data Protection and the Prevention of Cybercrime: The EU as an Area of Security? 
EUI Working Papers, 2012/25, 1-90, 5 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/23296/LAW-2012-
25.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 3rd September 2017 
1370 Article 5 of Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of 
personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
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recommended that the topic of data protection should receive more attention. This is 
because data protection and cyber security are “two sides of the same coin.”1371 For the 
UAE, this means firstly extending the existing data protection law which applies to the 
Dubai International Financial Centre to the UAE as a whole. Such an approach would 
also close one of the current gaps highlighted by the interviewees, namely that data 
collection by companies is unregulated. This in turn is likely to indirectly promote 
digital security and may thereby reduce the occurrence of cybercrime. However, 
exceptions should be stipulated for law enforcement agents, but which are not excessive, 
so that that private and personal data is safeguarded, but without this adversely affecting 
policing operations.  
 
Additionally, law enforcement agents could adopt a privacy policy, as recommended by 
the interviews. This may help to ensure that the various surveillance powers are not used 
in a way which marginalises the right to privacy and data protection.  Communications 
service providers could report breaches within 24 hours to the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority and inform data subjects about the privacy and/or personal data 
breach. In turn, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority could immediately alert 
law enforcement agencies about the security breach, which may help to avert 
cybercrime which may be perpetrated with the private and personal data from the 
security breach. This may help law enforcement agents to take preventive and pre-
emptive steps. 
 
                                                 
1371 V. Reding, The EU's Data Protection rules and Cyber Security Strategy: two sides of the same coin, 
European Commission, 2013 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-436_en.htm> accessed 
30 June 2014 
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Whilst these legal reforms are undoubtedly imperative, the right to privacy could also 
strengthened by a regulatory requirement which mandates that organisations employ 
“privacy enhancing technologies.” 1372  Privacy-enhancing technology safeguards 
personal identity through organisational structures and technology, such as encryption, 
spyware and virus protection, privacy policies, anonymous proxies. 1373  Such a 
technocratic requirement could be phased in and firstly be imposed on organisations 
which deal with sensitive personal data.1374 In other words, citizens’ privacy could be 
protected through regulatory technical guidelines and standards.1375 This is likely to 
result in a shift in approach by businesses which engage in data mining or which 
manufacture interception technologies. 1376  This is because they are currently not 
incentivised to protect privacy. 1377  However, by imposing a legal or regulatory 
requirement that devices, e.g. with built-in listening devices, such as SmartTVs, have 
privacy enhancing technologies embedded, they would be compelled to internalise 
privacy.1378 Surveillance capacity could thus become curtailed through technological 
and legal restrictions, which in turn will help to respect the human right to privacy, as 
well as the related right to data protection.1379 The governing principles on which such 
restrictions could be built is that of minimal data retention, data minimisation and 
                                                 
1372 B. Akhgar, B. Brewster, Combatting Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Challenges, Trends and 
Priorities (London, Springer 2016) 286 
1373 C. Fuchs, K. Boersma, A. Albrechtslund, M. Sandoval, Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of 
Web 2.0 and Social Media (Abingdon, Routledge 2012) 20 
1374 B. Akhgar, B. Brewster, Combatting Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Challenges, Trends and 
Priorities (London, Springer 2016) 286 
1375 European Central Bank, Forum on the Security of Retail Payments - SecureRe Pay, 2017 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/pol/forum/html/index.en.html> accessed 2nd September 2017 
1376 B. J. Goold, D. Neyland, New Directions in Surveillance Privacy (Abingdon, Routledge 2009) 29 
1377 Ibid 
1378 Ibid 
1379 Ibid, 30 
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“minimal data sharing and processing” i.e. data sharing in accordance with a “legally 
justifiable purpose.”1380 
 
Edgar also argues that people often wrongly agree that privacy must be sacrified in order 
to achieve security, but observes that such a conclusion is only reached because people 
“are not aware of privacy-enhancing technology” which can “mitigate such trade-
offs.”1381  By adopting a private sector online identity management system with inbuilt 
privacy safeguards cybersecurity monitoring (i.e. mass surveillance) becomes less of a 
controversial topic. 1382  Practically, this means creating an online identity akin to a 
passport or identity card and no longer making use of passwords, so that online 
transactions are confirmed by a robust identity assurance.1383 This will help to increase 
privacy and security. One crucial recommendation is therefore for the UAE legislator to 
create a digital identity for UAE citizens and residents. For example, the Swiss town of 
Zug recently announced that it will provide digital identities for its residents through an 
app which “secures personal information using blockchain technology and associates it 
with a crypto address.”1384 Such an approach would also accord with the latest trends in 
cyber security, as presented at the Digital Identity Summit which took place this 
                                                 
1380 Ibid, 31 
1381 T. Edgar, 'The US Privacy Strategy' in (eds) D. Aspinall, J. Camenisch, M. Hansen, S. Fischer-
Hubner, C. Raab, Privacy and Identity Management, Time for a Revolution? (London, Springer 2016) 20 
1382 Ibid, 21 
1383 Ibid, 27 
1384 B. Vitaris, Swiss "Crypto Valley" to Create Digital Identities for Its Citizens on the Ethereum 
Blockchain, Bitcoin Magazine 13 July 2017 <https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/swiss-crypto-valley-
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September in San Francisco and will take place in Paris in 2018.1385 Digital identity can 
also facilitate e-government services of which policing is one.1386  
As of the 25th of May 2018 data protections changes in the UK and in the EU in general, 
as the EU General Data Protection Regulation ("the GDPR') enters into force, ‘The 
GDPR is designed to protect and empower all EU citizen's data privacy, and to reshape 
the way organisations across the region approach data privacy. Following the UK's 
departure from the EU, the GDPR provisions will be retained in UK law by cl 3 of the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which incorporates EU law into domestic law. To give 
effect to the GDPR, the Government introduced the Data Protection Bill 2017 ("the Bill') 
into the House of Lords on 13 September 2017. Domestically, this legislation will replace 
the Data Protection Act 1998.’1387 
The first commentaries published with respect to the newly implemented regulation are 
far from positive, arguing that ‘The regulation does little to change the way cookies 
monitor us on a site. You’ll be tracked and manipulated just like before.’ 1388 
 
 
6.3 Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning Combating Information 
Technology Crimes 
Overall the interviewees thought that Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 ensures that most 
cybercrime offences are covered. The analysis of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 also 
                                                 
1385 Digital Identity Summit 2017, The Currency of Trust, 2017 <https://digitalidentitysummit.com/> 
accessed 2nd September 2017 
1386 M. Ienco, Digital identity as a key enabler for e-government services, Mobile Connect, 2016, 1-8, 1 
<https://www.gsma.com/identity/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/MWCB16-Digital-Identity-as-a-Key-
Enabler-for-eGovernment-Services-Marta-Ienco.pdf> accessed 1st September 2017 
1387 -- (2018) ‘Legislative Comment: Data Protection Bill 2017’, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Law 32(2) 98-99. 
1388 M. Dixon, (2018) ‘GDPR should have made cookies toast’, Fortune, 
<http://fortune.com/2018/05/24/gdpr-data-privacy-cookies/> accessed 22 June 2018.  
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showed that many different types of acts are outlawed. Yet some Articles are rather 
broad in scope, namely Articles 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9, as no distinction is drawn between 
using off-shore virtual private network (VPN) and hacking. Use of VPNs should not 
attract the same sentence, as hacking since the latter is clearly a much more serious 
offence. It should also not be deemed illegal to record a conversation, but instead a more 
nuanced approach should be adopted. In other words, consent should constitute a 
defence when a person records another or the circumstances are such that it appears 
warranted to make a recording, e.g. when a person possesses no men rea to commit a 
criminal offence. 
 
Another issue with Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 is that the provisions, e.g. Articles 20, 28 
and 29, are vague and far-reaching and as a result, they can be applied in a way which 
contravenes free speech. Guidance should be issued, so that lawful criticism can be 
distinguished from unlawful defamation. In this context, it is also noteworthy that the 
UN Special Rapporteur called on states not to use criminal sentences for defamation, but 
to instead employ civil law, as for instance, the UK does.1389 The legislator should 
therefore consider decriminalising defamation and to consider this a civil case for which 
damages can be sought, as opposed to imposing criminal sanctions.1390 Otherwise, the 
criticism that free speech is under attack may likely persist, which may not help to 
ensure that a progressive image is fully created.1391  
                                                 
1389 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right 
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1391 Human Rights Watch, UAE: Cybercrimes Decree Attacks Free Speech, 28 November 2012 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/28/uae-cybercrimes-decree-attacks-free-speech> accessed 1st 
September 2017 
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Moreover, Chapter Four also identified that Article 47 of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 
only confers extra-territoriality when a cybercrime is directed against the state. As this 
greatly diminishes the effectiveness of the cybercrime provisions, it is important that 
Article 47 is revised, so that it ensured that all crime is considered a local matter.1392 
This would also align Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 with Article 23 of the Penal Code 
which allows the Public Prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against a person 
who commits a crime in a foreign country. 
In the alternative, a threshold amount could be stipulated and certain offences could be 
classified as serious, so that in these instances the concept of extra-territoriality would 
apply automatically. However, as observed by the interviewees extra-territoriality also 
requires cooperation from other states. One way to signify that the UAE affords 
cooperation to other states would be to make clear that UAE nationals can be prosecuted 
for cybercrimes even if they do not reside in the UAE and the offence is one which the 
UAE also criminalises, despite it not being directed against the UAE. The analysis of the 
UK legal framework showed that such an approach has been adopted.1393 
 
Yet this alone is insufficient and extradition treaties must also be entered into with other 
countries, particularly those in which many cybercrime criminals reside, in order to 
ensure that the extra-territoriality concept is not only a theoretical concept. However, it 
is unlikely that countries will extradite persons for matters which are not considered 
                                                 
1392 R. Broadhurst, P. Grabosky, Cyber-Crime: The Challenge in Asia (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press 2005) 154 
1393 S.5(1a) and (1B) of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
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criminal, especially defamation cases and privacy breaches. This further supports the 
above recommendation to remove defamation and privacy violations from Federal Law 
No. 5 of 2012. Otherwise, it could be made clear that extradition cannot be sought for 
these types of cases i.e. these cases should not pass the requisite threshold to be 
considered sufficiently serious to warrant extradition. This is because it is unlikely that 
these types of extradition requests will be granted. 
 
Moreover, Federal Law No.3 of 1987 (the penal code) requires that crimes are notified 
and it would be useful for Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 to also contain a provision which 
requires businesses and organisations to notify cybercrimes in excess of a certain 
threshold. This alongside a requirement for communications service providers to report 
data protection breaches within 24 hours to the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authority and to inform data subjects about the privacy and/or personal data breach, as 
recommended above, may ensure that the topics of cybercrime and cyber security 
receive more attention by enforcement agents. 
 
Another deficiency of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 is that it does not outlaw intellectual 
property crime. This kind of crime can be perpetrated through copyright infringement, 
piracy and counterfeiting of patents and trademarks.1394 For instance, operating websites 
to advertise counterfeit goods or pirated software and movies could be criminalised. 
Organised criminals are particularly involved in this very lucrative market which takes 
                                                 
1394 B. Zagaris, International White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials (2nd ed, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2015) 623 
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place on an enormous scale.1395 Interpol has therefore also created a special contact 
point to assist law enforcement agents.1396 As the UAE has been identified as one of the 
“main hubs for fake trade”1397 this would be a further stepping stone to address this 
issue. Also, as software piracy (i.e. unlicensed software) particularly renders 
organisations and individuals more vulnerable to cybercrime since it often contains 
malware, this would also be another measure to combat cybercrime.1398 
 
Another limitation of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 is that there is no specific crime for 
launching cyber attacks against critical infrastructure. Contrariwise, the UK has adopted 
such a provision.1399 It would be better if a provision was added which specifically 
covers situations where computers are impaired in order to cause serious damage or the 
risk of serious damage to UAE’s national security, the economy, the environment or 
human welfare of private and state-owned critical infrastructure. UAE academics and 
professionals also support such a recommendation. 
 
6.4 The Criminal Procedure Law and Procedural Rules Governing 
Electronic Evidence 
The analysis of the Criminal Procedural Law Federal Law No. 35 of 1992 in Chapter 
Four showed that it is inadequate for the digital age. This is because there exist no 
                                                 
1395 Ibid 
1396 Ibid 
1397 K. Megget, Hong Kong, Singapore and UAE main hubs for fake trade, Securing Industry, 23 June 
2017 <https://www.securingindustry.com/hong-kong-singapore-and-uae-main-hubs-for-fake-
trade/s111/a4881/#.Wbxc89HTXIU> accessed 2nd September 2017 
1398 J. Gassen, E. Gerhards-Padilla, P. Martini, 'Botnets: How to Fight the Ever-Growing Threat on a 
Technical Level' in (eds) H. Tiirmaa-Klaar, J. Gassen, E. Gerhards-Padilla, P. Martini, Botnets (London, 
Springer 2013) 45 
1399 S.3ZA of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
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special procedural rules for electronic evidence, investigative, measures, third party 
cooperation duties, jurisdiction and international cooperation. 1400  However, at the 
regional level Articles 22 to 29 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information 
Technology Offences 2010 spell procedural rules, but these have not yet been fully 
transposed.  
 
It is therefore crucial that this oversight is urgently remedied. Firstly, standard 
procedures for the collection, preservation and presentation of electronic evidence are 
required, so that evidence is not declared inadmissible.1401 As discussed in chapter three, 
in the UK the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) has published the Good Practice 
Guide for Digital Evidence, the Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic 
Evidence and the Good Practice Guide for Managers of E-Crime Investigation. 
Similarly, UAE police should promulgate guidelines which spell out the relevant 
technical procedures for digital evidence, computer-based electronic evidence and those 
who conduct investigations with an e-crime element. At the core of these guidelines 
should be to ensure that data is not changed, but kept intact.1402 This must also be 
guaranteed when original data is being accessed by law enforcement agents.1403 Officers 
must therefore be able to explain and testify that their actions have not affected the 
                                                 
1400  K. A. Aljneibi, The Regulation of Electronic Evidence in the United Arab Emirates: Current 
Limitations and Proposals for Reform, PhD Thesis, February 2014, 1-326, 194 
<http://e.bangor.ac.uk/4992/1/Aljneibi%20khaled%20thesis.pdf> accessed 15th February 2017; United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Approaches in national cybercrime legislation and the UNODC 
Cybercrime Repository, undated 1-44, 2 
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/Cybercrime%20Nayelly%20Loya%20(UNODC).pdf
> accessed 1st September 2017 
1401 K. M. Hess, C. H. Orthmann, H. L. Cho, Police Operations: Theory and Practice (6th ed, Boston, 
Cenage Learning 2013) 375 
1402 The Association of Chief Police Officers Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence 2012, 1-43, 7 
<http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2011/201110-cba-digital-evidence-v5.pdf> accessed 2 May 
2014 
1403 Ibid 
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data.1404 All steps which have been taken must be clearly documented through an audit 
trial, so that other persons can verify what has been done. 1405   Responsibility for 
ensuring that the data has not been changed and to document the steps taken must rest 
with the person in charge of conducting the investigation.1406 This would help with 
ensuring that evidence is not declared inadmissible at trial.1407 
Moreover, the Criminal Procedure Law should contain provisions which permit that law 
enforcement agents can preserve stored data on digital devices and can require that it is 
not being changed or destroyed.1408 Courts must also be empowered to order persons or 
organisations to preserve such data without any alteration for a stipulated time period. 
At present, Article 41 of Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 only provides that the court can 
order “the confiscation of devices, programs or means used in the commission of any of 
the crimes.” Hence, no power exists which legally mandates not to alter data.  
 
Traffic data must also be preserved and promptly made available to competent law 
enforcement agencies or individuals responsible for cybercrime investigations.1409 A 
new section which enables the court to make a production order should also be inserted 
in the Criminal Procedure Law.1410 Such a provision would make it possible to order 
those in control or possession of specific computer data, including service providers, to 
make data available to the relevant authorities.  Additionally, the person or organisation 
                                                 
1404 Ibid 
1405 Ibid 
1406 Ibid 
1407 Ibid 
1408 Articles 23-24 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010; also 
see Article 16 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
1409 Also see Article 17 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
1410 Article 26 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010; also see 
Article 18 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
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which receives such an order must be required not to disclose such a request. Hence, a 
type of tipping off offence must be included, so that suspects are not alerted.  
 
New powers must also be conferred on law enforcement agents to conduct electronic 
searches and seizures.1411 Such search and seizure powers must extend to keeping copies 
but without compromising the integrity of the data, as well as removing or making 
inaccessible the data in appropriate cases. However, the search and seizure power is 
only effective if relevant organisations or persons can be ordered to safeguard the data. 
 
It must also be possible to compel telecommunication services and social media 
companies, such as Facebook, to gather and record data and to assist and co-operate 
with law enforcement agents in real-time.1412 Access points must therefore be provided 
and private and confidential agreements must be entered into, so that this is facilitated, 
as also suggested above. Service providers must therefore be statutorily obligated to 
assist with the interception of data.1413 Whilst Etisalat and Du are closely connected to 
the government and there therefore does not exist a pressing need, in the digital age 
important data is also held by many other organisations, especially on mobile devices 
and apps, such as WhatsApp. It is for this reason important to enact a power which can 
be extended to these other operators, so that vital evidence is not being hidden from the 
competent authorities. Law enforcement agencies should discuss with the legislator 
                                                 
1411 Article 27 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010; also see 
Article 19 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
1412 Article 28 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010; also see 
Article 20 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
1413 Article 29 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010; also see 
Article 21 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
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which service providers should provide real-time access, so that interception can take 
place. Clearly, those services which are very popular, such as Facebook, WhatsApp, 
Skype, should be obligated to provide real-time access.  
 
Special rules are also needed when electronic evidence has been obtained through 
surveillance.  
The analysis of the UK evidence rules highlighted that government secrets can be 
protected through the concept of public interest immunity.1414 No such concept exists in 
the UAE and as a result intelligence sources may be disclosed to the defendant during 
criminal court proceedings. In light of the fact that the UAE intends to increase its 
surveillance capability, sensitive information should be similarly protected. A legislative 
procedure should therefore be developed, so that the prosecutor can make an application 
in relevant cases to protect the sources and investigatory techniques of law enforcement 
agencies. Yet judges cannot simply grant such applications, but must carefully assess the 
documents in respect of which confidentiality is sought. This is because non-disclosure 
of evidence contravenes notions of fairness and arguably breaches the right of the 
defendant to have a fair hearing. Hence, it must be in the public interest to grant an order 
which prevents a defendant to see certain documents. In the UK, this is normally granted 
when national security requires this, to safeguard anonymous informers and also for 
covert surveillance operations. 1415  Intercepted communications are also covered by 
                                                 
1414 C. Forsyth, 'Public Interest Immunity: Recent and Future Developments' (1997) 1 Cambridge Law 
Journal, 51-59, 51 
1415 Rogers v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1973) AC 388; D v NSPCC (1978) AC 171 
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public interest immunity.1416 The UAE could adopt the following legal provisions and 
insert them in the Criminal Procedural Law Federal Law No. 35 of 1992: 
 
“(1) The prosecutor must provide the accused with any material, including 
material which weakens the case of the prosecution, except when public 
interest immunity is successfully pleaded by the prosecutor. 
(2) In case, public interest immunity is asserted by the prosecutor, an 
application must be made to the court to determine this. For this purpose, 
the judge must balance the right of the accused to have a fair hearing 
against the public interest, namely to ensure national security, safeguard 
anonymous informers and covert surveillance operations and prevent 
disclosure of intercepted communications, except when the sender or 
receiver of the intercepted communication has expressly consented to the 
interception. 
(3) The prosecutor is barred from making a public interest immunity 
application when this clearly undermines the fairness of the legal 
proceedings. 
(4) The court can order the prosecution to admit a specific fact when this is 
deemed important to guarantee the fairness of the hearing for the accused.” 
 
Nevertheless, the various measures outlined are not enough if cooperation is lacking; 
steps must be taken to strengthen this area as discussed next. 
 
                                                 
1416 S.17 of RIPA 
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6.5 Cooperation 
As cybercrime is borderless, it is crucial that countries cooperate with each other to 
bring perpetrators to justice. The interviewees also emphasised that international and 
regional co-operation is an absolute priority in order to combat cybercrime effectively. 
Article 23 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention also emphasises that co-
operation should take place “to the widest extent possible.” The interviewees suggested 
that the UAE should actively lobby for a UN-based cybercrime treaty. Yet in the 
absence of such a treaty, it is essential that co-operation is established with law 
enforcement agencies from all around the globe. For this purpose, a memorandum of 
understanding could be drawn up which spells out the terms of cooperation, including in 
respect of undertaking joint cybercrime investigations. For instance, Europol has 
increased internet security and cybercrime cooperation through such a memorandum of 
understanding.1417   
 
The UAE could also enter into mutual legal assistance treaties with other countries 
which particularly cover cybercrime offences. Either one of these methods would ensure 
that legal obligations are detailed on how to assist with cybercrime investigations, as 
well as prosecutions. Expertise and assistance could be pledged, as well as information 
disclosure. A special department could be created at the Ministry of Interior, which 
could be in charge of entering into these memoranda of understanding with foreign 
authorities and mutual legal assistance treaties with other countries.  
                                                 
1417 Europol, 'Europol enhances cybercrime and internet security cooperation by signing MOU with 
EURID', 21 December 2016 <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-enhances-
cybercrime-and-internet-security-cooperation-signing-mou-eurid> accessed 1st September 2017 
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In the absence of such memoranda of understanding or mutual legal assistance treaties, 
co-operation should also be promoted through diplomatic channels, as also mentioned 
by the interviewees. Law enforcement agents would submit details, e.g. through the 
Ministry of Interior, to the embassy of the particular state in question from which 
cooperation is sought, so that it is then passed on to the relevant law enforcement 
agencies.1418 Yet this channel is often slow1419 and may therefore not be as effective at 
bringing cyber criminals to justice. This is because a request does not impose an 
international legal duty on the state to which it is made, whereas this is the case with 
mutual legal assistance treaties.1420 However, even mutual legal assistance treaties do 
not ensure that requested evidence is promptly provided.1421In case a foreign country is 
not a party to any multilateral treaty which provides judicial assistance, UAE courts 
could also make more use of letters rogatory i.e. could formally request a foreign court 
to render judicial assistance, e.g. to provide evidence.1422 However, such letters do not 
compel the other country to comply with any request.1423 
 
Another means to heighten cooperation is for the UAE to enter into extradition treaties. 
An extradition treaty creates a legally binding obligation on the state parties to transfer 
an accused who resides in one country to the other. Such an extradition treaty could list 
                                                 
1418 J. D. McClean, International Co-operation in Civil and Criminal Matters (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2002) 16 
1419 Ibid 
1420 S. W. Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal Threats from Cyberspace (Santa Barbara, Greenwood 
Publishing Group 2010) 143 
1421 Ibid 
1422 J. R. Westby, International Guide to Combating Cybercrime (Chicago, ABA Publishing 2003) 45 
1423 Ibid 
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the particular offences in relation to which an accused can be extradited.1424 However, it 
is better for the extradition treaty not to list the offences as cybercrime constantly 
evolves and this risks that cyber criminals escape their punishment because of an 
omission to include a particular offence. Instead, it is better to include a clause which 
makes clear that extradition can be sought so long as both states punish the offence for 
at least one year.1425 Whilst Article 24 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
stipulates in respect of which offences extradition can be sought, it also makes clear that 
they must attract a minimum punishment of at least one year. Equally, Article 31 of the 
Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010 states that the 
offence must result in the “deprivation of freedom for a minimum period of one year or 
a more severe penalty.” 
 
An authority must also be created which is responsible for extradition or procedural 
arrests.1426 
Yet even when there exists an extradition treaty, it may be legally challenging to ensure 
that a suspect is transferred. 1427 All of these different channels which promote 
cooperation should nonetheless be pursued, despite their limitations. Police forces, as 
well as individual investigators should additionally engage in informal cooperation i.e. 
should network with colleagues in other countries.1428  
 
                                                 
1424 Ibid, 46 
1425 R. Broadhurst, P. Grabosky, Cyber-Crime: The Challenge in Asia (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press 2005) 275 
1426 Article 31(7)(a) of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010 
1427 S. W. Brenner, Cybercrime: Criminal Threats from Cyberspace (Santa Barbara, ABC-Clio LLC 2010) 
145 
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Yet co-operation whether through agreements, treaties, formal or informal requests or 
diplomatic channels depends on the country having procedural and substantive laws in 
place. 1429  Whilst the UAE has substantive laws in place, it must also develop the 
requisite procedural laws, as discussed above. Procedural laws must also be enacted in 
order to facilitate international cooperation and mutual assistance. This includes requests 
by foreign states to “obtain the expeditious safeguarding of information stored on an 
information technology located within its territory”1430 and “users tracking information 
related to specific communications”,1431 as well as “to investigate, access, seize, secure 
or disclose the stored information technology information located within the 
territory.”1432It should be statutorily mandated that UAE law enforcement authorities 
furnish information, even without being requested to do so, to another law enforcement 
authorities in circumstances when they consider that this may assist the foreign law 
enforcement authority.1433 Such information should be made available subject to the 
condition that it must be kept confidential or any other specific conditions.  
 
Furthermore, the UAE must develop the capacity so that mutual assistance requests can 
be rapidly and efficiently answered.1434  It must also create the necessary mechanisms to 
facilitate requests on a twenty-four-hour basis every day of the week.1435 Practically, this 
                                                 
1429 S. Schjolberg, The History of Cybercrime: 1976-2014 (Norderstedt, Cybercrime Research Institute 
GmbH 2014) 122 
1430 Article 37 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010 
1431 Article 38 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010 
1432 Article 39 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010 
1433 Article 33 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010; Article 26 
of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
1434 Article 32 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010; S. 
Schjolberg, The History of Cybercrime: 1976-2014 (Norderstedt, Cybercrime Research Institute GmbH 
2014) 122. 
1435 Ibid (Schjolberg) 
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means setting up a Cybercrime Cooperation Department, which is responsible for 
dealing with requests from foreign agencies.1436 Such a department could act as central 
contact point for foreign authorities which seek assistance with cybercrime 
investigations. Such requests should only be refused in cases where it is considered that 
the offence is a political one or where the sovereignty, ordre public, security or any 
other important interest is adversely affected.1437 The requisite technological platform 
must also be created, as well as a streamlined procedure through which requests can be 
made by foreign partners. Expert personnel and resources must be made available to this 
department. 
 
Formal and informal cooperation mechanisms must thus be developed.1438  National 
capacity must be developed i.e. law enforcement agents, the judiciary and prosecutors 
must receive cybercrime training.1439  
 
This chapter has illustrated how the research findings have contributed to knowledge 
creation, through the gathering and analyses of theoretical information and empirical 
evidence.  As a result, the final two chapters of the thesis will address how the research 
objectives have been met and present the recommendations. 
 
 
                                                 
1436 Articles 34 and 43 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences 2010; 
Article 27 of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
1437 Article 27(4)(a)-(b) of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
1438 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Approaches in national cybercrime legislation and the 
UNODC Cybercrime Repository, undated 1-44, 2 
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/Cybercrime%20Nayelly%20Loya%20(UNODC).pdf
> accessed 1st September 2017 
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7. Conclusion 
 
A critical comparison of e-crime legislation in the UK, EU and UAE has uncovered 
many conflicting and often problematic dichotomies incorporating safety in the digital 
realm and mass surveillance, the public and private interest, proactive and reactive 
regulatory measures, privacy and intrusion, protecting civil liberties and infringing upon 
them, to name a few.  This study has shown how these conflicting aspects continue to 
provoke controversy and spark debate amongst lawmakers, academics, politicians, law 
enforcement, human rights groups and the general public.  As extensively depicted in 
the research, all legislation is closely aligned with the political aims and economic 
priorities of a country, region or group, yet this comparative study which incorporates 
the UAE legislative framework that is shaped by Sharia law, has foregrounded some of 
the ways that legislation is driven and circumscribed by dominant cultural, religious and 
social norms and agendas. 
 
The key areas covered in the research were primarily laws regulating cybercrime, 
surveillance, data retention, data protection and privacy in the UK, EU and UAE.  The 
admissibility of electronic evidence and intercepted communications in criminal court 
proceedings and non-disclosure (and the public interest) were an integral part of the 
analysis.  The research was comprised of an empirical element for triangulation of the 
research data, and to contribute to a more textured understanding of the research topic. 
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Five senior experts in the field of cybercrime from the UAE were interviewed, 
representing the judiciary, the police, Interpol, the office of prosecution and the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.  Taken all together, these theoretical and 
empirical resources were utilised to comprehensively assess the existing legislation in 
the UAE and consider ways that it might be improved. 
 
To meet the research aim and objectives key e-crime legislation and other associated 
laws issuing from the UK, EU and UAE were analysed and incorporated:   
The seminal legislation adopted by the UK to deal with cybercrime offences, namely, 
the Computer Misuse Act 1990.  It has proved instrumental in prosecuting perpetrators 
of cybercrime offences due to its very wide scope.  Authorisation and unauthorised acts 
performed on a range of electronic devices with the capacity to store data, as well as 
intent to access data are incorporated in the Act and due to the way in which they are 
loosely defined, it has been effectively used to cover an extensive range of cybercrime 
offences.  The Serious Crime Act 2015, which was constituted as an amendment to the 
1990 Act has been criticised for its ill-defined concepts such as ‘damage to human 
welfare’ which carry sentences of life imprisonment.  
 
The thesis explored the UK surveillance and UK and EU data retention laws.  Laws 
which govern surveillance and data retention underpin an effective legislative 
framework to combat e-crime.  Nevertheless, intrusive surveillance and covert 
investigation techniques in the UK which were based on the EU Data Retention 
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Directive (2006/24/EC) and deemed essential by law enforcement agencies, were found 
to be in breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Court of Human 
Rights.  Owing to this, the UK’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) 
and Terrorism Act 2000 were pivotal in legalising interception, intrusive surveillance, 
data acquisition and decryption.  Moreover, intrusive techniques sanctioned by RIPA 
can and are being used by hundreds of other bodies, authorities and companies.  Many 
find it concerning that they are being monitored and reviewed internally, and not 
independently. 
 
An analysis of the UK Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 in the thesis 
revealed that it was deemed to be controversial for failing to clarify what crimes (with 
the exception of organised crime and terrorism) would necessitate data retention.  This 
was a major oversight since this regulation allowed the retention of data for an 
inordinate amount of time.  It was thought that this regulation could succumb to abuse 
by authoritarian regimes and constitute an erosion of human rights and a violation of the 
privacy rights of citizens.  It was explained in the thesis that the scope and application of 
legislations such as these must be clearly defined and safeguards imposed.  The Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) and the Investigatory Powers 
Act 2016 were adopted in response to the Court of Justice of the European Union ruling 
that the 2009 Data Retention Directive was invalid. 
 
Another important strategy to combat cybercrime is to ensure that steps are taken to 
protect the right to privacy, especially personal data. This makes it more difficult for 
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cyber criminals to utilise this data for criminal purposes. Privacy, data protection and 
network and information security laws are intrinsic to strengthening e-crime legislation. 
The thesis examined the UK and EU privacy and data protection, and network and 
information security laws.  It showed how the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 8 of 
the ECHR were in accord with each other.  They both stipulate that the right to privacy 
shall not be interfered with by a public authority, except in accordance with the law, 
democratic society, national security, public safety and the prevention of disorder or 
crime.  The UK Data Protection Act 1998 and the Directive 96/46/EC protect the rights 
to privacy with regard to the processing of personal data.  Businesses who collect 
personal data must comply with this legislation.  The UK Act has been updated by a 
new Data Protection Bill which was published in the UK in September 2017.  The bill 
aims to overhaul the existing UK data protection to reflect an increasingly digital age 
and economy. The Directive 96/46/EC has also been replaced and updated by the 
General Data Protection Regulation to harmonise and strengthen data protection for 
people in the EU, it will apply from May 2018. 
 
When cyber criminals are being prosecuted, it must also be ensured that digital evidence 
is not declared inadmissible and criminal evidence rules must be in place, including for 
intercept material. Otherwise, cases may be thrown out or the work of law enforcement 
agencies may be undermined. Addressing these matters therefore also forms part of an 
effective legislative strategy to combat cybercrime.  The UK evidence rules on the 
admissibility of digital evidence and intercept material in criminal proceedings were 
analysed in the research.  What constitutes evidence obtained by illegal and unfair 
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means which cannot be relied upon in court?  The answer to this question is chiefly 
determined by the RIPA.  Unauthorised and/or intrusive surveillance is inadmissible if it 
is RIPA evidence.  It is acknowledged that justice and the public interest is a difficult 
balance to achieve or balancing administration of justice against non-disclosure.  The 
issue is disclosure of police work and covert information to organised crime networks. 
 
Turning to the UAE, the thesis critically evaluated the effectiveness of its legislative 
framework to combat e-crime.   Comparatively, the UAE is a newcomer, its first 
cybercrime law, the Federal Law Decree No. 2 of 2006 was enacted nearly two decades 
after the UK.  It was replaced with Federal Legal Decree No. 5 for 2012 and Federal 
Legal Decree Law No. 3 of 2012 was also adopted to establish the National Electronic 
Security Authority. Federal Law No. 2 of 2006 was specifically formulated to combat 
identity theft, internet fraud, hacking and harm caused to the public.  Article 16 
illustrated some of the issues with these UAE laws.  It declares it to be illegal to breach 
family values and principles or to publish anything which invades the privacy of another 
person or their family life.  Yet it does not define ‘family values and principles’ or what 
‘private information’ is deemed to be.  Further, this article renders surveillance of the 
digital realm illegal and did not include a provision for enforcement agencies to 
circumvent it.  In comparison to the proactive methods of RIPA in the UK, the UAE 
does not have a surveillance law and its work in this area is reactive.  Surveillance is 
restricted to monitoring web content which contravenes UAE’s moral and ethical code, 
such as pornography, gambling, illegal drugs and religious hatred.  In contrast to the 
UK, there is also no legislation that covers data retention and very little that seriously 
375 
 
addresses data protection.  The exception concerns situations where there is a data 
protection breach associated with credit information or financial services connected to 
the Dubai International Finance Centre (DIPC). 
 
The successor to No. 2 of 2006 was Federal Law No. 5 of 2012.  It was seen as an 
improvement for delineating more cybercrime violations, removing the need to 
demonstrate intent, dealing with the issue of authorisation and access, and for covering a 
wide range of online websites.  It increased data protection for e-payment services and 
online data.  Additionally, stricter penalties, higher fines, deportation of offending 
foreigners and sentences up to seven years were imposed.  It was found to be more 
comprehensive, but there were still legislative gaps and inefficiencies.  Once again the 
area of privacy has proven problematic.  The increase of privacy violations as detailed in 
the 2012 law potentially voids some of the cybercrime violations and once again 
restricts surveillance by law enforcement agencies.  In comparison, the UK legal 
framework contains clear legal guidance in the interpretation of privacy rights. 
 
In addition, the above UAE laws were analysed in the research through the lens of 
senior and experienced experts in the UAE from the Department of Cybercrime, the 
Fujairah Federal Court of First Instance, the General Directorate of Investigations at 
Dubai Police, the Dubai Public Prosecution and the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authority.  They acknowledged the need for legislation which regulates the processes 
and procedures for e-crime prevention, investigations and prosecutions.  Laws currently 
not covered were identified as those for surveillance, data protection, data retention, 
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decryption requests and law enforcement.  It was felt that legislation needs to keep pace 
with new technology and criminal behaviour, whilst balancing privacy rights with 
security interests so that mass surveillance does not become normalised.  Data transfer 
agreements with other countries on a par with Europol, were viewed as essential in 
combating e-crime. 
 
With respect to research design, the second chapter explained the methodology, namely 
the ontology, epistemology, research philosophy, research design, approach to analysis. 
Reasons were provided why a mixed method research approach - consisting of doctrinal 
legal analysis/the black letter law approach and the comparative method, as well as 
empirical qualitative research - was chosen. Accordingly, it was discussed how the 
positivist approach was supplemented by the interpretative stance in the form of a 
qualitative segment i.e. interviews with different key stakeholders from the UAE. As a 
result of the empirical research, it was necessary to consider how sensitive issues should 
be addressed and how ethics can be maintained. The qualitative interviewing techniques 
which were used were described, as well as the sampling procedure. Moreover, the 
setting of the interviews was outlined, as well as the method of recording and how data 
quality was achieved. Additionally, it was explicated how the data was analysed, as well 
as the approach to publish the qualitative research.  
 
The research also contributed to knowledge creation. The e-crime legislation in the UAE 
was analysed in a comprehensive manner.  Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 concerning 
combating information technology crimes was analysed holistically. Put differently, it 
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was considered that a mere legal analysis of the cybercrime offences is insufficient to 
strengthen e-crime legislation in the UAE. The horizon was widened by making 
recourse to other jurisdictions, namely the UK and the EU. The research provided novel 
insights since UK and EU e-crime laws served as comparators. The evaluation of the 
UK and EU e-crime laws particularly highlighted the importance of shifting towards a 
more proactive policing style facilitated by surveillance and data protection, strong 
privacy and data protection rights, as well as clear procedural criminal procedure laws 
for electronic evidence. New legislative recommendations could be developed based on 
the UK and EU legal frameworks. These were more refined than if only the UAE e-
crime legislation had been analysed. 
 
Hence, a much broader range of aspects which affect the effectiveness of cybercrime 
policing was considered. The question of how to strengthen e-crime legislation in the 
UAE was thus not confined to the narrow legislative toolbox of merely criminalising 
certain acts. An innovative and inclusive research strategy was thus pursued. 
 
Very little research had been conducted to analyse Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 
concerning combating information technology crimes. Moreover, this is the first piece 
of legal research which not only analyses e-crime legislation in the UAE, but which also 
takes into account the views of senior and experienced e-crime experts in the UAE.  The 
question of whether e-crime legislation has been effective was therefore better 
understood. Broader descriptions were obtained which looked at the phenomenon of 
cybercrime and its intricacies. 
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The in-depth doctrinal research was thus supported through the qualitative part of the 
research and information which is different to a theoretical legal analysis. Such an 
approach was also useful since UAE legal cases are not normally published and are only 
occasionally reported in the media.  As the UAE only enacted its first piece of e-crime 
legislation in 2006 there still exists very little research in this area. This research 
therefore contributes to the literature in the UAE and may be a useful reference point for 
academics and practitioners alike.  
 
 
The research has distinct advantages and also some limitations. An in-depth legal 
analysis was conducted as primary e-crime legislation was studied. Legal gaps, 
contradictions, ambiguities and other limitations within the statutory provisions and 
available laws in the UAE were identified. Other issues which impede the effectiveness 
of the e-crime framework were pointed out.  However, one limitation is that the analysis 
of the UAE e-crime laws in chapter four does not refer to as many cases as chapter 
three, the doctrinal analysis of the UK e-crime legislation, as well as EU law. This made 
it difficult to know how the different offences in Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 are being 
interpreted. However, this was not an insurmountable problem since as a judge the 
researcher is aware of the typical judicial approaches employed.  
 
Moreover, the research sample was rich in quality, as senior and experienced UAE 
experts were interviewed. Certainly, it would have been desirable to also interview 
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experts from the UK. Ideally, it may have been also useful to employ a questionnaire 
and to distribute it to a large sample. However, as this is not a social science thesis, such 
a research strategy was not chosen. The underlying reason for this is also that doctrinal 
legal research is rooted in positivism. Laws can be objectively ascertained and 
distributing questionnaires may therefore not have added much additional information. 
 
Another benefit of this research was that the e-crime legislation in the UAE was studied 
against the backdrop of the UK and EU laws, which directly and indirectly combat 
cybercrime. Hence, the Western approach towards combating cybercrime was taken into 
account and these new insights helped with the development of new legislative solutions 
for the UAE. Of course, even more insights would have been gained had recourse been 
made to even more jurisdictions. More improvement suggestions could have been 
generated. Although studying several different jurisdictions would have risked that the 
e-crime laws in respective jurisdictions are not properly investigated.  
 
The fact that the research was limited to the UAE, UK and EU also does not mean that 
the research was not comprehensive. On the contrary, a benefit of this research was that 
a variety of different types of legislation were evaluated and the topic of strengthening 
e-crime legislation was analysed holistically. It is conceded that more emphasis could 
have been placed on each specific definition contained in Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 
had the focus been on scrutinising the cybercrime offences in the UAE. However, such 
an approach was not adopted as it was considered that merely criminalising certain acts 
as cybercrime is insufficient to secure the digital space. Surveillance, data retention, 
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privacy and data protection laws and criminal procedure laws which govern electronic 
evidence were therefore studied. Certainly, each of these topics could fill several books. 
Nevertheless, the clear advantage of such an approach was that it made it possible to 
identify key aspects of different types of legislation which underpin an effective 
legislative e-crime framework. 
 
However, even these topics are not the only tools to fight cybercrime; legislation is only 
one discipline amongst many. Human resource management, forensics and software, 
technology and design development are other areas which can greatly contribute to 
combating cybercrime. Nonetheless, it would have been inappropriate to consider them 
here, as this was explicitly a law-centred, driven and focused research project. 
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8. Recommendations 
 
As set out at the beginning of the thesis, a key aim of the research is to contribute to 
knowledge creation by assisting UAE legislators to strengthen e-crime legislation. By 
drawing together the theoretical and empirical resources of this study, this chapter 
identifies and delineates provisions in order to show where they can be amended, 
revised, supplemented or completely discarded. Additionally, draft provisions are 
proposed therein which can form the backbone of e-crime legislative reform in the UAE. 
If such recommendations are enacted they may assist other countries in the Middle East 
to combat cybercrime more effectively.  
 
1. A preventative and intelligence-led policing model 
a) Fundamentally, the UAE must move towards a more preventative and 
intelligence-led policing model.  
b) A surveillance law must be urgently enacted. Such a law must equip law 
enforcement agents with various powers, particularly to intercept 
communications; conduct intrusive surveillance; require parties to decrypt data; 
use Covert Human Intelligence Sources; conduct directed surveillance and 
acquire communications data; and conduct targeted hacking.  
c) As some of these powers are more intrusive, it should be ensured that only 
certain public bodies can make use of these powers.  
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d) Legal safeguards must also be put in place to prevent abuse of powers. It could 
be required that a warrant is granted or a court order is obtained.  
e) Additionally, an oversight regime should be created and for this purpose a 
commissioner could be appointed with quasi-judicial functions at the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority and a specialised tribunal could be 
set up. 
2. A data retention law to facilitate data access for law enforcement agents 
a) A data retention law must also be enacted, which obligates Etisalat, Du and ISPs 
to retain data and to make it available to law enforcement agents when they 
request this.  
b) A data retention period of one year appears reasonable.  
c) Access should only be granted to authorised persons in cases where certain 
access grounds – i.e. to protect the national security, to promote the economic 
well-being or to combat and investigate serious crime – are made out.  
d) Data retention by the private sector can also provide important clues for 
cybercrime investigations. Law enforcement agents should therefore also be 
empowered to enter into private agreements, so that they have access in real time 
to other data, such as social media posts and WhatsApp messages. Such data 
could then be fed into an intelligence data fusion center.  
e) In the near future, it should be studied how the UAE can create an intelligence 
data fusion center i.e. what model they should adopt to enhance information 
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sharing.1440 As data gathering is at the heart of surveillance and data retention, 
future research must also be conducted about the privacy implications of 
“individual intelligence profiles” which are thereby created.1441  
3. Heightening privacy and data protection 
a) Cyber security can be heightened, especially if data protection legislation was 
adopted throughout the UAE. As the ultimate objective is to combat cybercrime, 
privacy and data protection should be viewed as “two sides of the same coin.”1442  
b) The right to privacy as guaranteed in the constitution should be further 
developed. This is particularly important to facilitate that privacy rights can be 
better balanced against security interests.  
c) Communications service providers should also be required to report breaches 
within 24 hours to the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. This may help 
to avert cybercrime.  
d) A regulatory requirement which mandates that organisations employ “privacy 
enhancing technologies”1443 could also be imposed.  
e) Most importantly, the UAE should consider creating digital identities for its 
citizens and residents, including corporate entities. 1444  New blockchain 
                                                 
1440 W. E. Smith, Developing a Model Fusion Center to Enhance Information Sharing, PhD Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2011, 1-115, 1 
<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a556626.pdf> accessed 3rd September 2017 
1441 T. Mendel, A. Puddephatt, B. Wagner, D. Hawtin, N. Torres, Global Survey on Internet Privacy and 
Freedom of Expression (Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2012) 46 
1442 V. Reding, The EU's Data Protection rules and Cyber Security Strategy: two sides of the same coin, 
European Commission, 2013 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-436_en.htm> accessed 
30 June 2014 
1443 B. Akhgar, B. Brewster, Combatting Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Challenges, Trends and 
Priorities (London, Springer 2016) 286 
1444 World Economic Forum, A Blueprint for Digital Identity, The Role of Financial Institutions in 
Building Digital Identity, World Economic Forum, August 2016, 1-108, 1 
384 
 
technology could be employed, such as the civic secure identity platform, which 
offers individuals and businesses to protect and control their identities. 1445 
Alternatively, the UAE could create a “universal national digital identity scheme 
using blockchain” technology like Estonia has set up.1446 This could help protect 
user’s privacy, whilst at the same time helping to bring down cybercrime, 
especially digital identity crime.1447  
f) Research must therefore be also conducted on how to create digital identity 
systems, including with the help of blockchain technology.1448 Future research 
should also explore what impact such technology has for policing in a 
surveillance age. 
 
4. Improving Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 concerning Combating Information 
Technology Crimes 
a) Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 concerning Combating Information Technology 
Crimes should be further improved.  
b) The concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Article 47 should be expanded.  
                                                                                                                                               
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Blueprint_for_Digital_Identity.pdf> accessed 1st September 
2017; B. Vitaris, Swiss "Crypto Valley" to Create Digital Identities for Its Citizens on the Ethereum 
Blockchain, Bitcoin Magazine 13 July 2017 <https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/swiss-crypto-valley-
create-digital-identities-its-citizens-ethereum-blockchain/> accessed 3rd September 2017 
1445 Civic.com, 2017 <https://www.civic.com/> accessed 1st September 2017 
1446 M. Mainelli, Blockchain will help us prove our identities in a digital world, Harvard Business Review, 
16 March 2017 <https://hbr.org/2017/03/blockchain-will-help-us-prove-our-identities-in-a-digital-world> 
accessed 1st September 2017 
1447 A. Faulkner, How to Use Anonymized Global Digital Identities to Fight Cybercrime, RSA 
Conference, 8 April 2016 <https://www.rsaconference.com/blogs/how-to-use-anonymized-global-digital-
identities-to-fight-cybercrime> accessed 1st September 2017 
1448 M. Mainelli, Blockchain will help us prove our identities in a digital world, Harvard Business Review, 
16 March 2017 <https://hbr.org/2017/03/blockchain-will-help-us-prove-our-identities-in-a-digital-world> 
accessed 1st September 2017 
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c) An additional provision which outlaws attacks on critical infrastructure should 
be inserted.  
d) A provision which specifically criminalises digital IP crime should be added to 
Federal Law No. 5 of 2012. 
e) A notification requirement for businesses and organisations for certain threshold 
cybercrimes may prove useful. It would put pressure on the public and private 
sector to adopt sufficient security measures to combat cybercrime. A notification 
requirement would also help with the development of cybercrime statistics, 
which should include information about the number of prosecutions and 
successful convictions. This is important for studying how effective the e-crime 
legislation has been in bringing criminals to justice.  
 
5. Revision of the Criminal Procedural Law Federal Law No. 35 of 1992 and 
adoption of additional guidelines 
a) The Criminal Procedural Law Federal Law No. 35 of 1992 must be revised.  
b) An additional part should be added for electronic evidence.  
c) The Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention and the Arab Convention on 
Combating Information Technology Offences could serve as base for the 
development of new cybercrime procedures, including powers.  
d) Additionally, the police should develop guidelines for digital evidence, 
computer-based electronic evidence and those who conduct investigations with 
an e-crime element. In this context, research should also be conducted about the 
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best digital investigation processes. 1449  Research must also be continuously 
conducted about cybercrime trends.1450 
6. Enhancing regional and international cooperation 
a) Efforts must be made to enhance international and regional cooperation, 
particularly through the conclusion of extradition treaties and mutual legal 
assistance treaties, but also other channels, including informal ones. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1449 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Approaches in national cybercrime legislation and the 
UNODC Cybercrime Repository, undated 1-44, 2 
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/Cybercrime%20Nayelly%20Loya%20(UNODC).pdf
> accessed 1st September 2017 
1450 Ibid 
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10. Appendices 
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10.1.1 Interview Schedules 
The main interview questions are numbered and follow-up questions/prompts are 
alphabetized. 
 
 
 
 
MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE UAE JUDGE 
 
 
Icebreaker question (Research objective 5) 
1. Could you tell me about your professional career? 
a) How long have you been a judge and dealt with cybercrime? 
b) Does the area of cybercrime pose specific challenges for judges?  
c) If so, which ones? 
d) In general, is it more difficult to be a judge in the area of cybercrime? 
 
2. In your opinion, should more cybercrime offences be adopted than those set out in 
Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on combating cybercrime and Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning 
Combating Information Technology Crimes? UAE cybercrime offences legislation 
(Research objective 5) 
a) If so, what type of cybercrime offences should be adopted? 
b) Do certain cyber criminals escape punishment and if so, why? 
c) Do you think that the existing cybercrime offences are sufficient to prosecute 
cyber criminals which target critical infrastructure? 
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3. Do you think that the issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction is sufficiently addressed by 
the existing cybercrime legislation? UAE cybercrime legislation (Research objective 5) 
a) If not, why not? 
b) Should territorial jurisdiction be extended to close potential gaps in 
jurisdictional reach? 
c) In your opinion, what should be the basis for this, for instance, prescriptive 
jurisdiction in accordance with the nationality principle (i.e. jurisdiction for acts 
committed by nationals irrespective of location) or objective territoriality (i.e. 
jurisdiction for acts committed even outside the jurisdiction but which affect the 
UAE) or both? 
 
4. In your experience, what would you consider to be the greatest problem for judges 
hearing cybercrime cases? UAE cybercrime framework (Research objective 5) 
a) To what extent can that problem be addressed? 
b) Do you think that there are any legislative gaps within the cybercrime 
legislative framework which cause problems? 
c) What problems do these other legislative gaps cause? 
d) How can these be addressed? 
 
5. What is your opinion about surveillance powers in the fight against cybercrime and 
current problems with the law? Surveillance (Research objective 5) 
a) Do you agree that the current legislative framework fails to adequately address 
surveillance powers (i.e. does not spell out the powers for enforcement personnel 
in respect of interception, surveillance, communications data acquisition and 
decryption)?  
b) Do you think that enforcement personnel require more comprehensive and 
invasive powers to collect information? 
c) What do you think about interception of communications and bulk collection 
of communications data? 
d) What is your opinion about data acquisition powers in the fight against 
cybercrime and current problems with the law? 
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e) What steps can be taken to prevent abuse of broad enforcement powers? 
 
6. Should the UAE adopt a law requiring communication service providers to retain 
data? Data retention (Research objective 5) 
a) How long should communication service providers be required to retain data? 
b) What sort of data should be retained? 
 
7. What is your opinion about decryption powers in the fight against cybercrime and 
current problems with the law? Surveillance (Research objective 5) 
a) Do you think the law should ban encryption or require companies to open a 
backdoor for enforcement personnel to easily access encrypted content? 
b) If so, why?  
 
8. Do you think that the UAE should improve its data protection laws? Data protection 
(Research objective 5) 
a) If so, why? 
b) What data protection reform is needed to improve cyber security? 
c) In your opinion, how can a balance be struck between protecting the public 
and using surveillance, interception and data retention, decryption and protecting 
the right to privacy? 
 
9. How can evidence laws be improved in respect of cybercrimes? Evidence rules on the 
admissibility of digital evidence and intercept material in criminal proceedings 
(Research objective 5) 
a) What would you consider to be the greatest problem with the current evidence 
laws in respect of cybercrimes? 
b) What other problems exist? 
c) Is there a problem with considering intercept material not admissible in 
criminal proceedings? 
d) Do you think that evidence rules should be developed for digital evidence and 
intercept material? 
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10. Do you have any other legislative improvement suggestions? 
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MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE UAE PROSECUTORS 
 
 
 Icebreaker question (Research objective 5) 
1. Could you tell me about your professional career? 
a) How long have you been a prosecutor and dealt with cybercrime? 
b) Does the area of cybercrime pose specific challenges for prosecutors?  
c) If so, which ones? 
d) In general, is it more difficult to be a prosecutor in the area of cybercrime? 
 
2. In your opinion, should more cybercrime offences be adopted than those set out in 
Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on combating cybercrime and Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning 
Combating Information Technology Crimes? UAE cybercrime offences legislation 
(Research objective 5) 
a) If so, what other cybercrime offences should be adopted? 
b) Do certain cyber criminals escape prosecution and if so, why? 
c) Do you think that the existing cybercrime offences are sufficient to prosecute 
cyber criminals which target critical infrastructure? 
 
3. Do you think that the issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction is sufficiently addressed by 
the existing cybercrime legislation? UAE cybercrime legislation (Research objective 5) 
a) If not, why not? 
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b) Should jurisdiction be extended to close potential gaps in jurisdictional reach 
when prosecuting individuals who are not located in the UAE? 
c) How should the law address this? 
 
4. In your experience, what would you consider to be the greatest problem for 
prosecutors dealing with cybercrime cases? UAE cybercrime framework (Research 
objective 5) 
a) To what extent can that problem be addressed? 
b) Do you think that there are any other legislative gaps within the cybercrime 
legislative framework which cause problems? 
c) What problems do these other legislative gaps cause? 
d) How can these be addressed? 
 
5. What is your opinion about surveillance powers in the fight against cybercrime and 
current problems with the law? Surveillance (Research objective 5) 
a) Do you agree that the current legislative framework fails to adequately address 
surveillance powers (i.e. does not spell out the powers for enforcement personnel 
in respect of interception, surveillance, communications data acquisition and 
decryption)?  
b) Do you think that enforcement personnel require more comprehensive and 
invasive powers to collect information? 
c) What do you think about interception of communications and bulk collection 
of communications data? 
d) What is your opinion about data acquisition powers in the fight against 
cybercrime and current problems with the law? 
e) What steps can be taken to prevent abuse of broad enforcement powers? 
 
6. Should the UAE adopt a law requiring communication service providers to retain 
data? Data retention (Research objective 5) 
a) How long should communication service providers be required to retain data? 
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b) What sort of data should be retained? 
 
7. What is your opinion about decryption powers in the fight against cybercrime and 
current problems with the law? Surveillance (Research objective 5) 
a) Do you think the law should ban encryption or require companies to open a 
backdoor for enforcement personnel to easily access encrypted content? 
b) If so, why?  
 
8. Do you think that the UAE should improve its data protection laws? Data protection 
(Research objective 5) 
a) If so, why? 
b) What data protection reform is needed to improve cyber security? 
c) In your opinion, how can a balance be struck between protecting the public 
and using surveillance, interception and data retention, decryption and protecting 
the right to privacy? 
 
9. How can evidence laws be improved in respect of cybercrimes? Evidence rules on the 
admissibility of digital evidence and intercept material in criminal proceedings 
(Research objective 5) 
a) What would you consider to be the greatest problem with the current evidence 
laws in respect of prosecuting cyber criminals? 
b) What other problems exist? 
c) Is there a problem with considering intercept material inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings? 
 
10. Do you have any other suggestions on how to improve the prosecution of cyber 
criminals? The UAE’s legislative framework to combat e-crime (Research objective 5) 
a) Do you have any other suggestions to improve the UAE’s legislative 
framework to combat e-crime?  
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1. Could you tell me about your professional career? 
a) How long have you worked for Interpol and dealt with cybercrime? 
b) Does the area of cybercrime pose specific challenges?  
c) If so, which ones?. 
d) In general, is it more difficult to work for Europol in the area of 
cybercrime? 
 
2. On a policy level, what measures are important to strategically combat 
cybercrime? (Research objective 3) 
 
3. In your opinion, what are the key requirements for a successful domestic and 
regional cybercrime strategy (Research objective 3) 
 
4. In your experience, what would you consider to be the greatest problem for 
Europol and national law enforcement agencies when combating cybercrime? 
(Research objective 3) 
a) To what extent can that problem be addressed? 
b) What other operational problems exist? 
c) Are there any preventative related issues? 
d) If so, which ones are there? 
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5. How important are surveillance powers in the fight against cybercrime? 
Surveillance (Research objective 2) 
a) In your opinion, how far-reaching should interception, surveillance, 
communications data acquisition and decryption of data be? 
b) In practice, how does mass surveillance work?  
c) What sort of set up is required for mass surveillance? 
 
6. How essential is data retention by communication service providers? (Research 
objective 2) 
a) What type of data is most important for Europol and law enforcement 
agencies?  
b) In your opinion, how long should data be retained? 
 
7. Do you consider it a good strategy to weaken or ban encryption or in the 
alternative to require that backdoors are created for law enforcement officers?  
(Research objective 2) 
a) Do you prefer a ban on encryption over backdoors for law enforcement 
officers? 
b) Do you think that there are problems with a ban on encryption and/or the 
creation of backdoors? 
c) If so, which ones? 
d) In your opinion, to which extent can these be addressed? 
 
8. How can network and information security be best achieved?  
(Research objective 3) 
 
9. In your opinion, what role does privacy and data protection play in ensuring 
network and information security?  
 
10. How can the right balance be struck in cyberspace between privacy and security. 
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11. Do you have any other suggestions to improve the legislative framework to 
combat e-crime? (Research objective 3) 
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Icebreaker question (Research objective 5) 
1. Could you tell me about your professional career? 
a) How long have you worked as a police officer and dealt with cybercrime? 
b) Does the area of cybercrime pose specific challenges for police officers?  
c) If so, which ones? 
d) In general, is it more difficult to be a police officer in the area of cybercrime? 
 
2. In your opinion, should more cybercrime offences be adopted than those set out in 
Federal Law No.2 of 2006 on combating cybercrime and Law No. 5 of 2012 Concerning 
Combating Information Technology Crimes? UAE cybercrime offences legislation 
(Research objective 5) 
a) If so, what type of cybercrime offences should be adopted? 
b) Do certain cyber criminals escape punishment and if so, why? 
c) Do you think that the existing cybercrime offences are sufficient to prosecute 
cyber criminals which target critical infrastructure? 
 
3. When cybercrime is committed in the UAE by individuals who are located abroad, 
are there are operational issues? 
a) To what extent are these overcome? 
b) In your opinion, how can these problems  be addressed? 
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c) Do you think that jurisdiction should be further extended? 
 
4. In your experience, what would you consider to be the greatest problem for police 
officers combating cybercrime? Network and information security (Research objective ) 
a) To what extent can that problem be addressed? 
b) What other operational problems exist? 
c) Are there any preventative related issues? 
d) If so, which ones are there? 
e) How can these be addressed? 
 
5. What is your opinion about surveillance powers in the fight against cybercrime? 
Surveillance (Research objective 5) 
a) Do you agree that the current legislative framework fails to give police 
officers adequate surveillance powers (i.e. does not spell out the powers for 
enforcement personnel in respect of interception, surveillance, communications 
data acquisition and decryption)?  
b) Do you think that the police require more comprehensive and invasive powers 
to collect information? 
c) What do you think about interception of communications and bulk collection 
of communications data? 
d) How extensive should data collection be i.e. what data should be collected by 
communications service providers? 
e) What role should mass surveillance play in the fight against cybercrime? 
f) In practice, how would mass surveillance work?  
g) What do you think about interception of social networks? 
h) What steps can be taken to prevent abuse of broad policing powers? 
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6. Should the UAE adopt a law requiring communication service providers to retain 
data? Data retention (Research objective 5) 
a) How long should communication service providers be required to retain data? 
b) What sort of data should be retained? 
 
7. What do you think about requiring communication service providers to assist with 
communications interference and interception and to require them to retain the ability to 
decrypt data? Surveillance (Research objective 5) 
a) Do you consider it a good strategy to weaken or ban encryption?   
b) In the alternative, should law enforcement officers be given easy access i.e. by 
requiring that backdoors are created? 
c) If so, why? 
 
8. How can network and information security be best achieved? Data protection and 
network and information security (Research objective 5) 
a) In your opinion, what role should privacy and data protection play in ensuring 
network and information security?  
 
9. Have you encountered problems with current evidence rules on the admissibility of 
digital evidence and intercept material in criminal proceedings laws in respect of 
cybercrimes? Evidence rules on the admissibility of digital evidence and intercept 
material in criminal proceedings (Research objective 5) 
a) Which type of problems did you come across? 
b) In your opinion, how can these be addressed? 
 
10. Do you have any other suggestions, so that the police can combat cybercrime more 
effectively in the UAE? (Research objective 5) 
a) Do you have any other suggestions to improve the UAE’s legislative 
framework to combat e-crime?  
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR EMPLOYEE OF UAE COMPANY 
 
 
Research objective 5 (Icebreaker question) 
1. Could you tell me about your professional career? 
a) How long have you worked in cyber security at your current employer? 
b) Why did you choose this field? 
c) What particular challenges do you face? 
 
2. What problems have you encountered when dealing with cybercrime and security 
related issues at your company? Cyber-crime offences (Research objective 5) 
a) What would you consider to be the greatest problem? 
b) To what extent can that problem be addressed? 
c) Do you think that these challenges are also attributable to legislative gaps 
within the cybercrime offences framework? 
d) If so, what legislative gaps do you think exist? 
e) What problems do these legislative gaps cause? 
 
3. In your opinion, what role should the private sector play in assisting law enforcement 
with surveillance? Surveillance through private sector cooperation (Research objective 
5) 
a) Should the private sector undertake mass surveillance for the government? 
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4. Is encryption important for your company? Encryption and security (Research 
objective 5) 
a) Is it important for enterprise IT security? 
b) Do you consider a ban on encryption would expose your company to security 
risks? 
c) If so, why? 
d) Do you think that creating backdoors for enforcement personnel to access 
encrypted content, including of commercial data, is a good or bad idea?  
e) If so, why? 
 
5. How does your company ensure data protection? Data protection (Research objective  
a) What processes are in place to ensure that personal data is protected?  
b) In your opinion, how can data protection be improved in the UAE? 
c) Do you think that it is a good idea if companies which handle personal data 
had to notify security or data protection breaches to the authorities? 
 
6. From your experience, what steps should the UAE take to improve cyber security and 
to combat cybercrime? Network and information security laws (Research objective 5) 
a) Are different laws needed and if so, what types of laws? 
c) What can the UAE do to create a more stable digital environment for 
businesses operating in the UAE? 
 
7. Do you have any other suggestions to improve the UAE’s legislative framework to 
combat e-crime? UAE’s legislative framework to combat e-crime (Research objective 5)  
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10.1.2 Interview Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
 
24 October 2016 
To Whom It May Concern 
This letter confirms that Mr. Waleid Alantali is a doctoral candidate in the School of 
Law at the University of Middlesex in London (United Kingdom). He is in the process 
of writing his doctoral thesis and he is collecting data for that purpose. The doctoral 
thesis explores Strengthening e-crime legislation in the UAE: Learning lessons from the 
UK and the EU. 
Interviews will be conducted in United Arab Emirates, from October to December 2016. 
He is planning to interview key personnel in government bodies who deal with e-crime 
legislation such as judges, enforcement agencies, the office of prosecution, the secret 
service and companies operating in the UAE. 
The data collected will be anonymised in order to ensure the confidentiality of 
participant's views and information provided. 
The purpose of this letter is to ask for your assistance by agreeing to be a participant in 
this study. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Julia C. Davidson 
Julia Davidson, PhD 
Professor of Criminology 
Co-Director Centre for Abuse & Trauma Studies 
Middlesex University 
The Burroughs, Hendon, 
London NW4 4BT 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
Strengthening e-crime legislation in the UAE: Learning lessons from 
the UK and the EU 
 
Please read the participant information sheet and if you are willing to participate,  
please kindly read the below form and initial it. 
 
 
 
Please Read and Initial the Boxes 
1. I have read the attached participant information sheet about the research and could 
consider the topic. I was able to raise questions and have 
them answered adequately.  
 
2. I have been made aware that participation is voluntary and that I can withdraw my 
consent to participate without having to provide any 
reason and at any time.  
3. I am happy that an audio-record is made of the interview. 
 
4. I give my consent that the researcher can quote what I say,  
so long as it is ensured that I cannot be identified as a result of it.  
 
I agree to take part in the research about strengthening e-crime 
legislation in the UAE: Learning lessons from the UK and the EU. 
Name of research participant in capital letters: 
Date: 
Signature: 
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10.1.3 Example of an Interview Request to a UK Expert  
 
 
From: waleid al antali [mailto:xwaleidx@hotmail.com]  
Sent: 23 July 2017 23:28 
To: Communication 
Subject: PhD research 
  
Dear Sirs, 
  
I am a PhD student at Middlesex University London, whose field of research is how to 
strengthen e-crime legislation. As part of my doctoral research, I intend to interview a 
police officer specialised in the field of cybercrime. I would be most obliged if you can 
point me in the right direction and could inform me whom I could make contact with in 
order to arrange an interview, either in person, by phone or via Skype. In the alternative, 
I could also email the questions and any of them could be answered in writing. 
 
I highly appreciate the assistance with this matter, which is also in the public interest 
since it will contribute to the available knowledge in the field. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
  
Yours faithfully, 
Waleid Alantali  
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10.1.4 Response Received from a UK Expert to an Interview Request  
 
From: NCCU Strategy <nccu.strategy@ncax.gsi.gov.uk> 
Date: July 28, 2017 at 6:06:34 PM GMT+4 
To: "xwaleidx@hotmail.com" <xwaleidx@hotmail.com> 
Cc: NCCU Strategy <nccu.strategy@nca.x.gsi.gov.uk> 
Subject: RE: PhD research 
 
OFFICIAL 
 
 
Dear Waleid, 
  
Many thanks for your enquiry. Unfortunately, we’re not able to help on this occasion, 
but you may find the information on our website helpful for your research. 
  
Best wishes, 
  
Threat Response, NCCU 
  
Threat Response 
National Cybercrime Unit 
National Crime Agency 
www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk 
www.facebook.com/NCA 
Twitter: @NCA_UK 
 
 
